LANSING, Mich. — The Michigan Supreme Court in a series of five decisions Thursday expanded state statute and federal case law prohibiting mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide, further limiting the circumstances under which Michigan prosecutors and judges can imprison youth offenders for life.
The decision is likely to upset many cases across the state involving so-called "juvenile lifers" who have, in some instances, been sentenced for the same crime multiple times because of successive federal and state changes clarifying how and when youth found guilty of murder can be sentenced to life without the possibility for parole.
In largely 4-3 rulings, the state's highest court created five additional guidelines for resentencing decisions related to youth killers, resulting in tense clashes in opinions between the four Democratic-nominated justices and three Republican-nominated justices.
The majority largely found that the Michigan Constitution's prohibition against "cruel or unusual punishment" is broader than the U.S. Constitution's ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" and so the state's limits on juvenile life sentences should be more extensive than what the nation's highest court handed down in 2012.
In dissenting opinions, the Republican-nominated justices largely characterized the majority's decisions as an overstep that meddled in the Legislature's jurisdiction on shaky constitutional grounds.
"I question whether ... the ratifiers of the Michigan Constitution in 1963 understood the 'cruel or unusual punishment' clause to provide greater protection than what the Eighth Amendment currently provides under our society’s evolving standards of decency," Justice Brian Zahra wrote in a dissent.
Chief Justice Bridget McCormack likened Zahra's interpretation of the "original meaning" of the 1963 constitution, without acknowledging "evolving standards of decency," to using a "ouija board" in 2022 to discern the intent of the ratifiers of the Michigan Constitution.
"...his premise that clear, unanimous original intent can be discerned and applied by judges with superhuman neutrality to resolve legal questions in cases like this is flawed," McCormack wrote.
Eaton County Prosecutor Doug Lloyd, president for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, said the group is reviewing the decision to discern the full effect on current and future cases.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan called the decisions a recognition that fair sentencing for young offenders "is a human right."
"No longer will children be subject to life sentences for lesser, second-degree offenses, and all youth must be given individualized consideration that take their unique circumstances and potential for rehabilitation into account," said Dan Korobkin, legal director for the ACLU of Michigan.
The reconsideration of juvenile offender sentencing rules dates back to a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Miller v. Alabama, that ruled a mandatory life sentence for youth under the age of 18 convicted of first-degree murder was a form of cruel and unusual punishment because youth are less culpable and have greater capacity for rehabilitation.
The decision set up a series of factors prosecutors would have to show to convince a judge that the youth's act reflected "irreparable corruption" and merited a life sentence. Those factors, incorporated into law by the Michigan Legislature in 2014, included the offender's age or immaturity, family environment, the extent of the juvenile's participation in the crime, peer pressures, the youth's ability to participate meaningfully in his or her trial and the possibility for rehabilitation.
The Miller ruling and some subsequent opinions led to multiple resentencing hearings for many juvenile lifers, some of whose cases came back before the Michigan Supreme Court when the youth offenders argued their new sentences still constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
In other cases decided Thursday, 18-year-old offenders or youth precluded from the Miller hearings because they'd been convicted of second degree murder begged the Supreme Court for relief.
In each of the five cases, relief was granted that set up new guidelines for youth offender sentencing. The majority ruled:
Eighteen-year-olds convicted of murder do not automatically merit life in prison without parole and imposing such a mandatory sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, those individuals at sentencing should undergo the same test for culpability reserved for other minors "before condemning 18-year-olds to die behind prison walls," Justice Elizabeth Welch wrote in the majority opinion.
Prosecutors at sentencing bear the burden of showing life without parole is not a disproportionate sentence and must do so with "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant is "irreparably corrupt." They must start with the presumption that the juvenile offender committed a crime because of "transient immaturity." Without that burden, a juvenile defendant is left "to the whims of individual sentencing courts, instead of promoting uniformity and fairness," Justice Megan Cavanagh wrote in that case's majority.
An offender's youth should be considered a mitigating factor at sentencing whether a prosecutor seeks a sentence of life without parole or a term of years, Justice Richard Bernstein wrote in a majority opinion joined in part by Beth Clement, a Republican-nominated justice.
Youth guilty of second-degree murder should not be sentenced to life in prison with parole, in part because it allows prosecutors to give youth offenders with a second-degree murder conviction a life sentence while those with a more serious first-degree murder conviction are allowed a hearing to consider culpability. Further, McCormack noted, the sentence "does not necessarily further the sentencing goal of rehabilitation" for the youth.
An 18-year-old juvenile lifer who's been denied relief under Miller — based on past interpretations limiting it to those under 18, questions of retroactivity and technical issues with the timing of appeals — should have his case reconsidered because of Miller's retroactivity and in light of Thursday's separate decision prohibiting mandatory life in prison without parole for 18-year-olds.
Republican-nominated justices Clement, Zahra and David Viviano offered dissents on most of the decisions.
Arguing against the ruling prohibiting mandatory life sentences for 18-year-olds, Clement noted officials continue to push an arbitrary cutoff for culpability back further and further. She argued the majority's reliance on scientific data regarding the culpability of an 18-year-old is a policy deliberation that should be made by the Legislature.
"Despite the decades of legal experience the justices on this court have, I do not believe we are well-suited for this foray into neuroscience," Clement said.
"...I view the majority's decision as replacing a constitutional penalty with a penalty that the majority believes is better policy."
Viviano argued against the majority's attempt to "micromanage" trial court judges on a presumption that a juvenile offender should not get life without parole, arguing it was a violation of separation of powers.
"To the extent the presumption essentially supplements the statute, it is akin to an amendment of the statute, which is clearly beyond judicial power," Viviano wrote. "...The breadth of the majority’s holding in this case is breathtaking."
Zahra noted, should the Thursday decisions result in a wave of new sentencing hearings, the families of the homicide victims would be the ones to suffer.
"This will exhaust precious judicial resources in an untold number of cases and will not only open up old wounds for the families of victims, but will also subject them to a whole new trauma — the prospect that their loved-ones’ killers will be released from incarceration," Zahra wrote.
