It was a classic Peter Dutton outing. The defence minister used a speech this week to warn that “ominous clouds are forming” in the Indo-Pacific, that China and Russia’s “unholy alliance” should ring alarm bells, and that countries in the region must confront the “mounting threats to regional stability”.
Dutton then turned his attention to threats closer to home: specifically Labor, his electoral enemy, based on a simplistic extrapolation of its previous record in defence.
“When we came in to government [defence] spending was at 1.56% of GDP – the lowest level since 1938,” he told a United States Studies Centre event in Canberra.
“Had spending continued on that trajectory we would have had $55bn less in aggregate spent in defence and on acquisition over the course of the last several years, and we would be facing a budget today with a three in front of it instead of a four. This year we spent $41bn.”
It’s a taste of what voters are likely to hear during the election campaign as the Coalition seeks to make national security a central issue, with Scott Morrison repeatedly declaring that we are living in uncertain times and now is not the time to change captains.
But experts say there is largely bipartisanship on major defence issues, including on ramping up spending levels, recruiting more ADF personnel and implementing the much-trumpeted Aukus pact with the US and the UK – even as the nuclear-powered submarines plan is yet to be bedded down.
In one sense, the Coalition’s attempt to cast backwards is a marker of how the parties are largely united on the major strategic settings that they believe are suited to the current security environment. But Dutton’s defence spending tale describes a parallel universe that doesn’t exist. He’s taken a single-year percentage and added up the total gap in spending in the unlikely scenario that the rate had remained at that historical low for every year between then and now.
Lesson learned
Dennis Richardson, a longtime public servant who has worked under both sides of politics, started as defence secretary a few months after the Gillard government’s 2012 budget outlined plans to cut about $5.5bn from the defence portfolio, spread over four years, including by deferring some acquisitions and reducing the civilian workforce.
That was a time when Labor remained under significant political pressure to deliver promised budget surpluses, and months before Xi Jinping took power in Beijing. (Two years later, Tony Abbott invited China’s president to address the Australian parliament and feted him at a state dinner.)
“That sole budget is not the reason why we have a problem now, quite obviously,” Richardson says. He notes that the Gillard government published a new defence white paper in 2013 that “did commit the Labor government to increasing the defence budget to 2% of GDP”.
“In other words, the Labor government learned from the criticism it legitimately got following [that] budget.”
According to an analysis of official data compiled by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, annual defence spending as a share of the economy hovered between 1.7% and 1.8% of GDP during the life of the Howard government.
Under the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments, it hit a peak of 1.96% in 2009-10 and a low of 1.59% in 2012-13. Under the Abbott, Turnbull and Morrison governments it has steadily risen to be about 2% now – and will continue to increase.
Prof Peter Dean, the director of the University of Western Australia’s defence and security institute, says defence spending “is and will continue to be a big battleground” in the election even though both parties have a commitment to 2% or above. He notes how the same figures can be interpreted multiple ways.
“The Coalition is right that defence spending under Labor fell to the lowest point of GDP since 1938 – if you want to compare defence spending to the monetary value of final goods and services in the economy,” Dean says.
“If, however, you want to look at government spending on defence as a percentage of the [overall] budget, Labor spent more in their last two years in office than the Coalition has in 2021-2022. Nine years on from 2013, though, both the budget and the economy are much larger, as is overall defence spending.”
Getting what you paid for
Increased defence spending is one thing. What it actually delivers is another.
Dean says Aukus “will be difficult for no matter who wins government” and “will require closer cooperation with the US in a period of increased risk”. Regardless of who forms government, leaders will face post-election decisions about how the nuclear-propelled submarines are actually built and delivered, which remains subject to a study conducted jointly with the US and the UK.
Dean published a paper this week describing the Aukus announcement six months ago as “the moment the Australian government came to terms with the repercussions of a more assertive China, a more multipolar global order and changing US power”. But he argues the broader security cooperation aspects of Aukus “are far more important than Australia’s shift to nuclear-powered submarines”.
“The benefits of Aukus in the near term will be found in other areas such as long range missile collaboration and science and technology,” he says.
While Labor has attempted to dismiss any suggestion of a divide on Aukus or on the major national security threats, it has also sought to chip away at any perceived Coalition political advantage on the issue. Labor says it is entitled to question the Coalition’s record on major acquisitions, including the new frigates and the handling of the now-dumped French submarine contract.
“We are facing times of global instability, particularly growing tensions within our region,” Brendan O’Connor, the shadow defence minister, told the same US Studies Centre event that Dutton addressed this week.
“And though we share concerns on these matters, we have an obligation to question the gap between what the government says and what the government delivers.”
Chief among Labor’s concerns is the so-called “capability gap” between now and when the first of the new nuclear-propelled submarines are ready in the late 2030s. The government has committed to major work to extend the life of the existing conventionally powered Collins class submarines.
Labor says, if elected, it would take advice on what can be done to bridge the gap, including considering fitting tomahawk missiles to the existing submarines and assessing what strike capabilities could be accelerated or strengthened in the near term.
It has also committed to ensuring all defence contracts “have measurable and enforceable levels of local content”.
Climate threat
On the whole, these may seem to be minor differences and tentative commitments. But it would be wrong to say there is no difference between the major parties on approaches to national security.
The Labor leader, Anthony Albanese, has sought to elevate recognition of the climate crisis as a key national security threat. He said he would order the head of national intelligence and the secretary of defence to undertake a climate-driven security risk assessment within four months of coming to government. One option is to set up a new Office of Climate Threat Intelligence.
And, in the wake of severe flooding in northern NSW and south-east Queensland, Labor would consider the need for a new national emergency taskforce.
Albanese argues a stronger climate policy – including a more ambitious 2030 target – would give Australia more credibility in its relations with Pacific nations.
Dean observes: “Morrison has issues inside his own party with this and chose not to make the link to national security while visiting flood areas. Albanese has no such problem with this – meaning Labor is more aligned with the US than the government on this, given the Biden administration’s work on climate and security.”
Australia-China relations
When it comes to the relationship with China, however, both major parties now see the differences as largely structural, and not something that can enjoy a simple “reset” merely by a change in tone.
This week Labor’s foreign affairs spokesperson, Penny Wong, met with the new Chinese ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, a week after the minister, Marise Payne did so. Wong made largely the same points as Payne (on human rights, detained Australians, and free trade) and affirmed that those positions were bipartisan. Wong also “expressed her serious concerns over reports that Russia has asked China for weapons” and urged Beijing to reject the request.
After being rebuked by current and former national security officials, the Morrison government appears to have stepped back from last month’s heightened rhetoric about Albanese being the Chinese Communist party’s choice in the forthcoming election. That doesn’t mean the Coalition’s warnings against “appeasing” China won’t return as polling day approaches, but it is far from clear whether that line of attack has resonated with voters.
“It’s legitimate for there to be differences on national security in a liberal democracy. There always have been,” Richardson told the National Press Club this week.
“There were differences over the Vietnam war. There were differences over the Iraq War.”
Richardson said he had spoken up because he objected to the government’s attempt “to create the perception of a difference on China where, in fact, there was none” – something he saw as contrary to Australia’s national interests.
“Beyond that, however, I hope there is debate, an active debate on matters of national security,” Richardson said.
“That’s as it should be in a liberal democracy. That doesn’t weaken us. I suspect [Vladimir] Putin would be in a better position today if there was a bit more debate and questioning within his own system.”
