The shock at the storming of Brazil’s democratic institutions by violent supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro, seemingly seeking to overthrow his elected successor, has not worn off. It is, if anything, deepening as the days pass. It is felt most profoundly, of course, in Brazil itself. But it should resonate much more widely.
The wreckage left by the mob as they tore through the presidential palace, national congress and supreme court on 8 January testifies to their orgy of violence. But the deeper fear is about the extent to which rioters were enabled or abetted by powerful vested interests and even parts of the state. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has said he suspected that members of the presidential staff facilitated the insurrectionists’ entry. Who laid on buses for crowds to travel to the capital? How were the Bolsonaristas able to camp on army land around the capital for weeks? Given intelligence warnings, why were the buildings not better protected? The former justice minister Anderson Torres, Brasília’s security chief when the attacks happened, has been arrested in connection with the events. The supreme court is to investigate the role of Mr Bolsonaro himself in its inquiry.
Mr Bolsonaro, currently in the US, has denied involvement and said the attacks “crossed the line”. Yet a violent uprising by his supporters, perhaps backed by elements of the security forces, had been anticipated since the storming of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. Mr Bolsonaro said that if his doubts about the voting system were not addressed, Brazil could have worse problems than the US. Like Mr Trump, the far-right leader repeatedly fostered suspicion about the validity of any future defeat, and then challenged the results when it happened. There has been close and sustained contact between the US and Brazilian far right, and the Trump and Bolsonaro families in particular. In a country run as a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985, the threat of at least parts of the armed forces joining an insurrection has felt very real. Bolsonaristas beseeched the troops for a coup.
The moment of greatest peril had appeared to pass with the inauguration. There will be much greater vigilance from now on. Though the president insists that this will not distract him from his agenda, security must take precedence; he cannot transform his country if he is not in power. Backing away from the profound social, economic and environmental changes that the country so sorely needs would be a mistake, and might not temper opposition. It is clear that many, if not most, of Mr Bolsonaro’s grassroots supporters wrongly but truly believe the election was stolen, even if others ranged against the new government might act more rationally. Politicians across the spectrum have rallied to condemn the insurrectionists, and a poll suggests that more than three-quarters of Brazilians disagreed with their actions. The optimistic view is that the crisis has boosted Lula’s legitimacy. But in the US, Republican politicians who initially denounced the Capitol attack soon fell silent or minimised what had happened. And nearly one in five Brazilians say they back the rioters.
The Trumpian playbook is in use far beyond the US. Messages from the top fuel violence beneath, social media and messaging apps ease organisation and rapidly spread disinformation, and movements take their cues from those in other countries. Even if Brazil can constrain these forces, the threat does not end there.
