Chinese President Xi Jinping waves during the meeting between members of the standing committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th CPC Central Committee
(Picture: Getty Images)The coronation of Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress was both expected and dramatic. It makes him the most powerful leader of Communist China since Mao. He could be there for another 10 years at least.
Does this make him the most powerful world leader? For the moment, let’s pass over the hyperbole and superlatives. The outcome of the Congress marks his extraordinary influence on world events — Russia’s fortunes in the war in Ukraine, security and global co-operation through the UN and its agencies, nuclear proliferation, growing tensions across the Pacific and in Africa, the challenge of climate change.
The chosen direction of his increasingly autocratic rule is ominous. It points to greater isolation both at home and abroad. The Chinese markets took fright, the yuan hit a 14 year low, but Xi appeared unabashed.
The unexpected piece of theatre in the closing stages of the Congress, the dramatic removal of his predecessor Hu Jintao, is an indication of his break with the past. The former leader, now 79, seemed confused as two besuited ushers lifted him from his seat and escorted him out of his seat after his file was removed by a colleague.
Later, an official statement said Hu was ill, which was not reported to domestic media. It emerged later that he had been prevented from reading a statement prepared in his file.
The incident sends a powerful message — that Xi is now concentrating his power on control of the seven-man steering group of the Politburo. His second power base is his control of the Central Military Committee — the undisputed command in chief.
The removal of Hu underlines Xi’s determination to dispense with the legacies of Hu and Deng Shao Ping , and their encouragement to follow a limited free market and enterprise culture. Xi believes, and states, that the state and the Party is dominant. There is no space for free enterprise nor the followers and appointees of the former leaders.
He has appointed his acolyte Li Qiang as prime minister and premier, despite the widespread criticism of his conduct of the month-long Covid lockdown in Shanghai, seen by many as disastrous.
The focus of both Xi and China is on the Party, rather than on government bureaucracy and machinery, and the People’s Liberation Army. The modernisation of the forces is to intensify — with the intention that China should become “the world dominating military power” by 2049.
For this reason, and because of the setbacks of Russian forces in Ukraine, China’s troops are unlikely to stage a strike on Taiwan soon. Xi has repeated with the 20th Congress that the Taiwan issue will be resolved and “by force if necessary.”
Seasoned Beijing observers noted this Congress omitted previous key phrases offering diplomatic engagement.
The 20th Congress just ended marks the end of the opening from the US that began with the “Mr Nixon Goes to China” visit planned by Henry Kissinger. It also marks the end to the subtle initiative of Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, ambassador to Beijing and academic Sinologist. He said relations with China should be a competition, tempered by constructive engagement and co-operation on common interests from health to climate change.
In adopting an increasingly Leninist approach to his personal power, based on the terror and threat of authority, and increased isolation, Xi has put himself at disadvantage in competition and rivalry with the US, Europe and India especially. Washington aims at restricting China’s access to western electronic chips and semi-conductors, and this makes overtaking the US and its Nato allies unlikely in the short run.
Xi also seems, like many western strategists, planners and thinkers, to be prepared for the variable and accelerated rate of change, especially in the rapid switches and refusals of climate and environmental change now hitting China itself very hard.
With worsening security in Europe and the North Atlantic, we are fixated on East-West tensions. More critical, however, is likely to be the North-South axis of upheaval, in which China’s rival is India.
Xi and the 20th Congress have served notice that China is pivotal, mighty and very likely to be decisive in the crisis around Ukraine. Beijing needs persuading that to be a durable world power, engagement is more durable than confrontation.
