Four years ago, Emmanuel Macron remarked that the era of European naivety on China was over. As Andrew Small establishes in his book The Rupture, the shift was not born primarily of US pressure to pick sides – though that was unquestionably felt – but of Europe’s own dealings with Beijing. Views have hardened further thanks to China’s increasing forcefulness in foreign policy, its handling of Covid and its support for Russia over Ukraine. Last month, the EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, urged a “de-risking” of relations with China. The French president’s insistence on including her in his trip to Beijing last week sent a welcome message of unity.
But it was his remarks to journalists on the way home that seized attention. Observing – in the context of Taiwan – that Europe should not be a “vassal” to the US or get caught up in crises that “are not our own” undermined support for a democracy and sparked anger across European capitals. The German parliamentarian Norbert Röttgen attacked “a PR coup for Xi [Jinping] and a foreign policy disaster for Europe”.
Of course, European and US foreign policy are not, and should not be, synonymous. Nor will Beijing be surprised to learn that Taiwan is lower on the European than the American agenda. But spelling these things out so bluntly as he returned from Beijing, and while China was conducting military drills around Taiwan, was a blunder. German officials have portrayed this week’s trip to Beijing by the foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, as damage limitation. She warned that escalation in the Taiwan Strait would be a “horror scenario for the whole world”. The EU is also pushing back. Even in purely economic terms, the chip industry and trade flowing through the state mean Europe cannot be indifferent to Taiwan’s future.
European interests and approaches can differ without contradicting each other. All agree that deterring China from supplying arms to Russia is a priority. Ms Von der Leyen has stressed that support for Moscow could be a breakpoint in relations; Mr Macron sought to hold out a carrot, suggesting that Beijing could still gain from engagement. French business interests were a key driver, but the approach was not inherently wrong or foolish, even if he greatly overestimated his persuasive powers.
While some suspect that France is striking off alone, others think Mr Macron was busking it and failed to think through the impact of his words. (Intriguingly, a French naval frigate appears to have sailed through the Strait during China’s drills.) His desire for European strategic autonomy is bolstered by fears of Donald Trump’s return and concern at the resurgence of Atlanticism. But his remarks were both poorly judged and poorly timed, given Europe’s increased reliance on the US for security and Republican resentment of that shift. The Republican senator Marco Rubio quickly suggested that if the French president spoke for the continent, then the US should consider focusing on containing China and leave Europe to handle the war in Ukraine.
Chinese state media too have seized upon Mr Macron’s loose words. Yet their triumphalism may prove short-lived. Relations with Europe continue to deteriorate. Beijing has squandered the considerable efforts it invested in central and eastern Europe, not merely through “wolf warrior” diplomacy but, critically, by tying itself so closely to Moscow. The underlying economic, democratic and security imperatives appear clearer than ever. Acting in unity will be essential.
