The 2022 Asean summit in Cambodia on Nov 10–13 is approaching. Because the crisis in Myanmar goes to the heart of questions about Asean's role in the region, this will no doubt be one of the more problematic issues on the leaders' agenda.
Asean's policy is based on the Five-Point Consensus which its leaders agreed in April 2020. But immediately after it was adopted, Myanmar's military leader Min Aung Hlaing made it clear he would not implement it until his regime's own Five-Point Roadmap had been realised. But the overall objective of Min Aung Hlaing's roadmap is to ensure the military's own survival and not the restoration of democracy.
Myanmar's uncompromising military leaders have resisted all efforts to start a serious dialogue with Asean, even in the face of an imploding economy and formidable domestic hostility, including a much stronger-than-expected country-wide armed resistance movement.
Since the coup, the regime has lost effective control of vast swathes of the country. While its security forces rely heavily on air power in their fight against strongly motivated resistance troops, they fail as an occupying force. The military mostly attacks specific towns, villages and resistance strongholds, but its capacity to hold onto territory is limited.
Discussions over the past two months, including at the UN General Assembly's High-Level Meeting in New York, have shown growing unease and frustration with the lack of progress with the Five-Point Consensus.
Asean must ask itself whether it should tweak its modus operandi to ensure it remains fit for purpose.
In today's rapidly changing environment, regional and multilateral structures are changing all around us. To ensure its effectiveness in the international arena, Asean too will have to re-calibrate its current policies and practices.
In the run-up to the summit, Asean has been making it clear to Myanmar that the lack of progress with the Five-Point Consensus is unacceptable. Among Asean members, Malaysia has taken an encouraging lead in summit preparations.
Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah has challenged others to re-examine Asean's policy to develop a framework with a clear endgame, and hold inclusive and fair consultations with stakeholders in Myanmar, including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).
Indonesia has also been proactive and has called for a special Asean foreign ministers meeting at the end of this month, intended to reassess Myanmar's strategies. The Philippines' new president has indicated an interest in playing a role but it remains unclear what this might entail.
If the upcoming Asean summit is committed to making real progress, it will have to go beyond the current Five-Point Consensus which has not met its objectives.
Malaysia's proposal that Asean re-examine it and develop a new framework deserves serious consideration.
The underlying analysis was flawed from the beginning. It wrongly assumed that the Myanmar crisis is a typical case of two rival political communities. In reality, it is a national uprising against an illegitimate and brutal military regime that wages war against its own people. When drafting, Asean's leaders deliberately excluded a call for the release of all political prisoners. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of 4 Oct, Myanmar is holding 12,563 political prisoners.
Additional pressing issues to be addressed in the lead-up to the summit include (i) the position of the Asean Special Envoy, (ii) partnering with other international stakeholders, (iii) elections the Myanmar regime is planning next year, and (iv) the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
A critical point that runs across these issues is that the voices of Myanmar's people must be heard and acted upon. Without this, agreements will be destined to fail. This implies involving the NUG and other key representatives of Myanmar's people, including civil society.
Until now, Asean's lead role has received support from many other actors in the international community. But after 18 months without meaningful progress, that support is waning. Many now believe that Asean should also include others in its efforts to secure far-reaching and sustainable change. The organisation might consider a mix of stakeholders, some from Asean and some from other countries and institutions, including independent experts.
In this context, it is important to note that only two of Myanmar's five immediate neighbours are Asean members: Thailand and Laos. Of Myanmar's 6,158 kilometres of land borders, less than 40% are borders with Thailand and Laos. The other neighbours are India, China and Bangladesh. All five carry the burden, and the attendant responsibilities, of immediate proximity to Myanmar.
Without better cooperation among Myanmar's neighbours, dealing with significant cross-border effects will remain elusive. In the post-coup environment, these have not only grown dramatically, but have also contributed to worsening violence, corruption and impunity. Among others, increased refugee flows and trafficking of persons, drugs production and smuggling and illegal mining of precious stones and rare earth metals have exacted a toll on all Myanmar's neighbours.
On the Special Envoy issue, the Myanmar crisis has shown that continuing to link this position to the annually rotating Asean chairmanship exacts a price in terms of continuity and decisiveness.
The leaders should consider de-linking the envoy from the rotating chairmanship. They should also make it a full-time position with dedicated resources to do the job.
Myanmar plans to hold elections in 2023, even though the conditions for free and fair elections cannot possibly be met. Not only has the regime jailed many politicians, but it has also amended electoral laws and is planning to replace the current first-past-the-post system with a system of proportional representation. Such a system would favour the military and its affiliated parties.
The regime is keen because it views controlled elections as a vehicle to legitimise its violent coup. Asean should communicate clearly that such elections are unacceptable. They would entrench the roots of the current crisis.
In the run-up to the Asean summit, the most urgent issue is the need to accelerate humanitarian assistance, including assistance by Asean itself.
Local humanitarian organisations have been clear. Utmost care must be taken to ensure that relief assistance is not instrumentalised for political and military purposes. Current Asean plans include an unacceptable role for the military regime.
The very idea that the regime would have anything to do with the provision of assistance to the same populations it is brutalising, has rightly enraged many. Depriving communities of basic relief supplies has become textbook operating procedure for the military.
Asean is using the Asean Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Center) to deliver its assistance. But after months of deliberation little has been achieved.
In the current environment, effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is possible only if all actors, including Asean, respect international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles.
A military regime that stands accused of ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity must not be allowed to play a role in decision-making and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Laetitia van den Assum is a former Netherlands ambassador and a former member of the Rakhine Advisory Commission, headed by Kofi Annan. Kobsak Chutikul is a former elected member of parliament and a retired ambassador of Thailand.
