In an important discussion in The Hindu (June 2, 2023), the scholars argued that what distinguishes the south from the north politically is its language of politics, its regional parties and their demand for more power to the States, its multiple languages and cultures, its countercultures built through various anti-caste, anti-Brahmin and rationalist movements, its higher economic status and its investment in education, modern institutions, industrial infrastructure, etc. while the north lagged in most of these aspects.
Linguistic movements
On similar lines, in 1956, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar argued that the north was conservative, superstitious and educationally backward, whereas the south was progressive, rational and educationally forward. He criticised Jawaharlal Nehru for practising Brahminical rituals. He did not spare President Rajendra Prasad for worshipping the Brahmins in Banaras, washing their toes, and drinking that water. Thus, Ambedkar wondered how, under such leadership, the south would tolerate “the rule of the north.” Even today, his observation seems pertinent considering how the north has nurtured hard-liner Hindutva politics, while the south has barred the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from entering its political landscape. Thus, the perplexing question is: what makes the south such a formidable fortress where the BJP has no presence now?
To understand that, we must look at the most important historical factor that distinguishes the two regions: the linguistic nationality movements, which imagined India as a federation of nationalities. While the north imagined India as a homogenous nation that resonates with the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan slogan, the south aspired to build India as a federation of nationalities. The print and publishing culture led to the formation of distinct linguistic public spheres in the south, which were further consolidated by cinema, mainly through the mediation of film stars such as M.G. Ramachandran (Tamil), N.T. Rama Rao (Telugu) and Rajkumar (Kannada). By the early 20th century, different linguistic communities in the south began to claim nationality status for themselves. The leaders were inspired by the political developments in Europe where, in the aftermath of major revolutions, new nations were founded based on linguistic identity with the political objective of achieving ‘popular sovereignty.’
Linguistic identity had proven to be secular, flexible and more inclusive than religious or racial identities, so the then Madras Presidency leaders consciously tried to cultivate it. The middle-class intelligentsia from the south recognised the crucial connection between language and liberal democracy. For a democracy to function, it is essential to employ the language of the common people in the domains of education, administration and judiciary, without which equality and justice cannot be realised. Also, to perform this new role, people’s languages needed to be modernised adequately. However, all these, it was believed, would be possible only when India was created as a federation of nationalities. These languages would perish if India were forced into a single homogenous nation. Even a cursory look at the condition of the languages of the south today makes it clear that such fears are vindicated. As early as 1913, Konda Venkatappayya and Pattabhi Sitaramayya, the leaders of the Andhra Mahasabha, warned the Congress party leadership against creating a unitary India, which, by default, would be based on the Hindu religious identity of the majoritarian population. Later, Puchhalapalli Sundarayya (Telugu), Annadurai and Periyar (Tamil), E.M.S. Namboodiripad (Malayalam), and much later, V.K. Gokak (Kannada) and others spoke and wrote on the importance of creating India as a federation.
The need for a strong bond
The Andhra Mahasabha leaders, in particular, argued that India was not a nation but a subcontinent of multiple nationalities (similar to the European Union), and a unitary India would be unsuitable for democracy, which required the sovereign-citizens to participate in the decision-making processes of the nation-state actively. They argued that no single language could facilitate such a process for the entire subcontinent. Moreover, a strong nation needs strong bonding among its people. But the population of the Indian subcontinent spoke multiple languages, so no single language could bind them all as a national community. The idea that Hindi could keep India together, a fallacy that continues even today, emanates from the gross misunderstanding that it could bind people who do not speak it. We know that the French language could unite the people who spoke it. Or Tamil could unite the people who used it in their everyday life. However, to believe that Hindi could unite people from Kerala and Punjab or West Bengal who do not speak that language is to believe in the impossible.
After independence, the Congress made peace with the south through a compromise formula of agreeing to create linguistic States with limited powers granted by the Constitution. Still, they were far from the nationalities envisaged by the Andhra Mahasabha. The right-wing Hindu groups vehemently opposed the idea of the federation and continue to do so as it would undermine their dream of creating a homogenous Hindu nation. In the end, while the Indian state has triumphed over the nationalities of the south, the ghosts of the latter continue to haunt the champions of the former, at least during elections.
N. Manohar Reddy is an Assistant Professor at the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad
