What do we do when somebody — anybody — proposes an idea that would appear to be heresy and a threat to some established order or narrative?
We do pretty much what we always do. We seek to isolate and “other” an individual holding a different opinion — as an example, just take the study of former prime minister Paul Keating’s criticism of the AUKUS submarine deal.
Keating’s perspective on AUKUS has been covered ad nauseam over the past week, and a range of people in the media, politics and policy have sought to isolate Keating and paint his perspective as outdated.
This “othering” of a former prime minister by those in power, who have stated that his opinion belongs to some Jurassic era, is an opportunity for reflection on how we as a society question opinions held by anybody in a democracy.
It should be said that Keating is no shrinking violet — he has the hide of a rhino and needs no defending. But the treatment he has received at the hands of his critics prompts a consideration of the Western philosophy on liberty, particularly where expression and evaluation of opinion are concerned.
Let’s go back to the 19th century and consider John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which he contemplated the freedom of expression and opinion and the way in which alternative views and ideas ought to be considered.
The methods used in an attempt to smother and deflect Keating’s views on AUKUS, for example, would certainly fall within the scope of Mill’s treatise: he took a particularly dim view of the phenomenon of silencing those deemed as guilty of articulating inconvenient thoughts.
“If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind,” Mill argued.
The libertarian goes even further to state that the “peculiar evil silencing the expression of an opinion” is that it robs the current and future society of a perspective that could be valuable if it is articulated.
“If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error,” Mill explained.
Just reflect for a moment on that last paragraph. A person or group of people might change their opinion if an opinion is deemed true. Alternatively, it could result in people confirming their view if a differing opinion is found to be crap.
Mill poses a stark question to his readers that is still relevant: how sure are those people who seek to suppress other views that they are absolutely right? How are such people certain in their thinking if they have not allowed a view to be properly tested against their perspective in the first place?
“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still,” Mill said.
But what happens when a silenced or suppressed opinion has only a portion of truth within it? Mill’s response is instructive.
“[Though] the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied,” Mill opined.
What do we learn from this in the AUKUS context? Keating attracted attention because his view was outside of the accepted orthodoxy about the alliances with the United Kingdom and the United States. The view of Keating — a senior political figure in this country for many years — was clearly inconvenient to the “prevailing opinion”.
His outsider status and remoteness from official decision-making roles made it easier for some people in political and media circles to characterise his view as being archaic, one based on an assessment of China frozen in the 1990s.
But Keating offered a difference in perspective that allowed an evaluation of the AUKUS deal that would not have been possible otherwise.
It is irrelevant whether an observer agrees or disagrees with Keating on AUKUS, or even — as Mill argued — if Keating is deemed wrong on one or more aspects of his analysis. Australians are served best when there is a proper contest of ideas, as opposed to a silencing of those views that represent a diversion from a desired consensus.
The true mischief in an open democracy is where an alternative perspective such as Keating’s does not get aired because somebody in a powerful position somewhere sees that as a threat to their control of a discourse.
Ask yourself every so often: how the heck do you know what is right if you don’t have other views against which to assess your own?
Does Australia welcome dissent or disagreement, or do we shut down discussion? Let us know your thoughts by writing to letters@crikey.com.au. Please include your full name to be considered for publication. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity.
