Grant Shapps’ appointment comes at a time of the largest war in Europe since 1945, with Britain a key strategic partner for Ukraine as it seeks to kick out the Russian invaders. A central part of the job is public and private diplomacy, with the UK particularly keen to maintain its position as a bridge between Kyiv, always seeking new weapons, and an often cautious White House, already increasingly mindful of the looming 2024 election battle, most likely with Donald Trump.
Once Boris Johnson had been ousted from Downing Street, Kyiv looked to Wallace as an increasingly important figure, with the former defence secretary central in efforts to find a pathway for Ukraine to eventually join Nato and in ensuring long-term military support continues. Shapps will want to keep the long-term door to Nato membership open, but he may give Kyiv candid advice and help it temper its not always realistic lobbying.
Top of Kyiv’s current wishlist are Atacms ground-launched missiles, which have a range of 190 miles (300km) and have still not been released by the US. Shapps may be called upon to try to release them from Washington’s grip. Over the next year there will also likely be pressure for more artillery, tanks and fighter jets, although Wallace was careful to warn Ukraine at the Nato summit in July not always to keep pleading for new arms, but instead sometimes show “a bit of gratitude”.
The new minister also inherits a military badly wanting a government to commit to greater investment in response to the war, and dealing with new threats that have emerged, such as air and missile defence or drones. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of the electricity grid to missile and drone strikes in a conflict, for instance, and the military’s default response will be to try to spend more money.
Defence budgets are largely set, but Shapps will have to decide, in the run-up to an election, whether he wants the prime minister, Rishi Sunak, to commit to a firm timetable lifting defence spending from 2.1% of GDP to 2.5% as some European militaries, most notably Poland, boost their own budgets. Boris Johnson had previously promised to increase spending to 2.5% by 2030 but, mindful of other spending pressures and the military’s long track record of financial waste, Sunak has been vague on timing.
Other threats loom in the background, which can easily be talked up by the security community, but nevertheless have to be dealt with. Chief among these are the issues raised by the rise of China, a subject of near obsession in Washington, where Beijing is seen as the “pacing challenge” to justify extra US military spending.
No change is expected to Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt, and growing military focus on the region, despite its distance from the UK. But the defence secretary has to manage the initial development of strategic Aukus nuclear submarine deal, which will see the US and UK help Australia build its own nuclear-powered attack submarines, based largely on a British design.
Although the Australian submarines, intended as a counter to Beijing’s fast-growing navy, will not sail until from the 2040s, the project is critical to securing jobs at BAE in Barrow-in-Furness and Rolls-Royce in Derby, and needs to be kept on financial and political track in the run-up to the general election.
Shapps will also have to contend with the legacy of Britain’s long interventions in Iraq and in particular Afghanistan, amid allegations of war crimes committed by the SAS in the country in the early part of the last decade. Hearings at a public inquiry into the issue are expected to start in the autumn. While the investigation will take some time, Shapps will have to engage with public fallout from the issue, which some of his predecessors have tried, and failed, to brush under the carpet.
Finally, there is always the unknown or unexpected crisis. Shapps may have to respond calmly and flexibly to incidents in hot spots such as the Middle East or the Gulf, where there may be an attack by Islamists or a threat to commercial or maritime interests. In the first instance, a defence secretary has powers to authorise the use of force – or adopt an alternative response. Like all his predecessors, it will be necessary for him to keep a cool head when faced with an unexpected incident.
