In domestic political terms, the foreign policy of the Biden administration has proved almost unimaginably successful – for Donald Trump, whom it enabled to run for president as the representative, however mendaciously so, of foreign policy restraint. A deep and searching debate on the Democratic party’s approach to foreign affairs is now essential.
Since the second world war there has only rarely been a significant difference between the Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy. The most significant divergence around the time of the backlash against the Vietnam war (initiated by a Democratic administration) and Watergate. This, however, lasted barely a decade.
After the end of the cold war, Democrats wholeheartedly adopted the “Wolfowitz Doctrine”, whereby the US should aim to be a hegemon not just in the world as a whole, but in every region of the world: in effect, an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the entire planet. Barack Obama tried, to a limited extent, to push back against this, but was largely frustrated by the US foreign and security establishment – the so-called “Blob”.
Can the Democrats break free from the hold of the Blob? If they were guided by US public opinion, it should be easy for them to do so. According to a recent poll, only 56% of Americans think that the US should play an active role in world affairs – among the lowest level recorded since the end of the Vietnam war. Only a third of Americans overall, and only a minority of Democrats, believe that spreading human rights and defending other nations are important goals. Large majorities in both parties prioritise domestic spending over foreign commitments.
And indeed, responding to this public mood, Biden ran in 2020 on the slogan “A foreign policy for the middle class”. Very soon, this joined George Bush’s promise in 2000 to pursue a more modest and restrained foreign policy in the dustbin of history, and Biden was quoting Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton’s secretary of state, about America being “the indispensable nation”.
Three overarching principles need to shape a new Democratic party approach. First, US policy needs to prioritise common threats to humanity, climate change first among them and international cooperation to address these threats. Second, to achieve such cooperation, the US needs to abandon its messianic strategy of spreading “democracy” through US power, which has become in practice little more than a means of trying to undermine rival states.
Instead, it should return to relying on the force of US democratic example – if that example can in fact be renewed. There is after all a certain contradiction in Democrats calling the new US president a fascistic would-be dictator elected by a majority of illiterate bigots, and telling the rest of the world to adopt the US system.
Third, the US needs to pull back from the pursuit of domination in every region of the world and instead adopt a limited and realistic strategy of defending America’s position on the world stage as a whole. In Europe, this means accepting a peace deal with Russia (if Trump can achieve one), abandoning Nato expansion and shifting the chief responsibility for European security on to the Europeans, with the US military functioning only as an ultimate backstop.
In the far east, this involves drawing a lesson from the defeat of Russia’s Black Sea fleet by land-based missiles and drones and recognizing that the US navy will soon be incapable of defeating China close to China’s shores – though on the other hand it remains entirely capable of maintaining US dominance of the world’s oceans. This means that the US will need to share power with China and commit itself to the reunion of China and Taiwan, albeit only at some distant point in future.
Finally, there is Israel and the Middle East. A progressive party seeking votes from the young cannot succeed without at least some measure of idealism. The sight of a Democratic administration supporting mass murder and ethnic cleansing abroad, while clubbing, arresting and expelling US students protesting against these crimes, will not persuade idealistic young Americans to vote Democratic. What it will do and has done is to persuade even more of them to do what many were doing already: to stay at home, in a mood of nauseated contempt for the entire US political system. The very least the Democratic party should do is to return to the policies of previous US administrations in setting limits to Israeli aggression.
Such changes in their approach to the world would be extremely painful and difficult for the Democrats, but the deepening crisis of the western democracies demands radical new thinking. And if an electoral defeat this shattering does not lead Democrats to rethink some of their basic policies, then nothing will.
Anatol Lieven is director of the Eurasia programme at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and author of Climate Change and the Nation State: The Realist Case
