Late Tuesday evening, the Supreme Court granted Alabama's emergency motion to revise its legislative maps following Callais. The per curiam opinion offers a handy summary of Callais and expressly extends that doctrine to the vote dilution context. The merits analysis stretches one paragraph, but here I want to focus on a single critical sentence:
As to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608–609 (2018).
When I read the Alabama district court's order, I had the same reaction: not following a court's order that was vacated cannot be used to demonstrate a discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court's decision to vacate the district court's order rendered that order null and void, as if it had never existed. The district court cannot then turn around and claim that the failure to follow its non-existent order is proof of animus. I meant to write on this point, but I didn't get a chance. (Thanks Judge Betsy.) Now is a good time.
