At independence, most African states had two legislative chambers – a lower and upper chamber – in their parliament. African leaders saw that as a colonial legacy and as inefficient, so most states removed the upper chambers. Before 1990, only two states kept these bicameral parliaments: Liberia and Nigeria.
Since then, however, 40% of the 44 sub-Saharan African states that hold regular elections have added a legislative chamber to their parliament. These countries include Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Kenya and Zimbabwe.
The resurgence of African upper houses is puzzling and goes against a worldwide trend. Outside the continent, countries are getting rid of their upper chambers. In fact, the number of two-chamber parliaments globally has fallen by 33% in the last 30 years.
In a recent paper, I investigate the reasons behind the resurgence of bicameralism in Africa. I considered governments’ rationale, which argued that upper chambers would improve the state of democracy. However, quantitative and qualitative data suggests otherwise. These institutional changes often sought to weaken the opposition and amplify the executive branch’s control over the parliament.
The rationale
Having two legislative chambers tends to be seen as good for democracy. Research conducted in the west suggests that it fosters stability and efficiency. The creation of second chambers in western Europe, for instance, helped improve the democratic representation of marginalised social classes, ethnic groups and territories. Also, because most upper houses have veto power, they can serve as a watchdog within the legislature.
As a result, western donors have encouraged African governments to consider adding an additional chamber to their parliaments. In 2019, the Assembly of European Chambers said it was good for democracy. They emphasised bicameral legislatures’ ability to make laws more efficiently, and represent minority groups and territories.
African governments often give the same reasons when introducing a new upper chamber. In Zimbabwe in 2005, president Robert Mugabe and his party argued that the upper house would be a monitoring body, enhancing democracy and the separation of powers. In Kenya, the 2010 senate was designed to support decentralisation efforts. In Côte d’Ivoire in 2016, president Alassane Ouattara said a new legislative chamber would make parliament function better, bolster economic development, and ease territorial and ethnic tensions.
Anecdotal evidence from local newspapers and descriptive statistics cast doubt on such narratives, however. In Cameroon, for instance, civil society actors strongly criticised the new senate in 2013 for its lack of independence, legitimacy and competence.
Read more: Kenya’s courts were under political pressure: how a constitutional reform empowered judges
This anecdotal evidence is in line with the findings of my paper. I found that some African governments have used these upper chambers to undermine the separation of powers and weaken opposition groups. Bicameralism undermines democracy in such countries by preventing the opposition from participating meaningfully in the lawmaking process. It also undermines the separation of powers by giving the executive branch of government more control over parliament.
I don’t suggest that all African upper houses are inherently detrimental to democracy. For instance, South Africa’s National Council of Provinces hasn’t hindered the democratisation process that took place in the 1990s. My research, however, shows the need to be wary of institutional innovations and not assume that all reforms are inherently democratic.
Weakening opposition
My paper explored how power holders have used upper chambers. I first statistically analysed the data of 44 sub-Saharan African states holding regular elections over a 30-year period (1990-2020). This allowed me to check whether a relationship existed between the creation of an upper house and the strength of the opposition.
This statistical model found that when the opposition won seats in the legislature, the likelihood of parliaments becoming bicameral increased by 287%.
I then relied on qualitative evidence to investigate the motives and mechanisms behind the creation of second chambers. To do this, I wrote case studies on Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, using data from newspapers and from government and NGO reports.
Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe illustrate how the electoral vulnerability of ruling parties has led to a resurgence of bicameralism in Africa.
Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe
Fulfilling an electoral promise, Côte d'Ivoire’s president Ouattara created a senate in 2016. Despite his claim about the democratic benefit of bicameralism, Ouattara used the senate to weaken the opposition and solve the crisis his ruling coalition was facing.
After several electoral debacles at the local level, Ouattara’s ruling coalition – composed of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast, Rally for the Republicans and other minor parties – was on the verge of implosion.
Ouattara designed a senate that would allow him to regain control over the coalition and the political scene. He engineered the senate selection process and manipulated the electoral calendar. His coalition obtained nearly 84% of the vote. This allowed Outtara to find positions for coalition members who had lost seats in earlier elections. The senatorial election also gave new purpose to the ruling coalition and appeased tensions.
In Zimbabwe, Mugabe created a senate in 2005 after his party had been defeated several times at the parliamentary level.
Mugabe and his government didn’t use appointed seats like in Côte d’Ivoire. Instead, they manipulated constituency boundaries to gain an electoral advantage in the senatorial vote. The main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, didn’t know how to react and organise for senatorial elections. Part of the opposition party’s leadership called for a boycott of the election, knowing they had little chance of winning. Others wanted to participate.
This disagreement escalated into a conflict that almost led to the opposition party’s collapse. This allowed the ruling party to regain control over the legislative process.
Way forward
The resurgence of African bicameral parliaments shows the importance of being wary when pushing for institutional reform.
Bicameralism doesn’t necessarily improve the state of democracy. In fact, in countries where democracy still struggles to take root, power holders can use upper houses to gain greater control of the legislative branch.
When designing and promoting institutional reform, policymakers, donors and civil society actors should pay close attention to the political aspects of these reforms. They sometimes have the potential to become a roadblock to democracy.
Thalia Gerzso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
