One strategic shift and two tactical realignments. These were the driving forces of geopolitics in West Asia in recent years, until October 7. All were interrelated. The United States, the reigning superpower of the region since the end of the Second World War, had begun shifting its strategic focus to more conventional rivals such as Russia and China. But, to maintain its hold over and interests in the region, what the U.S. sought to do was to bring two of the pillars of its regional policy, Israel and the Gulf Arabs, closer. The Abraham Accords were a result of this policy, which was rolled out by the Donald Trump administration and embraced by the U.S. President, Joe Biden. A common Jewish-Arab front in a relatively peaceful West Asia would allow the U.S. to free up resources from the region which it could use elsewhere.
On the other side, the U.S.’s deprioritisation of West Asia led Gulf Arabs to make their own tactical changes in foreign policy for a more predictable and stable relationship in the region. This opened an opportunity for China, which has good ties with countries across the Gulf, to play the role of a peacemaker. The result was the Iran-Saudi reconciliation agreement. The U.S.’s response to the Saudi-Iran détente was to double down on the Abraham Accords. The Biden administration invested itself in talks between the Saudis and the Israelis. It was so confident about prospects of a deal that it unveiled the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) proposal earlier this year, which hinged on Arab-Israel peace, and sold it as an alternative to China’s outreach into the region. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.
