On August 18, the Second Circuit decided Kellogg v. Nichols, a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a New York state judge who denied applications by two individuals for firearm licenses. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of their individual-capacity claims as barred by absolute judicial immunity and then dismissed their official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as lacking an Article III case-or-controversy.
As Kellogg explains, the state judge denied applicant Kellogg's permit based on his "criminal arrest history and inadequate explanations for failing to disclose that history." The reasons for the arrests are not stated. He also "ruled that [applicant] Harmon's criminal history, including a youthful-offender adjudication for first-degree robbery, likewise demonstrated that he lacked the requisite maturity or responsibility to have a license." The applicants then filed suit in the U.S. district court alleging violation of their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Unlike some counties, the sitting judge is the licensing officer in Columbia County where the plaintiffs resided. As plaintiffs pointed out, under New York state law, acting on a gun permit application is an administrative function. Kellogg mentions none of the state precedents on point, but earlier this year, in In re Guthman, the Appellate Division, 4th Dept., held: "The appropriate procedure for the review of a determination of a County Court Judge, acting in [their] administrative capacity as the firearms licensing officer for the County of [Onondaga] under Penal Law § 400.00 (11) and § 265.00 (10), is not a direct appeal, but the commencement of a CPLR article 78 proceeding in this Court." (Bracketed items in original.) For that proposition, the court quoted In re Shuler (A.D., 2d Dept. 2009), which applied that rule to the County Court Judge of Westchester County. Other New York precedents consistently characterize the proceeding as administrative.
