[This is the four post in my series on my mission to Israel. You can read Parts I, II, and III.]
Though I don't particularly care for American politics, I generally understand how the various systems work. With regard to foreign governments, I neither care about their political systems, nor understand how they work. I write this post about Israeli political system with some trepidation, but I think it is relevant to understand the current situation with regard to the hostages.
In December 2022, Benjamin Netanyahu (known as Bibi) formed a government in parliament. His coalition included several members from (what are known as) far-right parties. A leading charge of the new government was judicial reform. Indeed, as I wrote in Part III, these reforms were viewed as essential to liberate the people from the rule of elite lawyers. Unsurprisingly, elite lawyers who wiled this power opposed these changes. These proposals triggered massive nationwide protests. Every Saturday night, people took to the streets of Israel to oppose changing the courts. They went on labor strikes and shut down roads. Society ground to a halt. Indeed, these protests spread to America, though I suspect most of the people marching knew as much about the Israeli Supreme Court as the kids at Columbia know which river and sea border Israel. After sustained protests, the government backed away from most of the proposals. (And those proposals that were passed were later declared unconstitutional.)
But then October 7 happened. And at least for a while, the protests ceased. I think most Israelis formed a sense of solidarity. There was a collective purpose–to bring the hostages home. Throughout Israel, signs appear with the faces of the hostages. The English translation reads "Bring them home," "Bring him home," or "Bring her home." But not everyone agreed on what those signs mean. Was it a charge to Hamas to release the hostages? Or was it a charge to the Netanyahu government to negotiate with Hamas to bring the hostages home?
Soon enough, the Saturday night protests returned. During my visit, the protest on the nine month anniversary of 10/7 swept across the nation. I asked what exactly the people were protesting: the return of the hostages or the Netanyahu government. The answer was both. The dynamics here are complicated.
Some of the protestors are calling for an immediate ceasefire to ensure the release of the hostages. Their sole priority is to bring the hostages home, and they will deal with the consequences later. But if Netanyahu agrees to a cease-fire, the "far right" members would leave the coalition, which would result in the dissolution of the current government. And if Netanyahu loses power, critics say, he will become more vulnerable to criminal prosecution on a host of long-standing allegations. So, critics contend, Netanyahu refuses to agree to a ceasefire, even if one would release the hostages, in order to ensure his government continues, and he stays out of legal hot water. Critics of Netanyahu consistently repeat this refrain. See this article in the Jerusalem Post. But things are not that simple.
I asked several critics of Netanyahu to imagine that a ceasefire is reached, a new government is formed, and the hostages are released. What policy should this new government adopt towards Hamas? The answer was consistently I don't know. I ask them what should Israel do to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its terror network and infrastructure. They don't know. So as unpopular as Netanyahu's policy is now, I'm not sure that the critics really have any other idea–other than to reach a ceasefire to return the hostages. Regrettably, many Americans on the left suffer from TDS–Trump Derangement Syndrome. I think at least some Israelis suffer from a different type of BDS–Bibi Derangement Syndrome. They are so morally opposed to everything Bibi does that they are unable to see some of the value in the difficult decisions he is making.
Then there is the issue of what a ceasefire would entail. As one international lawyer explained to me, every state retains the inherent power of self defense. Even if some deal was reached with Hamas, there is a 100% chance the terrorist organization would breach that agreement and engage in future terrorist attacks. 100%. And those attacks would allow Israel to immediately resume hostilities. One lawyer told me, half-jokingly, that Israel should agree to whatever terms Hamas demands because the terrorists will promptly breach any agreement, thus allowing Israel to resume strikes.
Certainly Hamas understands these dynamics. So why would they ever release all of the hostages? This is their leverage. One lawyer told me that taking a hostage was a very cost-effective means of pressuring Israel. Keeping the hostages also ensures that the weekly protests continue, and Israeli society remains divided. This strategy allows the nation to consume itself. One of the few hostages who was freed from captivity relayed that his captor–who freelanced as a "journalist"–showed him the protests on television. These protests are being used as propaganda by the terrorists to demoralize the hostages. Similar tactics were used during Vietnam with prisoners of war.
All of this is to say that the political situation in Israel is beyond complex. About half the nation hates Netanyahu but there is no coherent strategy, other than a ceasefire that will likely not hold, and will not result in the return of all hostages, but would likely allow Hamas to rebuild its terror infrastructure.
If you think American politics are corrosive, hold my falafel.
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