The mantra “as long as it takes” has become the European Union’s rallying cry in support of Ukraine’s resistance against Russia. Initially, some experts predicted that Ukraine would fall within three days – yet nearly three years have passed, and Ukraine is still standing. This prolonged struggle has come at an immense human cost.
It’s clear that the decision to resist was made by the Ukrainian population, and they are grateful to the EU for its support. However, hopes that Ukraine can repel the invaders are fading, and there is no clear end in sight. “As long as it takes” for the EU translates, for Ukrainian ears, to “as many of your lives as we can afford to sacrifice”. Ukrainians are weary, even as they hold the front line, but the west has not communicated a commitment to fully engage in stopping Russian aggression and deterring future threats. Instead, it seems focused on a policy of “de-escalation management”. This only emboldens Russia and its allies.
What is even more concerning is the absence of a coherent strategy for managing Russia. What would the EU do in the event that the war were to magically end tomorrow? Is there a plan in place, or will EU leaders simply offer Russia a reset?
The EU has excelled in rhetoric when it comes to Ukraine but has fallen short in delivering military support. It remains reluctant to draw firm red lines for Russia as a response to attacks on European soil or to adopt a more assertive stance.
The supply of shells to Ukraine is a case in point. The EU pledged to supply 1 million rounds of ammunition by March 2024, but by January, Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, admitted that the bloc would only deliver half of that on time while committing to send 1.1 million shells by the year’s end. To address this shortfall, Czech president Petr Pavel proposed an initiative at the Munich Security Conference in February, aiming to provide 800,000 shells to Ukraine by the year’s end, sourcing ammunition globally instead of solely from EU manufacturers. By August 2024, the EU had sent Ukraine only 650,000 shells out of the promised 1 million.
Various news outlets have reported that the result is a grim picture on the front line, where for every shell fired by Ukraine, Russian forces are firing ten or more.
Additionally, the EU has been reluctant to take decisive action, even in response to Russian attacks on its territory. Recent incidents, such as a narrowly avoided plane crash in Germany attributed to suspected sabotage, reflect a troubling increase in aggressive behaviour from Russian saboteurs. The only response so far has been a relatively weak sanctions framework to be used on those involved in such attacks.
A strategy for the future
The EU must adopt a proactive approach to securing peace in Ukraine, recognising that Russia is currently unwilling to negotiate – but would also never negotiate from a position of weakness.
A clear strategy – including security guarantees for Ukraine, preferably through a pathway to Nato membership – could help put pressure on Russia and facilitate negotiations. It’s clear that bringing Ukraine into Nato might take years, but in the meantime, European countries should consider deploying troops to Ukraine as a security guarantee for this interim period.
As the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, rightly said: “At the beginning of the year, Emmanuel Macron hinted at putting boots on the ground. At the end of the year, North Korea had actually done so. We are still on the back foot, reacting to escalation instead of reversing it. Macron’s ideas should now be revisited – better late than never.”
Security agreements do of course exist between Ukraine and its EU and G7 partners, but not a single country has hinted at a possibility of providing, as a guarantee for peace, such a security guarantee as “troops on the ground”. EU countries must consider this seriously.
And with a view to what happens after the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU needs at least the beginnings of an idea about what its terms would be for re-engaging with Russia. Otherwise it risks enabling Russia to set its own terms.
The situation on the ground is dire. While the west boasts economic strength, it lacks visionary leadership and political will. It should not allow Russia to take the lead and must adopt a clear strategy for Ukraine’s victory. Otherwise, we are heading toward the scenario described by Timothy Garton Ash in his Financial Times article advocating for Ukraine’s accession to Nato:
Consider the alternative. A defeated, divided, demoralized, depopulated Ukraine, pulsating with anger against the West and – as Zelenskyy hinted last week – probably seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Moscow triumphant. The rest of the world concluding that the West is a paper tiger. Xi Jinping encouraged to have a go at Taiwan. Biden and Harris going down in history as the leaders who ‘lost Ukraine’.
One could add: the EU faces disintegration, regressing to its pre-union state. Ursula von der Leyen is remembered as the leader whose “as long as it takes” policy resulted in an epic failure to secure a safer future for Europe and Ukraine. Does the west want to see itself in this way?
Viktoriia Lapa is an Affiliated Scholar at the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development, a research partnership between the School of Law of the University of Bologna and the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy (SAIS Europe).
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
