The unresolved question of Sudan's maritime boundary with Saudi Arabia has returned to the regional agenda, more than half a century after the two countries first negotiated over the Red Sea seabed.
Sudan has been at war since April 2023, when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict has produced what is widely described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis and has become a flashpoint for competing foreign interests in the Red Sea country, a major gold producer.
Border talks on hold
In October 2025, several regional outlets, citing unnamed sources, reported that Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, had ordered the final version of the maritime demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia to be postponed pending consultations with Egypt. According to the same reports, the decision followed direct Egyptian pressure, and Gen al-Burhan instructed that the Saudi agreement be finalised only after a deal with Cairo is signed.
The reports said the joint Sudanese-Saudi demarcation committee met on 20 September 2025 under the chairmanship of Al-Amin Muhammad Banqa to discuss amendments to the final draft, following changes to Sudan's map after a maritime and land border agreement with Egypt. These accounts rely on unnamed sources.
Analysis: Sudanese political analyst Ammar Siddiq told The Standard that the postponement shows how regional actors now shape Sudan's decisions on its borders, at a time of institutional weakness and political and military division. Critics of the army-led authorities go further. They argue that any border treaty concluded by the current wartime government would lack legitimacy, because Sudan has had no elected legislature to ratify it since 2019. An unnamed source cited by The Reporter (Ethiopia) alleged that Gen al-Burhan exceeded his authority and bypassed parliament by writing to the National Border Commission through the Sovereign Council on 11 May 2025. This allegation has not been independently verified.
Mining interests
In February 2026, Sudan's army-backed government signed a deal with the Saudi Gold Refinery Company covering research, geological evaluation and mine development for gold and associated minerals in Red Sea State. The agreement was signed with the refinery's locally registered branch, Al Ittihad Global Mining Company, and the ministry did not disclose its value. The deal followed talks in Riyadh in January, when Saudi Arabia's state-run gold refinery said it was ready to start buying Sudanese bullion as Khartoum tries to move gold exports away from Dubai.
Some Sudanese commentators have questioned what the deal means for sovereignty and the future of the country's Red Sea mineral wealth.
Historical background
The dispute dates back to the 1960s, when metal-rich deposits were discovered on the floor of the central Red Sea. The Atlantis II Deep, between Jeddah and Port Sudan, is among the largest known seafloor deposits of zinc, copper, silver and gold.
Bilateral talks began in Jeddah in July 1973. An agreement signed in Khartoum in May 1974 and registered with the United Nations gives each state exclusive rights near its own coast and establishes a common zone in the deeper central area, to be exploited jointly. In 2019, the two countries announced a joint effort reviving the 1974 agreement; earlier studies had estimated the shared deposits at around $8bn.
Because the 1974 agreement predates the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), some legal experts argue it should be reviewed to protect Sudan's interests.
Saudi Arabia's role in the war
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE say they support a diplomatic resolution, but Riyadh has put its weight behind Sudan's army. Sudan's army accuses the UAE of supplying the RSF, which the UAE denies.
In January 2026, Reuters reported that Pakistan was close to a $1.5bn arms deal with Sudan. According to two of its sources, the package included 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 reconnaissance and kamikaze drones, and advanced air-defence systems. A retired Pakistani air marshal added that it also included Super Mushshak trainers and possibly JF-17 fighters. The financing was unclear at the time. The sources did not say how the deal would be paid for. One said Saudi Arabia had brokered it but there was no sign it was paying, while another said Riyadh was not providing funds.
In April 2026, Reuters reported that Pakistan had put the deal on hold after Saudi Arabia asked for it to be terminated and said it would not finance the purchase, according to two Pakistani security sources and a diplomatic source. One source said a March meeting in Riyadh between Sudanese army leaders and Saudi officials ended Saudi financing, and that some Western countries had advised Riyadh to stay out of proxy wars in Africa. The Saudi government, Sudan's army and Pakistan's military did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment.
On 7 August 2026, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, bringing Turkey into the September 2025 Saudi-Pakistan collective defence pact. The parties have not released the text, but it reportedly treats an attack on one signatory as an attack on all. Analysts at the Arab Center Washington DC note that the pact sets up no joint command, standing forces or defined trigger mechanism, and that its practical significance may lie in defence-industrial cooperation, such as Turkish-Saudi co-production of the Akinci drone. Neither the official joint statement nor the published analyses reviewed for this article mention Sudan. There is no credible public evidence that the agreement involves arms transfers to the SAF.
Somali recruits: unverified claims
Between late August and early September 2026, Somali soldiers were detained in Jijiga, capital of Ethiopia's Somali Region; estimates of their number range from about 180 to 900. They reportedly belonged to a class of about 3,000 recruits who graduated on 16 August from the Xananbuure camp in Galmudug after nearly a year of training. Somalia's national security adviser said the soldiers were on authorised leave and had travelled through Ethiopia to reach their families because roads inside Somalia were controlled by al-Shabaab. Ethiopian authorities have not given a public reason for the detentions.
Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, citing local media, reported that the training is Saudi-funded under a military cooperation agreement signed with Mogadishu in February 2026, and is run by contractors from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia. Separately, Geeska reported in February, citing Africa Intelligence, that Sudanese military personnel had trained about 1,000 recruits in Galmudug before the Saudi agreement, under the oversight of Somalia's intelligence agency.
Some outlets and social media accounts allege that graduates of the programme are being prepared to fight alongside the SAF in Sudan. These claims remain unverified. Modern Diplomacy notes there is no independent evidence that the soldiers detained in Jijiga were travelling to Sudan.
References
- UN Treaty Series, Vol. 952 (1974 Sudan-Saudi Red Sea agreement): https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20952/volume-952-I-13605-English.pdf
- Reuters, "Pakistan nears $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons, jets to Sudan" (9 Jan 2026), via Arab News: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628783/amp
- Reuters, "Pakistan places $1.5 billion Sudan weapons sale on hold after Saudi objection" (20 Apr 2026), via StreetInsider: https://www.streetinsider.com/Reuters/Exclusive-Pakistan+places+$1.5+billion+Sudan+weapons+sale+on+hold+after+Saudi+objection,+sources+say/26333720.html
- The New Arab (Reuters report, Apr 2026): https://www.newarab.com/news/pakistan-halts-15bn-sudan-arms-deal-after-saudi-objection
- Saudi Press Agency, Mecca summit joint statement (7 Aug 2026): https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2649227
- Council on Foreign Relations, Steven A. Cook (13 Aug 2026): https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-led-middle-east-order-is-over-the-mecca-agreement-proves-it
- Arab Center Washington DC: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/diversification-without-substitution-what-the-mecca-joint-defense-agreement-offers-saudi-arabia/
- The Standard (Kenya), 21 Oct 2025: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/africa/article/2001532356/sudan-delays-maritime-border-deal-with-saudi-arabia-to-consult-egypt
- The National, 17 Feb 2026: https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/02/17/sudans-army-backed-government-signs-deal-with-saudi-company-for-gold-exploration/
- Sudan Tribune, 17 Jan 2026: https://sudantribune.com/article/309495
- COM (2019): https://www.mining.com/sudan-and-saudi-arabia-go-ahead-with-deep-sea-mining-plans-24346/
- Il Sole 24 Ore: https://en.ilsole24ore.com/art/ethiopian-and-somali-military-personnel-detained-mutual-accusations-bound-for-sudan-saudi-arabia-gives-the-go-ahead-AJfBOCEB
- AllAfrica / Capital FM, 14 Sep 2026: https://allafrica.com/stories/202609140605.html
- Modern Diplomacy, 15 Sep 2026: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/09/15/jigjiga-detentions-raise-questions-somalia/
- EU Reporter (opinion, Mohsin Osman), 15 Sep 2026: https://www.eureporter.co/world/sudan/2026/09/15/the-jigjiga-incident-raises-questions-about-somali-soldiers-involvement-in-the-sudan-war/
