After President Joe Biden took office, the United States' "Indo-Pacific Strategy" (IPS) --which was officially proposed by former president Donald Trump in November 2017 -- showed a new trend. This recent trajectory includes expanding overseas military bases to deter China's rise at sea, competing against its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure construction, and decoupling China's supply chain in the Indo-Pacific region.
At present, the US military focuses on building a "fire circle" of military deterrence against China around the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean. In the Taiwan Strait, the US military has formulated a draft joint operational plan with Japan for Taiwan's "emergency". More recently, an additional four military bases opened to the US army during US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin's tour of the Philippines this month. It was speculated that these bases are located on Luzon Island near Taiwan and the Palawan Island around the SCS, though the locations were not disclosed by the Philippines or US officials.
In the SCS, the US military has resumed joint military exercises with the Philippines and sped up military cooperation with Vietnam. Starting around late last month, the US Navy and Marine Corps have conducted drills in the SCS amid heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing over the Chinese balloon incident. It is the second time that the US aircraft carrier USS Nimitz has held military exercises in the SCS in this year. In the Indian Ocean, the US military held joint exercises with the Indian and Indonesian navies.
In addition, the US military has consolidated maritime cooperation with the above-mentioned countries through arms sales, military aid and defence agreements. At the same time, allies such as Japan and Australia are also invited by the US to form a free and democratic alliance containing China's rise in the Indo-Pacific region.
However, this containment fence is imperfect. In fact, Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia do not welcome the US in building military bases and facilities against a third country on their territory, nor do they want to be deeply involved in the fierce strategic competition between China and the United States.
Although the Philippine government allows US troops to rotate in its military bases, it refuses to permit a permanent/quasi-permanent American garrison in the country. Ricardo Saludo, the former chairperson of the Philippine Civil Service Commission, even openly criticised President Ferdinand Marcos Jr for recently letting American ships, subs, planes and missiles use AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) bases.
Vietnam has limited its defence cooperation with the US under the "Four No's" principle, ie, "no alliances with foreign powers, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, no allying with one country to counter another, and not using force or threatening to use force in international relations".
Indonesia has not allowed the US military to use its bases until now. As Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, said in his recent interview with The New York Times, "Militarily, access to the Indonesian bases will be an important asset of the US military amid the 'Taiwan war', but it is impossible". Indonesia's neutrality complicates Washington's expanding efforts in Asia to counter China, he added.
When the IPS was first put forward, former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo announced that it would provide US$113 million (3.9 billion baht) for new technologies, energy and infrastructure construction in the Indo-Pacific region. After Mr Biden assumed office, he proposed a grand initiative of "Rebuilding a Better World" -- which emphasises that developed democracies will cooperate in providing support for infrastructure construction in developing countries to cope with the infrastructure financing gap of more than $40 trillion, and promoted its connection with the "Blue Dot Network" -- which is a mechanism to certify infrastructure projects that meet robust international quality standards.
These initiatives are claimed by the US as alternative options to the BRI for Indo-Pacific states, but they have far from materialised. Due to the debt default and a recession warning from the US Treasury Department in early January, it is highly doubtful whether the US can fulfil the promise and finance the much-needed Indo-Pacific infrastructure projects.
The BRI has made remarkable progress even during the pandemic, for instance, more BRI cooperation agreements, and more trade, investment and employment in BRI route states. According to the Chinese Commerce Ministry, up until January 2023, more than 200 cooperation agreements on jointly building the BRI were signed by China and 151 states and 32 international organisations; by the end of 2022, China's cumulative investment in BRI route states was 397.9 billion yuan, creating 421,000 employment positions. Additionally, a number of BRI infrastructure projects have been constructed, mainly including the China-Laos railway, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, and the Budapest-Belgrade railway.
In March last year, Shanghai, one of the main centres of China's supply chain, went into an epidemic lockdown, which undermined China's advanced position in the global supply chain massively. The Western media seized the chance to tout how Vietnam and India would catch up or even replace China in the global supply chain. Late last year, Susan Burns, the new US consul-general in Ho Chi Minh City, said Vietnam had become a critical part of the US supply chain.
Recently, the US and India announced the "Key and Emerging Technologies Initiative", aiming to strengthen military, technology and supply chain cooperation and compete with China in military equipment, semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Before that, the leaders of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the US) announced the "Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative" at the September 2021 summit. This was designed to map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components. So clearly, the United States is accelerating the pace of wooing allies and partners to decouple from China in the supply chain.
Yet, it is not easy to reach these goals. The global supply chain is the result of the long-term independent and autonomic allocation of market resources. Once formed, it is relatively stable and cannot be easily changed by a single country. Even though a country can enhance its position in the global supply chain through industrial subsidies and foreign support, it is still a long, challenging process.
On the other hand, Vietnam and India are at a low position in the global supply chain, focusing on the rough machining of raw materials, processing with supplied materials and OEM. Natural resources and agricultural products still account for a large share of export commodities in these developing countries, and the proportion of manufactured goods is relatively low.
In addition, their poor infrastructure, complicated regulatory procedures, different industry standards and rules, and weak technology innovation capability are the main obstacles for India and Vietnam to take on a big role in the reconstruction of the US supply chain. India and Vietnam will struggle to decouple from China's supply chain, as both depend on the Chinese economy.
Nian Peng is director of the Research Centre for Asian Studies (RCAS), China.
