Since August 6, the war in Ukraine has become a tale of two major offensives. Ukrainian forces have invaded Russia, grabbing more than 1,000 square kilometres of Kursk Oblast, which they are now defending fiercely. At the same time, in the Donbas in eastern Ukraine, Russian forces are moving on three key logistical centres, Pokrovsk, Tonetsk, and Chasiv Yar.
It is far from certain that either operation can deliver a knockout blow. If the fighting continues at this rate to the end of the month, both sides risk running out of steam and crucial resources, in personnel, weaponry and support. Splits are reported in the leaderships in Kyiv and Moscow.
There is a change in the dynamics in Europe’s biggest war since 1945, and it is far from clear that the outside world, the western allies of Ukraine particularly, has taken this on board.
Ukraine opened the front in Kursk with almost total surprise. The Russians were unprepared, and even Kyiv’s closest western allies, the US and UK, were kept in the dark deliberately.
The Ukraine command under Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi had decided the allies, and their media especially, couldn’t be trusted with a secret. They blame the allied governments and their leaky press for ruining last summer’s offensive.
Russia has the depth of resources in theory — yet there are reports of corruption and chaos
They leaked that the Ukrainians were going to make a main push from the west onto the strategic provincial capital of Kherson. Forewarned, on June 6 the Russians blew up the Kakhovka dam, making the advance from the west impossible, flooding thousands of hectares of prime farmland and causing the biggest ecological disaster in the region since the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown of 1986.
Ukraine kept up the momentum of surprise this week with an overnight strike on Moscow with 45 drones. The aim was psychological as much as kinetic, to throw the Russian leadership and command off balance.
This appears to have had some success. Vladimir Putin seems unsure who he can trust to take charge of operations in Kursk, which is the first land invasion of Russia by a foreign power since Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.
First he ordered his former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin to take charge. Now the recapture of lost territory is to be supervised by a committee using FSB, former KGB, security troops and the Rosgvardiya gendarmerie, the national guard.
Russia has the depth of resources to sustain a far longer campaign than Ukraine — in theory, at least. However, there are reports of poor equipment, corruption in the defence industries, and chaotic logistics — emphasised by the Ukrainian air force destroying three bridges over the Seym river, vital for resupply convoys. Numerous social media channels report firsthand that totally untrained conscripts are being brought to the front in both the Kursk and Donbas sectors.
On the other side, disharmony in the Kyiv leadership is being reported by an increasingly tetchy western press and commentariat — with hints from august journals like the Economist and New York Times that President Volodymyr Zelensky and General Syrskyi are taking unwarranted risks.
There are now three sets of questions that, most likely, will determine the fate of Ukraine by the end of year.
First, there is the simple question of whether the present scheme of manoeuvre on the battlefield or in information, in its psychological operations especially, can bring lasting success for Kyiv.
Related to this is the question of how much support Ukraine can expect from its western backers and allies. How much will change in attitude and funding with a new incumbent in the White House from January, and a likely change of government in Berlin?
The second set of questions relates to how the Ukrainians have effected the surprise break-through in Kursk. They have managed to neutralise Russian domination of the air space over the close battle — to gain superiority in drone warfare and beat Russia’s electronic warfare devices — and against the odds. Russia’s air forces have been blunted, save in their ability to use refurbished “glide” bombs on civilian targets.
Third, there is the now urgent issue of how much latitude the allies will allow Kyiv to use their weapons over contested Russian territory, especially the air-launched missiles like the Anglo-French Storm Shadow, German Taurus, and the potent American AGM-158 JSSM.
The western allies must evolve a sustained strategy for months and years to back Kyiv — and not be over-distracted by the race for the White House, and chronic crisis in the Middle East.
Now is not the time for the axis of democracies to lose interest in the fate and destiny of Kyiv.
