Iran’s ballistic missile attack against Israel yesterday was a significant escalation in the conflict between the two states. And Israel has promised a response, which could include direct strikes on Tehran. However, the most active front in the conflict in the region is still on the Israeli-Lebanese border, with Israeli troops invading southern Lebanon.
Iran’s attack came in the aftermath of Israel’s killing of Hezbollah secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah; Iran’s close connection with Hezbollah means it is deeply invested in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon. At the same time, while Israel is presenting the invasion as a limited and short-term ground operation, it represents a significant escalation of its conflict with Hezbollah, as well as a huge commitment of military resources. The intertwinement of the Lebanese and regional fronts will impact Lebanon’s long-term security – but also Israel’s.
At no point since its inception has Hezbollah been attacked on multiple levels in such a short period of time and with such high losses. In the space of a fortnight, Israel has subjected the group to hybrid warfare, flattened its major military sites and assassinated its top commanders and Nasrallah.
Throughout, Hezbollah has vowed to remain defiant even as its security, communication and military capacity has been severely curtailed. Israel has insisted in its public statements that it is not at war with the people of Lebanon, but with Hezbollah only, yet Israel’s action risks dragging Lebanon towards instability.
Lebanon is already on a knife edge due to sectarian sensitivities. Since its creation as a modern state, the country’s political system has made it vulnerable to such strife. Political representation is based on power sharing among its sects, but instead of creating stability, the system has only fuelled competition for power. Having been through many such cycles of violence in the past, its ruling elite is worried that Nasrallah’s assassination could be a new trigger for conflict. Measured statements about Nasrallah by his Lebanese political opponents following his assassination were an effort to prevent clashes that could take a sectarian nature.
But then came the Israeli ground invasion, which in the short term is rallying the Lebanese people against Israel. This is because an invasion with ground troops is vastly different from even the most intense air campaign. There is something visceral about it. For the Lebanese people, seeing Israel infiltrate their land once again brought with it anger and despair that they had hoped was part of the not-too-distant past, when Israel and Hezbollah fought their last all-out war in 2006.
Through its ground invasion, Israel may be aiming to break Hezbollah’s spirit, but it is actually breaking the Lebanese spirit. Even Hezbollah’s most stubborn opponents in Lebanon reject the idea of being “liberated” from Hezbollah – as Israel claims to be doing – at the hands of an invader. Humiliation and anger among Lebanon’s population do not present an avenue for peace with Israel.
In the medium and long term, there is the risk of history casting a dark shadow. Israel’s previous invasions, especially in 1982 and 2006, drove a wedge between Lebanon’s communities, fuelling sectarian and political tensions. The 1982 invasion added to the woes of Lebanon’s sectarian-based civil war, while Hezbollah used its 2006 success against Israel to claim the political upper hand in Lebanon; in 2008, the group deployed its fighters to Beirut to intimidate its opponents, sparking fears of another civil war. Lebanon’s leaders, who were trying to put out the fires after Nasrallah’s killing, now face the prospect of another wave of civil strife as one million people, most from the southern Shia community, are displaced into areas inhabited by other communities.
Though ordinary people and civil society are stepping up relief efforts, the scale of the humanitarian crisis is unprecedented, while the bankrupt Lebanese state has been largely unable to offer the displaced even basic services. The longer Israel’s military campaign goes on, the greater the potential for sectarian tension to increase as winter looms, resources are depleted and people’s anger and despair grows.
Lebanon also finds itself once again a playground for regional actors. This brings with it another potential cause of instability. As Israel and Iran step up their direct military confrontation, the risk of regional war becomes ever greater. With Iran regarding Hezbollah as the frontline of its own defence, Lebanon may end up fighting for itself and for Iran.
Lebanon has always been intimately affected by regional developments in the Middle East. But with such a complex cocktail of challenges, the country’s stability is severely threatened. Economic hurdles are merging with potential sectarian tensions. National security is intertwined with regional security. And with both Israel and Hezbollah indicating their refusal to back down, more oil is being poured on the fire every day.
Israel may think that crushing Hezbollah militarily is the way to guarantee security for its northern region. But the crisis in Lebanon raises alarms about long-term stability there. Poverty and anger is always a recipe for disaster in any nation. Domestic instability in Lebanon will not bode well for Israel’s national security, especially given that Hezbollah will not disappear even if Israel overwhelms it militarily, and bearing in mind it has consistently used the framework of “resistance” against Israel as one of the tools of asserting power inside Lebanon. If this conflict has shown anything, it’s that domestic and regional security are intertwined.
• Lina Khatib is director of the Soas Middle East Institute and associate fellow at the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House
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