This week, Keir Starmer will reportedly visit China. This will be the first trip of this kind by a British prime minister since Theresa May’s three-day visit to Beijing in 2018. Since then, relations between London and Beijing have become increasingly fraught, caught between growing security concerns and deep economic interdependence. Allegations of espionage and influence operations have sharpened political and public suspicion in the UK, even as deep trade links and supply chains on which the country depends make disengagement unrealistic. As fierce debate about the recent approval for the new Chinese embassy has shown, there are strong opinions about how to best manage relations with Beijing – as well as what, precisely, constitutes a threat and what is an opportunity. The result is an uneasy balancing act in which caution and cooperation coexist, often uncomfortably.
These security concerns are grounded in recent experience. In December, the Foreign Office disclosed it had been the target of a sustained cyber-attack two months earlier that was suspected to be the work of a Chinese group known as Storm 1849. This followed investigations into alleged espionage involving parliamentary researchers and repeated warnings from security agencies about technology transfer and data exposure in sensitive industries.
Starmer will surely need a stiff drink on the plane to Beijing as he works through what cards he has to play. For all the current mood of malaise and low confidence, the UK is still a key part of the global geopolitical architecture. As a permanent member of the UN security council, a state with nuclear capability and a G7 country (even if at the bottom with regards to total investment), it retains significant clout.
China, however, also arrives at the table with formidable leverage: it is the world’s second-largest economy and a central hub in global manufacturing and supply chains, giving it weight on issues ranging from the climate crisis to financial stability, and making cooperation with it unavoidable. Moreover, Beijing’s aims are clear: securing a more predictable and less adversarial posture from the UK and Europe, limiting criticism of its internal and regional policies, maintaining access to British financial markets and deepening cooperation in education, research, green technology and investment.
For the past 30 years or so, China has worked systematically to build its own networks around the world by investing heavily in infrastructure, energy and transport, often in places where western capital has been reluctant to go. In Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, China has paired finance with diplomacy, trade and development assistance, presenting itself as a partner focused on growth rather than governance or political reform. Over time, this has translated into influence: access to markets and resources, diplomatic support in international forums and a stronger voice across much of the global south. History does not always count for much, but it counts for something if you can create a narrative that explains the benefits of cooperation and how to build for the future.
That is at heart of what Starmer needs to be thinking about when he touches down in Beijing. What do China and the UK have in common, and what are the areas where we can, or cannot, collaborate? Perhaps most importantly, how does the UK sees its place in a changing world: as a gateway to Europe, a sop to the US or a country that is in decline and “decaying” (as Donald Trump has called Europe as a whole)?
The belief that the west is volatile, unreliable and imperialistic is one reason that China has worked hard to embed itself in global supply chains, while reducing its own dependencies on others at the same time. It has done so by targeting strategic sectors: ports and railways, energy, mining, telecommunications and manufacturing, using state-backed finance to place Chinese companies at key points in trade and logistics. This has expanded its access to markets and resources abroad while strengthening its ability to insulate itself from external pressure at home.
While the UK has long agonised over its own energy strategy – and paid the price for being dependent on global markets – China set about solving the problem of relying on oil and gas from the Middle East and elsewhere by fostering a cradle-to-grave ecosystem that has created a near monopoly on photovoltaic cells, wind turbines and batteries. Clean energy is good for the environment, of course. But the incentives to dominate these technologies were also underpinned by the desire to ensure self-sufficiency in an age that Beijing considered to be one of rising geopolitical turbulence long before Trump’s first election.
With similar steps taken across a host of other sectors, including rare earths, biotechnology, data analytics and artificial intelligence, China’s emphasis on open-source models has helped accelerate adoption and diffusion at scale, strengthening its position globally. For countries such as Britain, this matters because Chinese companies now sit deep inside supply chains that underpin everything from energy transition and manufacturing to consumer goods and digital infrastructure. All this, then, means that others need China more than China needs others.
That much is clear from the most recent trade data. It shows that this year, China is on course to record a trade surplus of $1.19tn. This is in spite of Trump’s attempts to throttle Beijing by imposing tariffs as well as restrictions on the export of a slew of products. These have been sidestepped by shipping through countries such as Mexico and Vietnam, or by dumping cheap goods in other markets, including those in Europe.
For Britain, the implication is stark: reliance on China directly constrains policy choices. Decisions on security, human rights or technology are weighed not only on their merits, but against the risk of disrupted trade, higher costs for consumers and businesses, and retaliation against key sectors. Like the US under Trump, Beijing is willing to use coercive tools to settle scores: it imposed tariffs of up to 42.7% on the EU dairy industry just before Christmas in response to Europe protecting its car industry at the expense of Chinese manufacturers.
This all makes China a formidable competitor and means that Starmer needs real clarity of vision to work out what he wants from China and what he can offer in return. That is complicated by an age in which the UK’s national security is at its most vulnerable since the end of the second world war.
How Starmer navigates the opportunities and challenges of this visit will not define his premiership. But it is part of the wider question of what precisely the prime minister’s vision is for the UK at a time of change. Many are still waiting to see what that is. The Beijing trip offers the chance to articulate it.
Peter Frankopan is professor of global history at the University of Oxford. His most recent book is The Earth Transformed: an Untold History.
