In his first year in office, US president Joe Biden committed to resetting US-Africa relations based on a doctrine of equal partnership.
He sent his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. The visit was used to outline the administration’s policy outlook towards Africa. It laid the ground for the official US-Africa policy commitment that Blinken launched the following year in South Africa.
Since then, there have been high level engagements between the US and African countries to deepen ties. They included visits by top cabinet members of the administration: vice-president Kamala Harris, secretary of defence Lloyd Austin and treasury secretary Janet Yellen. First lady Jill Biden also came.
Biden hosted a well attended US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC in December 2022. Kenyan president William Ruto paid a state visit to the White House in May.
Yet our view, which is based on years of studying and writing on US and Africa relations, is that the Biden administration has not fulfilled its commitment to resetting US-Africa relations based on an equal partnership. It hasn’t recognised Africa’s growing agency in international affairs.
We argue that there has been a mismatch between the rhetoric and practice of an equal partnership. For example, African leaders or the African Union were not consulted about the agenda of the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit. This was also the case with the US’s Africa strategy.
This reflects the traditional paternalistic relationship of the US with Africa.
Biden is due to visit Angola in December – his only African visit as president. A much more encouraging message of equal partnership would have been delivered if the US-Africa Leaders Summit, for example, had been held at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia. Biden would have then been able to engage with African leaders in the continent early in his term.
A full diary of engagements
There are a number of positive indicators of Biden’s commitment to reset relations with Africa.
August 2022: The first tangible step was through the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. This presented a shift in emphasis from great power politics (vis-a-vis China and Russia in Africa) and Trump’s America First diplomacy, to one of mutual respect and partnership (at least on paper) under Biden.
Priorities included fostering open societies, delivering democratic and security dividends, advancing pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and supporting the climate agenda.
December 2022: The US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC was attended by 49 African leaders, three months after the release of the Africa strategy. The focus was on
strengthening ties with African partners based on principles of mutual respect and shared interests and values.
Biden pledged US$55 billion in investments until 2025 to advance goals that aligned with shared priorities. The US is said to have allocated 80% of said funds.
The US used the summit to formally announce its support for the African Union’s membership of the G20. This was realised when the AU officially joined the G20 as a permanent member in 2023.
November 2023: Biden hosted Angolan president João Lourenço at the White House on an official visit. They discussed cooperation on the economy, security, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture and outer space.
May 2024: Kenyan president William Ruto’s state visit was the first by an African leader in more than 15 years.
September 2024: US ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced US support for Africa getting two permanent seats on the UN security council.
Finally, Biden’s visit to Angola, set for the first week in December would be the first by a US president since 2015.
What’s gone wrong
It’s possible to see serious flaws in the US approach towards Africa set against the expectation of an equal partnership.
Firstly, the US has attempted to undermine African agency through its bid to pressure African countries to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many African countries chose non-alignment.
Secondly, the US championing two seats for Africa on the security council looks commendable on the surface. But the lack of veto power perpetuates power imbalances between Africa and the current permanent security council members – the US, France, the UK, Russia and China.
The question again is how equal the partnership is if Africa will be a junior member of the security council.
Thirdly, there has been a lack of joint agenda setting. African countries have made no input into US-Africa strategy or the US-Africa Leaders Summit.
Failing to consult African leaders, institutions and civil society on the continent’s own priorities reflects the same old practice of imposing priorities on African states. It looks like a continuation of the usual passing off of American national interests as African interests.
Fourthly, there have been challenges in implementing what’s set out in the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. These have included inadequate resource allocation.
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Fifth, the Biden administration has used the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) as diplomatic leverage over African countries. For example, in October 2023 it announced the removal of Uganda, Niger, Gabon and Central African Republic from the beneficiaries. Earlier, the administration removed Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. These countries were removed from Agoa for not complying with US human rights and political demands.
Between February and March 2024, the US Congress also considered the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Bill, which risks South Africa’s exclusion from Agoa because of Pretoria’s position on the Israel/Palestine conflict.
Lastly, the fact that Biden is only visiting Africa in the last days of his presidency suggests Africa is not a priority. The fact that only one African head of state has been afforded a state visit to Washington reinforces this thinking.
If the US is serious about equal partnership, it mustn’t treat Africa as an afterthought. It must always consult African states in shaping policies that affect them and the continent.
Ruth Kasanga, a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Sciences and Research Assistant at the African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria, made contributions to this article.
Samuel Oyewole is affiliated with Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria.
Christopher Isike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
