At 10 pages, this second draft of the Cop27 cover text is just half the length of the previous version, which will come as a relief to negotiators. Many of the ramblings and repetitions of the previous version have been removed or tidied up, but some key points have been weakened or left out.
There is still a commitment to phase down coal power, but the wider commitment to a phase down of all fossil fuels sought by India and others has been taken out.
On the 1.5C temperature limit, many countries were hoping for much stronger language that would reflect the advances made at Cop26 in Glasgow last year to “keep 1.5C alive”.
And on loss and damage – the vexed issue of how to provide financial assistance to poor countries suffering the worst ravages of climate breakdown – there is little of substance because countries are still fiercely debating the possibility of a new fund, proposed by the EU in the early hours of Friday.
This text has a long way to go, and while the tightening that has been done by the Egyptian hosts is welcome, the lack of substantial commitments and forthright language in some key areas will disappoint many.
Draft decisions 1/CP.27 and 1/CMA.4
COP:
The Conference of the Parties, Recalling decisions 1/CP.19, 1/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 1/CP.22, 1/CP.23, 1/CP.24, 1/CP.25 and 1/CP.26,
Noting decision -/CMA.4,
CMA:
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Recalling Article 2 of the Paris Agreement,
Also recalling decisions 3/CMA.1, 4/CMA.1 and 1/CMA.2, Noting decision -/CP.27,
Reaffirming our commitment to collective global response to climate change based on latest science and agreed principles, in line with article 2 of the Paris Agreement, recognizing the threat posed by climate change, acknowledging that such threat calls for the widest possible international cooperation in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication and through just transition pathways,
Acknowledging the global challenges the international community is facing due to overlapping crises of food, energy, cascading risks, geopolitical, financial, debt and economic challenges, compounded and coupled by more frequent and intense climate impacts, all having negative impacts in particular on developing countries,
Recalling Article 2 of the Paris Agreement that stipulates that the Paris Agreement enhances the implementation of the Convention,
Also recalling Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, that stipulates that the implementation of the Paris Agreement will reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is a key phrase. It refers to the fact that the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions from most developing countries are far smaller than those from the developed world.
Reaffirming the outcomes of all previous COPs/CMAs/CMPs including most recently the Glasgow Climate Pact (Decision 1/CP.26, 1/CMP.17 and 1/CMA.3),
Emphasizing the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking,
Noting the importance of transition to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production for the efforts to address climate change,
This weaker wording takes the place of an attempt to include strong language on diets, which were excised at the behest of the US.
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,
Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and also noting the importance of ‘climate justice’, when taking action to address climate change,
Emphasizing that the enhanced effective climate action should be implemented in a manner that is just and inclusive while minimizing negative social or economic impacts that may arise from climate action,
Expressing appreciation to Heads of the States and Governments and welcoming the outcomes of the COP 27 Climate Implementation Summit,
Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,
Recognizing also the critical role of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems in delivering benefits for climate adaptation and its co-benefits, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards,
1. Underlines the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems for effective and sustainable climate action;
The biodiversity Cop15 will take place next month, where the links between species loss and climate breakdown will also come to the fore. Why not a stronger message of support for Cop15?
2. Acknowledges the global energy and food crises that exacerbate the impacts of climate change, in particular in developing countries;
3. Enhances food systems resilience and security in dealing with the food crises;
{Science}
4. Welcomes the contributions of Working Groups II1 and III2 to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;
5. Also welcomes the 2022 adaptation gap3 and emissions gap4 reports of the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent global and regional reports of the World Meteorological Organization on the state of the climate;
6. Reaffirms the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels;
7. Recognizes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 oC compared with 2C, reaffirms the resolution to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C;
This language on sticking to the 1.5C temperature limit, which was the focus of Cop26, is still not as strong as some had hoped.
8. Noting that this requires immediate, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions;
9. Notes that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler to enhance mitigation action and address inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions, and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries;
{Enhancing ambition and implementation}
10. Resolves to implement ambitious, just and inclusive transitions to low-emission and climate-resilient development in line with the objectives of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as with this decision, the Glasgow Climate Pact and other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
11. Expresses appreciation to the Heads of State and Government who participated in the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Implementation Summit for their support in enhancing and accelerating the implementation of climate action;
12. Notes the reaffirmation of the steadfast commitments of the leaders of the G20 group, in pursuit of the objective of UNFCCC, to tackle climate change by strengthening the full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and its temperature goal, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances;
This is weaker language than in the G20 communique earlier this week, which reaffirmed the 1.5C temperature limit, not the Paris agreement which includes a 2C upper limit.
{Energy}
13. Recognizes that the global energy crisis, in addition to the impact of climate change, are challenging the efforts to achieve energy security. This underlines the urgency to rapidly transform energy systems to be more reliable, and resilient, and the need to accelerate clean and just transitions to renewable energy during this critical decade of action;
14. Being concerned with the impacts of the current energy crisis on the timely fulfillment of pledges and commitments related to energy transition and energy diversification, stresses the importance of avoiding backsliding on pledges related to action and support;
The call to avoid backsliding is still in the text, but in a limited way, applying only to the support that is supposed to come from developed countries to help poorer ones. A call to avoid backsliding on other key elements, such as cutting greenhouse gas emissions, is notably missing.
15. Calls on the importance of enhancing the share of renewable energy in the energy mix at all level as part of diversifying energy mixes and systems, and encourages the continued efforts to accelerate measures towards the phase down of unabated coal power and phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards just transitions;
This language will disappoint many. India led an attempt, with the backing of the EU and the US, to include the phase down of all fossil fuels, not just coal, in this draft. That appears to have been removed.
The call for a phase down of unabated coal power is the same as what finally appeared in the cover text from Cop26, when a phase out of coal was weakened to a phase down at the last minute by India and China.
{Mitigation}
16. Welcomes the latest version of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions;
17. Notes with serious concern the finding in that synthesis report that the total global greenhouse gas emission level in 2030, taking into account implementation of all latest nationally determined contributions, is estimated to be 0.3 per cent below the 2019 level, which is not in line with least-cost scenarios for keeping global temperature rise to 2 or 1.5C;
More repetition of the 2C upper goal of the Paris agreement – technically, this correctly reflects the language of the Paris agreement, but it leaves loopholes for those who want to unpick the promises to stick to 1.5C made in Glasgow.
18. Commends the Parties that submitted updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) pursuant to paragraph 28 of 1/CMA.3;
19. Strongly urges Parties that have not yet communicated new or updated nationally determined contributions, as per decision 1/CMA3, paragraph 28 to do so as soon as possible;
20. Also strongly urges Parties to align the targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, while recognizing the nationally determined nature of the contributions, taking into account different national circumstances;
21. Welcomes the synthesis report on long-term low-emission development strategies;
22. Reaffirms that limiting global warming to 1.5C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around midcentury, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases;
Stronger language on 1.5C here, which is good but not enough.
23. Urges Parties to communicate new or updated long-term low-emission development strategies aimed at enhancing contribution to global net zero emissions by or around midcentury, in line with the best available science, and aligned with their NDCs taking into account different national circumstances;
This language appears weaker than in the last draft, which requested “all parties to revisit and strengthen 2030 NDCs to align with 1.5C” and to update them “regularly” in line with the latest science. That was the “ratchet” agreed in Glasgow, which was supposed to mean that countries would return every year with better nationally determined contributions until they were all aligned with 1.5C. To lose the ratchet would be serious backsliding.
24. Welcomes the organization of and takes note of the discussions at the first annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, held on 14 November 2022;
25. Welcomes the adoption of decision -/CMA.410 on the mitigation work programme;
26. Urges Parties to engage constructively in that work programme with a view to urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade in line with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement;
27. Recognizes the importance of addressing and averting the negative economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures;
28. Reaffirms the call to Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phaseout of unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;
29. Welcomes the adoption of decisions -/CP.2711 , -/CMP.2712 and -/ CMA.4 on response measures;
{Adaptation}
30. Notes with serious concern the existing adaption gap between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts and reduce climate risks in line with findings from the contribution of Working Group II to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report;
31. Urges Parties to go beyond incremental action and take a transformational approach to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change by integrating adaptation into policy, programs, and budgets to accelerate climate resilient development;
{Global Goal on Adaptation}
32. Recognizes the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and recalls decision 7/CMA.3 to establish and launch the Glasgow - Sharm el-Sheikh work program on the global goal on adaptation;
33. Welcomes the progress made in year one of the two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, as outlined in the progress report of the subsidiary bodies; and looks forward to the conclusion of the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation at COP28 and notes the robust program of work for 2023 laid out in decision -/CMA.4;
34. Stresses on the urgency to fulfil the mandate of having a clear global goal on adaptation to guide the provision of finance and means of implementation from developed to developing countries to reduce the risk of climate change impacts;
35. Reiterates the call made by the United Nations Secretary-General on World Meteorological Day 2022 to ensure that everyone on Earth is protected by early warning systems against extreme weather and climate events;
36. Notes with concern the existing gaps in the global climate observing system, and that one third of the world, including sixty percent of Africa, does not have access to early warning and climate information services, and recognizes the need to enhance the coordination of activities by the systematic observation community and improve its ability to provide useful and actionable climate information for mitigation, adaptation and early warning systems, as well as information to enable understanding of adaptation limits and of attribution of extreme events;
37. Welcomes and reiterates the UN Secretary-General call made on World Meteorological Day on 23 March 2022 to protect everyone on Earth through universal coverage of early warning systems against extreme weather and climate change within the next five years; and requests the development partners, international financial institutions and operating entities of the financial mechanism to provide support for implementation of this initiative;
{Loss and damage}
38. Welcomes the Parties’ agreement for the first time to include a sub-agenda item titled “Matters related to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change including a focus on addressing loss and damage” under agenda item titled “matters related to finance” under COP and CMA, as a reflection of the wide global consensus around the grave situation in relation to loss and damage and the need for effective funding arrangements related to responding to loss and damage in particular addressing loss and damage;
39. Notes with great concern, as documented by the IPCC 6th AR WG II and WG III reports, the growing gravity, scope and frequency of loss and damage in all regions, and that loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change take the form of extreme weather events as well as slow onset events, and result in devastating economic and non-economic losses including through its impact on cultural heritage, human mobility and forced displacement and the lives and livelihoods of local communities, and underlines in this regard that an adequate and effective response to loss and damage is of great importance to the continue credibility and relevance of the UNFCCC process;
40. Expresses deep concern towards the significant financial costs associated with loss and damage for developing countries, resulting in increasing the burden of indebtedness and impairing the realization of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals;
41. Welcomes the Parties’ agreement on all the institutional arrangements of the Santiago Network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change to enable its full operationalization, supports its mandated role in catalyzing technical assistance for the implementation of the relevant approaches at the local, national and regional levels in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and renews their determination to select the host of the Santiago Network Secretariat by 2023 through a selection process which is conducted in an open, transparent, fair and neutral manner in accordance with the process outlined in paragraphs 17-18 of CMA/**** COP/****;
42. {Placeholder funding arrangement responding to loss and damage};
This section of the draft text, on loss and damage, was overtaken by events even before it was published, as the EU made its proposal in the early hours of Friday for a fund for loss and damage. Parties are still debating that proposal, so this placeholder text looks certain to remain in situ, perhaps until the final draft.
{Implementation - Just Transition Pathways}
43. Emphasizes the urgent need for immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions by Parties across all sectors, in order to limit global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels; and highlights the importance of ensuring and enabling just transition for developing countries;
44. Affirms that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders, and notes that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication;
45. Emphasizes that just and equitable transition encompasses pathways which include energy, socio-economic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection dimensions to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition, and highlights the important role of the instruments and measures related to social solidarity and social protection floors in mitigating the impacts resulting from the applied measures;
46. Decides to establish a work program on just transition to discuss pathways to deliver on article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement in the context of article 2.2 and requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session, in a manner that builds on and compliments the relevant work streams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the Mitigation work program;
47. Decides to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on just transition, as part of the just transition work program beginning at the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
This is good because many developing countries would like to emulate South Africa and Indonesia, which have gained billions of dollars in funding to help them move workers from coal to renewable energy and low-carbon jobs.
{Finance}
48. Reiterates articles 2, 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement; and highlights that about $4 trillion a year needs to be invested in renewable energy until 2030 – including investments in technology and infrastructure – to allow us to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. Furthermore, a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investments of at least USD 4-6 trillion a year. Delivering such funding will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors;
These seem like huge numbers, but are not much bigger than the investment needed to develop in a high-carbon economy. The impetus to reform the development banks and reduce the cost of capital investment in poor countries is growing.
49. Notes with concern the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness, and the support provided and mobilized to complement their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions, highlighting that current estimates of such needs are in the scale of 5.6 trillion USD up to 2030, while the global annual flows to developing countries;
Much of the climate finance that currently flows to developing countries comes in the form of loans, with high interest rates and repayment requirements. Countries already facing a debt mountain cannot afford to take on more. One of the key aims of reforming the World Bank and other development banks is to remedy this.
50. Expresses grave concern that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 has not yet been met and urges developed country Parties to meet the goal and address the shortfall to $100 billion since 2020;
51. Emphasizes that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler to enhance mitigation action and address inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions, and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries. Scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation funding for vulnerable regions, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy;
52. Notes that global climate finance flows are small relative to the overall needs of developing countries. Global climate finance in 2019–2020 was estimated to be USD 803 billion. This amount is 31–32 per cent of the annual investment needed for the global temperature rise to follow a well below 2C or a 1.5C pathway. This level of climate finance is also below what one would expect in the light of the investment opportunities identified and the cost of failure to meet climate stabilization targets;
53. Notes the important role of technology transfer in enhancing climate action and that capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries;
54. Urges developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention, and encourages other Parties to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;
55. Calls on MDBs and IFIs to align and scale up funding, ensure simplified access, mobilize climate finance from various sources, and encourages the shareholders of MDBs to define a new vision and commensurate operational model, channels and instruments that fitfor-purpose to adequately address the global climate emergency; including deploying full suit of instruments from grants to guarantees and non debt instruments, without exacerbating debt burdens, and address the conservative risk appetites and limited scale of capitalization towards increasing their deployment on climate finance three folds up to 2025;
56. Calls on multilateral development banks to reform their practices and priorities, in order to reduce the cost of borrowing for climate projects in developing countries and to increase their investment into adaptation financing and urges MDBs to align their operations with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and climate change emergency;
57. Urges the ad hoc work programme on the new collective quantified goal to produce more efficient and operational results by 2023;
58. Calls on multilateral development banks to significantly increase climate ambition using the breadth of their policy and financial instruments for greater results including on private capital mobilization;
59. Calls on multilateral development banks to ensure higher financial efficiency and maximize use of existing concessional and risk capital vehicles to drive innovation and accelerate impact;
{NCQG}
60. {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations};
{GEF/GCF/AF replenishment}
61. {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations};
62. Recognizes the centrality of the role of the adaptation fund in the climate finance architecture , and in this regard welcomes the new pledges made at COP27, and urges all contributors to fulfil their pledges in a timely manner, and invites the contributors to ensure the sustainability of the resources of the fund;
63. Highlights the role of the LDCF and SCCF in supporting developing countries actions to tackle climate change and in this regard welcomes the pledges made to the two funds and invites developed countries to further contribute to the two funds;
64. Emphasizes the ongoing challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing climate finance and encourages further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to such finance; Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement;
65. Decides to establish the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue between Parties, relevant organizations and stakeholders to exchange views and enhance the understanding of the scope of article 2.1.c and its complementarity with article 9 to take place in 2023 through two workshops and in this regard requests the COP27 Presidency to prepare a report on the deliberations of the workshops, and requests the secretariat to organize the workshops;
66. Develops a roadmap for the delivery of the committed doubling of adaptation finance by 2025, including individual developed country annual information;
67. Reaffirms the commitment of Parties to collaborate on the global climate agenda and deepen multilateral cooperation and solidarity in addressing climate change; 68. Welcomes the adoption of decisions -/ CMA.4,13 -/ CMA.4,14 and -/ CMA.4,15 on issues relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement;
69. Notes the work undertaken by ICAO and IMO to implement their respective mandates with regard to greenhouse gas emissions;
70. Welcomes the outcomes of and key messages16 from the dialogue on the ocean and climate change17 held on 15 June 2022;
71. Also welcomes the outcomes of the 2022 United Nations Ocean Conference on 27 June to 1 July 2022 and the adoption of the Lisbon Declaration on 1 July 2022;
72. Decides that the annual Ocean and Climate Change dialogue will, from 2023, be facilitated by two co-facilitators, selected by Parties, and invites the SBSTA Chair, in coordination with the co-facilitators, to select and define focused thematic areas in advance of the dialogue, in consultation with Parties and observers, including on progress of UNFCCC work programmes and constituted bodies to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action (as invited in 1/CP.26 para 60);
73. Encourages Parties to consider, as appropriate, ocean-based climate solutions in taking action to achieve their climate goals, as set out in nationally determined contributions, long-term low-emission development strategies and national reports such as biennial transparency reports and adaptation communications;
74. Recognises the impact of climate change on the cryosphere and the need for further understanding of these impacts, including of tipping points;
75. Urges developed country Parties to enhance their provision of support, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, to developing country Parties for taking ocean-based climate action;
76. Calls upon multilateral development banks, other financial institutions and the private sector to enhance the mobilization of finance for ocean-based climate action;
77. Urges United Nations entities to promote synergies to support ocean-based climate action at the national level;
78. Recalls that, in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support to developing country Parties, Parties should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2;
At Glasgow, more than 20 forested nations agreed to reverse deforestation by 2030. The lack of a deadline here shows that not all forested nations have agreed to that goal.
79. Recalls also the IPCC findings that GHG emissions reductions and removals from forests and land use are essential to all pathways to global net zero and the critical role that healthy forests serve in climate regulation, biodiversity protection, food and water security, soil fertility and limiting forced migration;
80. Recognizes the urgent need for public and private finance to significantly scale up support for REDD+;
81. Emphasizes the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and waterrelated ecosystems, including river basins, aquifers and lakes and urges Parties to further integrate water into adaptation efforts;
82. Encourages Parties to consider, as appropriate, nature-based solutions and ecosystembased approaches for their mitigation and adaptation action while ensuring relevant social and environmental safeguards;
{Enhancing implementation: action by non-Party stakeholders}
83. Acknowledges the engagement of non-Party stakeholders in climate action which complements and broadens it, while recognizing the pivotal role of governments in action on climate change within the framework of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement;
84. Recognizes the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities, cities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change, and highlighting the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action;
85. Welcomes decision -/CP.2718 on ACE adopting the Action Plan for the Glasgow Work Program on Action for Climate Empowerment;
86. Encourages Parties to increase the full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action and to ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, which are vital for raising ambition and achieving climate goals;
87. Recognizes the role of children and youth as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change by urging future Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties to continue to promote the full, meaningful and equal participation of children and youth including through continuing to host the Children and Youth Pavilion launched for the first time at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh;
88. Notes the outcomes from the seventeenth Conference of Youth, organized by the constituency of children and youth non-governmental organizations and held in Sharm elSheikh in November 2022;
89. Expresses its appreciation to the Presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties and the children and youth constituency for organizing the first youth-led climate forum (The Sharm Youth Climate Dialogue);
90. Encourages Parties to include youth in their processes for designing and implementing climate policy and action, and, as appropriate, to consider including young representatives and negotiators into their national delegations, recognizing the importance of intergenerational equity and maintaining the stability of the climate system for future generations;
91. Welcomes the first appointment of a COP Presidency’s youth envoy as a further step towards strengthening the COP Presidencies’ approaches towards youth and children climate engagement and dialogue, and encourages future incoming presidencies to consider to do the same;
92. Urges Parties to address the differentiated impacts of climate change on children and youth, including girls and women;
93. Encourages Parties and non-Party stakeholders to engage actively in Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action; 18 Draft decision entitled “[Y]” proposed under agenda item [Z] of the [body] at its [X] session.
94. Emphasizes that the outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action;
There were 12 references to the global stocktake in the last draft of this text; here there is only one, and it comes without a date. Next year’s global stocktake is a major requirement of the Paris agreement, requiring an assessment of countries’ progress on their emissions goals. It is the main way of checking that the Paris agreement is working as intended, and will be one of the key outcomes next year at Cop28 in Dubai, so it is odd that it is not receiving greater emphasis.
95. Welcomes the leadership of the high-level champions, in particular in the context of the Sharm el-Sheikh Adaptation Agenda and the Breakthrough Agenda, and collaboration between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, emphasize the need for continued acceleration and collaboration; 96. Noting the importance of the periodic review of the long-term goal under the Convention, and welcomes the adoption of decisions -/ CP.27, on the second period review;
97. Welcomes the recommendations of the high-level expert group on the net-zero emissions commitments of non-state entities, launched by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral in June 2022, which are designed to enhance transparency and accountability related to, and progress in achieving, the climate pledges of businesses, investors, cities and regions;
98. Invites the secretariat to ensure greater accountability on voluntary initiatives;
99. Welcomes also the convening of the 5 regional forums led by the COP27 Presidency and the UN high-level champions, in collaboration with the UN Regional Economic Commissions, on climate initiatives to finance climate action and the SDGs.
Was there pressure to bring the document down to less than 100 paragraphs? It is still a long text, and further editing can be expected.
