When he claimed victory in the early hours of November 6, Donald Trump said he was a man of his word. A hallmark of his second term as US president would be “promises made and promises kept”. Whether or not this would include his promise to resolve the conflict in Ukraine “within 24 hours” of taking office in January, he didn’t specify.
On the face of it, that timeline is unrealistic. But a speedy resolution is possible – and all countries with an interest in the conflict are now trying to influence the president-elect to produce an outcome, whether it favours Russia or Ukraine.
There are four basic developments possible and underway in Ukraine.
1. Cold war logic – the ‘Trump plan’
Once it had become clear that Trump had been re-elected, his campaign team outlined a plan that reduces direct US involvement in the conflict – and in European security in general. The proposal calls for an 800-mile demilitarised buffer zone along the frontlines in Ukraine policed by UK and European militaries, with Ukraine to shelve its plan to join Nato for at least 20 years.
The US would provide weaponry to Ukraine to deter further Russian incursions, but would not send troops or finance any western military presence in Ukraine.
During the cold war, eastern European states such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had formed a large buffer zone between the Soviet Union, and Moscow in particular, and Nato countries.
It’s important to note, however, that key members of Trump’s team hold views that are likely to heavily influence the new administration’s approach to the war. Pete Hegseth, Trump’s pick as secretary of defense is noted for his anti-Nato stance while Marco Rubio, who his pick for secretary of state, is likely to want Ukraine to agree a deal with Russia at nearly any price.
Vice-president-elect J.D. Vance, meanwhile, is well known for his statement in 2022 that: “I gotta be honest with you, I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.”
The plan for a buffer zone paid for and maintained by European militaries is typical of Trump’s “America first” doctrine, which places the risk and costs of European security with European states. The plan has been criticised because it effectively recognises Russia’s territorial claims, while undermining Nato unity on the question of the Ukraine’s pre-2014 sovereignty.
2. European support for Ukraine
European leaders, particularly the UK and France, have pledged “unwavering support” for Ukraine. But there are important questions about the sustainability of this support if the US effectively steps back from its contributions to Ukraine and European security.
European defence and security policy has traditionally been heavily reliant on US support. Without the American security guarantee, investment and political capital, Nato is likely to be diminished, which in turn will weaken European cohesion around the Ukrainian question.
Any US withdrawal will place a large and enduring financial burden on Europe if it intends to sustain unwavering support for Ukraine. This will in turn help Putin secure his goal of weakening and dividing the European bloc – something he sees as essential to securing Russian interests.
3. Zelensky’s Offer to Trump
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has made two proposals to Trump designed to appeal to Trump the deal-maker. The first calls for Ukrainian troops to replace some American units in Europe after the war, reducing the cost to the US.
The second would involve opening up some of Ukraine’s resources to the US and other western allies. Zelensky’s offer is obviously premised on a Ukrainian victory in the conflict – which at present is far from certain.
The Ukrainian president finds himself in a very challenging position. There is uncertainty around the Trump administration’s support for Ukraine, which will require considerable management.
Meanwhile, domestic sentiment towards Zelensky and the leadership of the armed forces is starting to become strained. If you couple this with general weariness in Europe abut the costs involved, it could be a pivotal moment in the conflict.
Zelensky is clearly aiming to position Ukraine in Trump’s eyes as a key contributor to European security in the postwar world. His offer appeals to Trump’s oft-expressed preference for the US to play a lesser role in European defence, while European countries do more. But it’s heavily reliant on Ukraine being admitted to Nato, which looks highly uncertain at present.
4. Russia’s military momentum
Meanwhile, Russia is currently winning significant swathes of territory in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s recent seizure of the strategically important city of Vuhledar has cleared the way for Russian advances to press deeper into the country.
It is also reported that Moscow is preparing for an offensive using around 11,000 North Korean and about 40,000 Russians in the Kursk region in Russia, where Ukranian forces are struggling to defend territory they captured during the summer. This will place further pressure on the general Ukrainian defence.
At a crossroads
Putin is now edging closer to the objective he sought when he launched his full-scale invasion in 2022 only to get held up by fierce Ukrainian resistance. The big difference will be in the quality of support Ukraine receives from its western allies.
Trump’s position is certainly not predestined. He is known to be a highly transactional politician, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. So while many commentators assume that Trump is likely to favour Russia, the European powers and Ukraine could come up with a way to appeal to Trump’s instinct for cutting a deal and to be the “big man of history” if he generates a different outcome.
A plan that allows Trump to reduce the US military presence in Europe, while being able to publicly claim that he won the peace could be a win-win for the re-elected president. But wars are messy, and Russian progress in Ukraine is now changing the reality on the ground.
By the time Trump takes office, the situation in Ukraine – and the territorial advantage held by Russian troops – is likely to have changed markedly. So the two months between now Trump’s inauguration on January 20 are a critical time for all concerned.
Robert Dover does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
