This edition of Paris Perspective looks at Turkey’s role within NATO and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s balancing act between Moscow, Kyiv and the Western military alliance.
The role of Turkey's authoritarian president Erdogan as a potential mediator in the Ukraine crisis has been under the spotlight ever since Russia first invaded its neighbour.
As a key Black Sea power that controls the shipping lanes into the Mediterranean – with ambitions to assert its influence in the Middle East and Africa – Turkey has shown itself to be adept at running with the hares while hunting with the hounds when it comes to international diplomacy.
Although Turkey and Russia have been fighting on different sides of proxy wars in Syria and Libya, a mutually tolerant cohabitation between the two powers can be put down to the cosy relationship that both Erdogan and Vladimir Putin have displayed in recent years – notably in the wake of a failed 2016 coup attempt to overthrow the Turkish leader.
As a longtime member of NATO that has kept diplomatic channels open with Ukraine and Russia throughout the conflict, Erdogan's presence at a recent summit of the military alliance in Madrid underlined the importance of his position, despite the fact Turkey is viewed with distrust by the United States.
In June Turkey threatened to block Finland and Sweden's application for NATO membership over their recognition of the PKK Kurdistan Workers Party as a legitimate, nationalist movement and not a terrorist organisation.
The move exasperated Western officials, but it did not come as a surprise.
The rise of Turkish influence
Carpe Diem
Turkey's uncomfortable role as the bête noir within NATO has many observers squirming in their seats.
But for the Erdogan administration, Turkey is exactly where it wants to be, says Dorothée Schmid, a specialist on Turkey with the Paris-based think-tank IFRI.
"I feel [Turkey's] very comfortable nowadays. They're really seizing the opportunity of the Ukrainian crisis to make the world understand that their status as a global power has changed," she explains.
Schmid maintains that Turkey is going through a sort of rehabilitation process within NATO after being side-lined as "the difficult ally" that is underscored by Ankara's relations with Moscow.
When it comes to the relationship between Erdogan and Putin, Schmid highlights the reasons behind their proximity: "They know each other very well ... they've been in strategic business together ... but since the 2016 coup attempt ... it's been said that Putin himself was the one who warned Erdogan that there was a coup going on. [Putin] basically saved his life."
Yet, trying to get a handle on Erdogan's intentions is a difficult task for the uninitiated. He has consolidated presidential power and shifted the secular foundations of the country towards a more populist, islamist agenda.
One could be forgiven for thinking that the Turkish strongman is looking to rebuild the Ottoman Empire, but Turkey's position as a Black Sea power means that Ankara's hand has been forced when it comes to walking the diplomatic tightrope in the region.
"[Turkey] has a very strong relationship with Russia. Gas imports from Russia go through the Black Sea. And Turkey is a partner with Zelensky in Ukraine. They have a strategic partnership ... providing them with drones. They were working on building an industrial partnership in the weapons industry.
"At the same time, they work with the Russians. So, they had no choice than to remain neutral in this crisis. They were engaged with both sides," says Schmid.
She believes that Erdogan understood very quickly that the Turks want to remain neutral in this war.
"What I heard from the very beginning of the Russian offensive in Ukraine, coming from Turkey, was that the Turks should remain neutral like they did during the Second World War, which is a very telling, very interesting comparison because they [only] joined the Allies' camp at the very last minute in February 1945, when they were sure that the Nazi side was totally defeated."
Franco-Turkish relations in 2022
Shipping lanes and the Montreux Convention
Turkey is hoping this crisis will be short-lived, because the longer it goes on, the bigger the problems for Ankara as it controls the Bosporus Strait.
As a NATO member, Turkey is compelled to police a blockade on Russian shipping, but was hesitant at first.
"At the beginning of the crisis, there was a call from Zelensky for them to close the Bosporus to Russian ships," Schmid explains.
The Turks reportedly waited for a few days, evaluated the situation and decided that Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine was indeed a war.
Under the Montreux Convention, where Turkey is allowed to close the Bosporus Strait to all warships in times of war and to permit merchant ships free passage, they had to block ships.
"The Turks had this ambivalence to play with and then decided that they would block Russian ships. Ankara knew it would come under strong pressure from the Allies to revise the Montreux Convention," says Schmid.
According to the IFRI academic, the Montreux Convention only protects Turkey's sovereignty: "Turkey can interpret the Montreux Convention according to their own interests. So far they've decided – after letting the necessary military capacities from the Russians to enter the Black Sea – to stop it because they wanted to keep a balance.
"But they've been accused of letting commercial ships pass through smuggling arms, to the theatre of operations. So they are under [intense] surveillance."
Turkey's showcase at NATO summit
So with Turkey's pivotal position within NATO and the warring parties on the Black Sea, how has Erdogan played his cards with suspicious allies at the June summit in Madrid?
"We don't know exactly what Turkey's checklist was at the summit, but we see it as it was – a formidable opportunity for Turkey to show off and explain to the world that it was an opposition force within NATO.
"This crisis is all about the reintegration of Turkey within the NATO community," she says.
According to Schmid, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined their priorities for the summit to her directly.
"Number one, Russia. Because Russia is dangerous, which is very interesting.
"Number two, the PKK. The West has to understand that they're terrorists. It's not only Turkey's problem, it's about terrorism. So this wide label makes it makes it easier for the other partners to endorse Turkey's position. But they've been mainstreaming this PKK issue within NATO for the last 10 years.
"The third point was China. Why China? Because they know it's on the US agenda," Schmid concludes, as Ankara knows it needs to play that card when dealing with Washington.
The bottom line is that Turkey is back, centre stage, defending its own interests.
Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.
Recorded and edited Vincent Pora.
Full Interview: NATO and the Erdogan paradox - Dorothée Schmid
Dorothée Schmid is an expert on Mediterranean and Turkey issues with the French Institute of International Relations, IFRI.
