Greater Manchester's Chief Fire Officer has apologised for the 'wholly inadequate and totally ineffective' response of the service on the night of the Arena bombing.
Greater Manchester's Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) has repeatedly apologised after its firefighters took more than two hours to arrive at the scene of the 2017 blast, blaming 'silence' from Greater Manchester Police (GMP). Frustrated firefighters were kept away from the scene due to their bosses' fears of a continuing terror attack even though police and paramedics rushed towards danger.
Firefighters based at Thompson Street fire station in central Manchester, close to the Arena, were even ordered to rendezvous further away, at Phillips's Park fire station, passing ambulances heading in the opposite direction.
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Today Chief Fire Officer David Russel, who was installed in 2020, made another public apology on behalf of the fire service, telling the continuing public inquiry the response on the night was 'wholly inadequate and totally ineffective'.
He told the inquiry and watching families: "We let people down when they needed us the most. I do hope that my witness statement and evidence today serves to demonstrate that the apology issued by my service was more than words and reflects a real and genuine determination of the organisation (not) to repeat the mistakes of that night."
The inquiry is hearing evidence from key figures about the implementation of 'monitored recommendations' suggested by chairman Sir John Saunders, to find out if lessons have been learned.
Mr Russel said the fire service had adopted all the four recommendations made by Sir John. He said they were a 'real driver for change'.
The first recommendation says the fire service should ensure that its commanders are adequately trained in the use of operational discretion, and the witness said this had been implemented. Commanders on the night had been 'paralysed' by indecision, he admitted.
The inquiry has previously heard a series of key commanders were fearful of dispatching firefighters to the scene.
Mr Russel said he wrote to all staff in March 2021 and 'reinforced' the need for 'operational discretion'.
Questioned by Nicholas de la Poer, KC for the inquiry, the witness said when he was installed as fire service chief officer he made this a central part of his work.
He said his efforts were to ensure firefighters were 'driven by the desire to make a difference rather than fear of making mistakes'.
The inquiry heard 'operational discretion' had been in place since 2014, but Mr Russel said he wanted his commanders to 'have the confidence to step out' of normal practice when it was required.
The witness said an incident command training program had been updated to bolster 'operational discretion'.
Since 2017, he said the service had used 'operational discretion' 37 times, citing one case involving an ammonia leak at a premises in Bury when an on-site engineer wearing protective equipment was dispatched to identify the correct valve to release tons of ammonia into the atmosphere.
Each time such discretion is used, it recorded and 'requires a full debrief', said Mr Russel.
Sir John put to the witness that firefighters on the night felt 'shame' that they had been held back, and he asked whether 'trust has been restored' between the firefighters and commanders.
The chief fire officer said: "From my appointment in September 2020 I have set culture as my number one priority and joining the service I have visited all 41 fire stations and invested hundreds of hours in talking to firefighters and many years after the arena attack the pain was visibly etched on their faces in respect of their inability to respond that night."
He added: "We have undoubtedly created a much more inclusive culture in GMFRS which is more open and tolerant to mistakes and in many ways I genuinely believe that's translated into front line work - so firefighters that have an increasing level of trust and confidence in their commanders to make the right decisions, and it's important for commanders listen to and need to hear what firefighters may have to say so our decision-making to incidents is as round as it can possibly be."
The inquiry has found a series of failings in three damning reports in the wake of the May 2017 terror attack. Suicide bomber Salman Abedi killed himself and 22 innocents when he detonated a huge improvised device in his backpack as concert-goers were leaving an Ariana Grande gig.
The first of three inquiry reports, published in June 2021 by inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders, found 'serious shortcomings' by the venue's owners SMG, their security contractor Showsec and British Transport Police (BTP). Sir John ruled the terrorist should have been identified that night and, had he been, 'the loss of life and injury is highly likely to have been less', a conclusion that angered families of those who died.
Sir John's second report ruled one of those who died, John Atkinson, could have survived if the emergency services response had been better. It also highlighted a series of failures by the emergency services on the night of the attack. Mr Atkinson wasn’t tended to by any paramedics in the foyer where the bomb went off and his early care was left to former pizza shop boss Ronald Blake, who held a makeshift tourniquet fashioned from his wife's belt and folded t-shirts for almost an hour.
Partly because of austerity cuts, Greater Manchester Police failed to keep up-to-date plans in place for major incidents and then, when a key training exercise revealed a key command position would become overwhelmed in the event of a real attack, they failed to learn lessons, Sir John's highly-critical report said.
Because of previous training exercises and experience of major incidents, GMP 'knew' its Force Duty Officer - a key hub who is supposed to communicate with the other blue light services - would become overwhelmed during a terror attack. The failure of the FDO on the night of the 2017 attack, Insp Dale Sexton, to communicate with other blue light agencies 'played a major part in the total failure of joint working that night', said Sir John.
Yesterday Deputy Chief Constable Terry Woods, of GMP, said the force was now 'far better placed' to cope in the event of another attack.
In March, Sir John's final report found the security services missed opportunities to stop the bombing, prompting MI5 to apologise.
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