The alliance between Britain and the US, resting on deep foundations of shared history and strategic interest, is not overly affected by the personal relationship between a prime minister and a president.
Sometimes individual affinity is consequential, as when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were aligned over cold war doctrine, or when Tony Blair put Britain in lockstep with George W Bush for the march to war in Iraq. But there is no prospect of Rishi Sunak forming such a partnership – for good or ill – with Joe Biden at this week’s Washington summit.
Viewed from the White House, the prime minister cuts an insubstantial figure – the caretaker leader of a country that has lost its way. That doesn’t jeopardise the underlying relationship. Britain is a highly valued US ally, most notably in the fields of defence, security and intelligence. On trade and economics, Mr Sunak’s position is less comfortable. The prime minister is a poor match with a president who thinks Brexit was an epic blunder and whose flagship policy is a rebuttal of the sacred doctrines of the Conservative party.
Mr Biden is committed to shoring up American primacy by means of massive state support for green technology, tax breaks for foreign investment and reconfiguring supply chains with a focus on national security. Mr Sunak’s instincts are more laissez-faire, and his orthodox conservative budgets preclude interventionist statecraft.
The two men disagree on a fundamental judgment about the future direction of the global economy, but only one of them has a hand on the steering wheel. Mr Sunak looks more like a passenger, or a pedestrian, since Britain bailed out of the EU – the vehicle that allows European countries to aggregate mid-range economic heft into continental power.
London lost clout in the world by surrendering its seat in Brussels, but that fact is hard for Brexit ideologues to process. Their worldview is constructed around the proposition that EU membership depleted national sovereignty and that leaving the bloc would open more lucrative trade routes. Top of the wishlist was a deal with Washington, and Mr Biden has said that won’t happen. Even if it did, the terms would be disadvantageous to Britain as the supplicant junior partner.
If Mr Sunak grasps that weakness, he dare not voice it. Instead, Downing Street emits vague noises about Britain’s leading role in AI regulation. But, in governing uses of new technology, Brussels matters more to Washington. London is not irrelevant, but British reach is reduced when ministers are excluded from the rooms where their French, German and other continental counterparts develop policy.
Those are the relationships that Mr Sunak must cultivate with urgency. But his view of Europe is circumscribed by Brexit ideology and parochial campaign issues. His meetings with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, have been dominated by the domestic political obsession with small-boat migration across the Channel. The prime minister has no discernible relationship with the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz. He has not visited Berlin.
Negotiating the Windsor framework to stabilise Northern Ireland’s status in post-Brexit trade was a vital step in repairing damage done by Boris Johnson and Liz Truss to UK relations with the EU. But there is still a gaping European hole in Britain’s foreign policy. It is visible all the way across the Atlantic, even if the prime minister refuses to see it.
