Ministers are more collegiate than you might think. They'll do the nightmare media round, defend the indefensible, cling to absurdist logic – on one condition. If the prime minister sends them into battle, the line to take must not subsequently change. Because then, the punches they have endured are rendered worthless.
And it was this, more than almost anything else, that ultimately ended Boris Johnson's premiership. Ministers were frequently despatched to hold the line on Partygate, only for it to later (and we're talking hours here) transpire that the prime minister was present, or was aware, or some other half-truth had been exposed.
Which brings us to the present day and this question: why were ministers sent out on Tuesday morning to defend, or at least deflect from, comments made by Conservative Party donor Frank Hester about Diane Abbott MP that byathe evening Rishi Sunak himself had characterised as "racist and wrong"?
Similarly, why was the prime minister so cautious in his condemnation of former deputy party chair Lee Anderson, regarding his "Islamist" remarks about Sadiq Khan? It's not mere incompetence – it drives at the heart of what the Conservative Party is for.
In a first-past-the-post electoral system such as Britain's, political parties are necessarily coalitions. That is why Labour is home to both John McDonnell and Alison McGovern. Similarly, the Tories make space for both Caroline Noakes and Miriam Cates. For goodness sake, even the Liberal Democrats used to pretend that Charles Kennedy shared anything in common with Jeremy Browne.
Sunak has been slow to condemn fairly obvious examples of racism made by people in or attached to the Conservatives in large part because he fears that his voter coalition may turn against him. I think this is wrong for two reasons. First, political leaders ought to condemn racism. And second, Sunak doesn't know who his coalition of voters are, or even should be.
David Cameron understood his. That Tory Party was comprised of urban and rural dwellers, the socially liberal and conservative, the old and young(ish), those on the housing ladder and a slice of those who needed a little help to climb aboard. This coalition wasn't quite enough to generate large parliamentary majorities. but it was coherent, and George Osborne knew who he needed to keep on side at the Budget.
Of course, Brexit put paid not just to Cameron's premiership, but his painstakingly assembled coalition. So the party changed. The Tories went from having a prime minister who considered Ukip to be full of 'swivel-eyed loons' to effectively swallowing Farage whole. From an electoral perspective, this worked out well, producing an 80-seat majority in 2019. But that too is now crumbling.
Reform UK poses both an electoral and ideological challenge to the Conservatives. Reform need not win any seats to deprive the Tories of scores of wins across the country. So Sunak has a decision to make: does he chase those voters to his right, stick to what is currently a losing strategy, or pivot to the centre?
In effect, he's tried all three, often simultaneously. That is how you pass your Rwanda Bill, spend your conference speech trashing the record of previous Conservative administrations and hire Cameron as your foreign secretary, all in the same year. But this fails to answer the fundamental question: who is a Tory voter?
Looking at the polls, the answer is: hardly anyone. But more seriously, the Tories under Sunak don't seem to know. The party pivots right by taking on illegal migration and political extremism, but without solutions, this merely serves to raise the salience of these issues and shine a light on the government's failure to resolve them.
The Tories have already changed their voter coalition once in government – no mean feat. It appears likely that the next time will be done in opposition. Spending time out of power doesn't necessarily mean it will make the right decision (see: the history of the Labour Party). But at least it grants you space and time.
Ultimately, to win British general elections, you need a voting coalition that will deliver you a smattering over 40 per cent. But before that can happen, you must have an understanding of who you want that broad coalition to be comprised of.
Sunak does not seem to know. And so he all too often finds himself saying nothing at all.
