In Indian federal democracy, a State’s relative population size gains political and economic significance. The strong linguistic identities and regional renaissances in political and social spheres propelled the southern States to scale greater heights in all spheres of development. In sharp contrast to the northern States, population control has been achieved in the southern States through social development and economic growth. In the federal political system, changes in population geography have a lasting impact on the political and economic geography.
Delimitation and political representation
Article 81 of the Indian Constitution stipulates that Lok Sabha constituencies in the country should be equal by the size of population. Based on the 1971 Census, the number of Lok Sabha constituencies for States was determined and frozen for the next 25 years through the 42nd Amendment Act 1976. In 2001, through the 84th Amendment Act, the freeze on the number of constituencies for each State was further prolonged until the first Census after 2026.
The population growth rates differ between the non-Hindi speaking southern States and the Hindi-speaking northern States. Between 1971 and 2011, the proportion of the population of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh increased from 44% to 48.2%, whereas the proportion of population of the five southern States (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana) declined from 24.9% to 21.1%. If equal size of Lok Sabha constituencies by population is enforced today as in the population projections of 2023, the five southern States will lose 23 seats, while the northern States will gain 37. In other words, the proportion of political representation of northern States will increase by 6.81% and that of southern States will decline by 4.24%.
The problem of balancing the political representation of sub-central units that have lower populations arises in all federations. For instance, Canada has been consistently increasing the proportion of representation in the national Parliament for the less populous provinces. The attempt to equalise the size of constituencies by population is based on the dictum, “One Person, One Vote”. In a ‘First-Past-the-Post’ election system, along with a multi-party contest, voters know that only one of the contestants shall win, that is, the winner takes all. Often, winners are elected even with less than one-third of the votes polled. If we calculate the proportion of votes secured by the winner in a constituency, it may be less than one-fifth of registered voters or even one-sixth of the total population of the constituency. A targeted vote gathering by a candidate should help to secure a win in this system. To give a perspective, from the 2019 election numbers, we can see that a Member of Parliament from the northern States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh represent around 18 lakh registered electors, while the five southern State Member of Parliament represents 16 lakh registered electors. But in both these two groups of States, it requires only 12 lakh voters to elect a Member of Parliament. The real meaning of ‘one person, one vote’ is lost in this system. Hence, equating constituencies by the size of the population is not essential.
When family planning and population control are the stated policies of the national and regional governments in India, States that have implemented these policies and effectively controlled their population should not be penalised through reduced political representation in subsequent periods. Population control happens not only due to the implementation of family planning programmes but also because of the social change that is engineered by the leaders in the society. Population control in the southern States is a classic example of this feat. Therefore, reducing the proportional representation of southern States in the national Parliament is not only a disincentive for these States but also an incentive for others not to take population control and social change as public policy seriously. So, continuing with the freeze on the distribution of seats among States as they were in 1971 till the population stabilises in all States is the only way out.
Role of population in fiscal transfers
Once in five years the Union government constitutes a Finance Commission to recommend, among other things, the share of each State in the assigned tax revenue of the Union government. Every Finance Commission recommends a formula for the horizontal distribution of the Union government’s tax revenue among the States. Population and per capita income of a State are considered to be two important indicators that are always included in the distribution formula with larger weights.
Population of a State is a measure of demand for public expenditure. Therefore, it is an important variable in the distribution formula. The first Finance Commission decided a State’s share based on its population size. The successive Finance Commissions reduced the weight assigned to the population in the distribution formula while including other variables. The Union government, in its terms of reference to the Eighth Finance Commission (1984-89), stipulated to use only the 1971 population in the distribution instead of the 1981 population. This practice continued thereafter till the Thirteenth Finance Commission (2010-15). In terms of reference for the Fourteenth Finance Commission, the Union government stipulated that apart from taking the 1971 population, the Commission may also consider demographic changes since 1971, wherever the population is to be used. Thus, for the first time, the established practice of rewarding the southern States for controlling the population was replaced by awarding the populous States. The terms of reference of the Fifteenth Finance Commission openly declared taking the 2011 population in the distribution formula. With this, the southern States lost the advantage of getting some financial rewards for population control. Therefore, the southern States have already started facing reduced financial transfers from the Union government as a reward for controlling population growth.
There is another factor that consistently brings in the current population in the distribution formula — the per capita income of a State. The per capita income of a State is considered as a proxy for its ability to raise its own revenue. The higher the per capita income of a State, the lower its share in the Union tax revenue. Lower per capita income of a State may be due to higher population for a given Gross State Domestic Product. Therefore, the higher the current population of a State, the higher its share in the Union tax revenue. It is important to note that usually the per capita income is assigned larger weight in the distribution formula favouring the northern States. The combined share of the five southern States in the Union government’s tax revenue from 2000-05 to 2021-26 declined from 21.1% to 15.8%. On the contrary, the combined share of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh increased from 51.5% to 53.2%.
Using the current population for delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies by equalising population and in the distribution formula for assignment of Union government tax revenue to States is clear retribution for the population control efforts of the southern States and a transparent accolade for the higher growth rate of population in the northern States.
S. Raja Sethu Durai is Professor of Economics, University of Hyderabad. R. Srinivasan is Member, State Planning Commission, Government of Tamil Nadu. The views expressed are personal
