There is something odd about Thailand's upcoming election. By all indications, it is slated to take place on May 7. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has announced that he will soon dissolve the Lower House to set the poll in motion. But no such dissolution has yet been announced, while the end of parliament's four-year term falls on March 23. The ambiguous election-setting scene is portentous and telling for several reasons.
First, Gen Prayut needs time to find traction for his new United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, an offshoot of the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), which hoisted him to power after the last election almost four years ago.
While Gen Prayut has had to bite the bullet and join the UTN as party leader, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan continues to lead the PPRP. The two generals, along with Interior Minister Anupong Paochinda, another member of the top brass and former army chief, spearheaded Thailand's most recent military coup in May 2014.
Although they are now in charge of different parties, the Prayut-Prawit split may be less than meets the eye. It stems more from PPRP rank-and-file MPs' dissatisfaction with Gen Prayut for not looking after them.
Gen Prawit's inner sanctum, such as former cabinet member Thamanat Prompow, may also have urged Gen Prawit to chart the PPRP's own course. The Prayut-Prawit rift appears not to be personal and irreparable, which suggests the two and their parties can realign if the post-election dynamics offer an opportunity to jointly form a coalition government.
What cannot be said at this time is that Gen Prayut will call an early election. Having an early poll requires a gap of months, not days, between an announced poll and its actual deadline. Thailand's parliamentary dissolution deadline is three weeks away. Gen Prayut is basically running out the clock.
He is clinging on to power and the incumbent advantages as long as he can because the UTN is not gaining as much appeal as its leadership would like. Being in government enables Gen Prayut to accelerate and pump budget disbursements into upcountry voter bases, providing a war chest to lure MP candidates from other parties.
As a result, the later rather than sooner poll date is a sign of weakness for the prime minister. Election prospects for the UTN, which is another political vehicle of the People's Democratic Reform Committee from 2013-14, remain questionable.
When the PDRC -- a pro-coup political movement that demonstrated in the streets and closed down sections of downtown Bangkok for months -- formed the Action Coalition for Thailand Party to contest the March 2019 election, it won just five MPs. This time, the UTN will do better, thanks to Gen Prayut's incumbency edge, meaning it's likely able to garner the 25 out of 500 MPs required to nominate the sitting prime minister for another term.
However, the UTN will not win anywhere near the 116 MPs the PPRP came up with four years ago. In fact, these two parties, together this time, may not be able to match their numbers from the previous election in March 2019.
Moreover, the PPRP has positioned itself as less of a royalist-conservative far-right group compared to the last poll. This means it is not inconceivable the PPRP will enter into a coalition government with the current government partner Bhumjaithai and even the opposition Pheu Thai Party. The UTN is somewhat isolated, similar to the Move Forward Party (MFP), the former farther to the right and the latter to the left of the Thai political spectrum.
Second, despite the party scene not stacking up in his favour, Gen Prayut oddly remains a top contender, if not the frontrunner, to return as prime minister. This prospect sends shivers down the backs of Thailand watchers near and far but the post-coup political system has been rigged to ensure post-poll outcomes. However, because the UTN is not expected to fare well as a breakaway wing of the PPRP, Gen Prayut will face greater adversity for a third premiership term after the military government in 2014-19 and the current administration.
Finally, Pheu Thai is poised to come in as the largest winning party. At issue in this election will be its margin of victory. Last time, Pheu Thai edged out the PPRP by just 20 seats, 136 to 116. This margin was small enough to be shaved and manipulated. So the referees of recent Thai elections, namely the Election Commission, National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Constitutional Court, operated in a way that ended up dissolving the Future Forward Party (FFP), the third-largest winner with 81 MPs.
Together with the disqualifications and the EC's decision to count party-list votes in favour of small parties with just one or two MPs, the PPRP was able to poach and entice enough MPs from the scattered post-election party scene to form a Prayut-led coalition, with critical assistance from the 250-member appointed Senate from the coup era. These manoeuvres were sufficient for Gen Prayut to continue in office and stay there for an entire four-year term.
This coming election will be different because Pheu Thai's margin of victory ahead of the second-largest winning party could well be over 50 MPs. Unless the electoral referees want to dissolve Pheu Thai on various charges that have been launched, it will be difficult to deny the biggest-winning party with an unassailable margin a leading role in the post-election coalition government.
But there is a caveat. Pheu Thai's two precursors, the Thai Rak Thai and People Power parties, were both dissolved in 2007-08. If that happens a third time, social unrest can be expected, as evident in the red shirts' protests in 2009-10 and the youth-led demonstrations in 2020-21 after the Future Forward's demise.
If there is a compromise, it will have to rest on the largest-winning party taking a lead in forming the coalition, but perhaps without its preferred choice of prime minister. This would mean Pheu Thai taking up a coalition role with Bhumjaithai and perhaps the PPRP forming the core of the post-poll government. Who gets to be the next prime minister will then be the main issue in the aftermath of the election. If not a Pheu Thai candidate and not Gen Prayut, the office may land in the court of Bhumjaithai or even the PPRP.
