My recent research trip to the Thai town of Mae Sot on the Myanmar border coincided with two big events. The heavens opened for several days with the first big rains of the monsoon season. And across the border, the Myanmar opposition forces took control of Lashio, a major military stronghold and key city on Myanmar’s trade route with China.
On July 25, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic opposition group, claimed it had captured the Northeast Regional Military Command of the Myanmar junta. It is the first time one of the 14 regional military commands around the country has fallen to an ethnic armed group in more than 50 years of military rule.
The rebels claim the regional commander was also captured – the highest ranking military officer to be apprehended. And they said more than 4,000 troops had been arrested.
This is an historic and humiliating setback for Myanmar’s military junta in its war with the opposition forces, which are comprised of ethnic armed groups and the People’s Defence Force, drawn from the democratic opposition.
But will this offensive be a turning point? While there remains no clear end point for the civil war, the opposition continues to make significant gains. This is giving them important resources, a significant morale boost and leverage in any future negotiations.
For Myanmar’s neighbours, particularly China, there is also increasing concern over the instability in the region and growing impatience with the junta.
What is happening in Shan State?
The recent successes by the opposition forces in northern Shan State are part of the second phase of Operation 1027. This operation was launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a group of ethnic rebel armies – in October.
In January, after the alliance took over the cyber-scamming centre of Laukkai on the Chinese border, China brokered a ceasefire between opposing forces.
In June, however, the military attacked rebel targets from the air and hostilities resumed. The alliance began rapidly advancing across Shan State and neighbouring Mandalay region, taking control of key towns such as Nawnghkio and Mogok, a lucrative hub for ruby production.
The biggest prize of the offensive, however, was the military’s Northeast Regional Command, which oversees the junta’s operations across Shan State. While some fighting continues, the MNDAA is tightening the noose around the remaining junta forces and setting up its own civil administration.
The rebels also took control of the local prison and released 200 political prisoners, including Tun Tun Hein, who was deputy speaker of the Myanmar parliament’s lower house and a key figure in Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party before the coup.
A map of the area taken by the opposition in the first and second phases of the offensive demonstrates the extent of their dominance across the state.
What is China’s role in the conflict?
China plays a somewhat ambiguous role in Myanmar’s conflicts and the extent of its influence, while undoubtedly significant, is difficult to gauge. It managed to negotiate a ceasefire between the combatants in January, but appeared to be unable to prevent both sides from returning to hostilities.
Myanmar’s mountainous borders with China and Thailand have always been unregulated grey zones with opium growing, methamphetamine production, gambling and online scam centres, along with more traditional natural resource extraction.
This has provided huge opportunities for the armed insurgent groups – as well as the military and its cronies – to accumulate wealth to fund their operations.
There is a complex interplay between the various ethnic militias in the region and their relationships with China.
The United Wa State Army, for instance, has a 30,000-strong military force and runs two autonomous border regions in Shan State, supported by China. During the rebel alliance’s attacks on Lashio, the army entered the city “to protect residents, its liaison office, and properties it owns”, although it made clear it received permission from both the junta and the MNDAA and that it wouldn’t be taking sides.
While the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are relatively independent, rather than Chinese pawns, the recent movements by the Wa indicate that China may be losing confidence in the ability of the junta to manage and control its northern frontiers. As a result, China may be deploying its ethnic proxy army instead.
What happens now?
On July 22, the junta announced that coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing would become Myanmar’s interim president, replacing Myint Swe due to health issues. This is in addition to his responsibilities as commander in chief of the military, prime minister and chair of the ruling State Administration Council.
A few days later, the junta again extended Myanmar’s state of emergency by six months in order to “prepare valid and accurate ballots” for elections. However, these proposed elections will likely never happen. Even if a vote of some sort is held, it will be so bereft of legitimacy it will be rendered meaningless.
The last democratic elections, held in November 2020 before the February 2021 coup, were a fair representation of the electorate’s will. Voters comprehensively rejected any role for the military in running the country.
As the monsoon gradually shifts from Myanmar’s southern lowlands to the mountainous northern border regions, opposition forces will endeavour to solidify their control over Shan State.
There is very little chance that negotiations alone will resolve the conflict in Myanmar – the military leadership and Min Aung Hlaing have too much to lose, unless their hand is forced.
As a result, it’s up to the international community to assist the pro-democracy forces however they can – militarily, diplomatically and through humanitarian aid – so the country can finally achieve a lasting peace.
Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
