Following a campaign marred by widespread and credible allegations of massive interference by Russia and pro-Russian proxies, Moldova’s incumbent president, Maia Sandu, has won another term in the second round of presidential elections.
According to preliminary results published by the country’s central electoral commission on November 3, Sandu beat her second-round challenger, Alexandr Stoianoglo, with 55% of the vote and on a higher turnout than in the first round of elections on October 20.
There were more than 180,000 votes between the incumbent and her challenger. In a country with an electorate of just over three million people, this is a significant margin, especially when compared with the razor-thin yes vote in the EU referendum that was on the same day as the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago. In that election, Sandu came first with 42%, compared to Staionoglo’s 26%, but in the EU poll, just 10,000 votes separated the yes and the no votes.
Sandu, who campaigned on a strongly pro-European platform, prevailed despite pro-Russian interference and fearmongering and a campaign by Stoianoglo that emphasised the importance of good relations with both Moscow and Brussels.
Moldova’s election result will certainly have come as a relief not only to Sandu and her supporters but also to Moldova’s western partners. It is the first time that a popularly elected president has won a second term in the tiny landlocked former Soviet republic. The country borders Romania and Ukraine and has a small but significant Russian breakaway region, Transnistria, as a constant reminder of Moscow’s influence in the region.
Moldova’s election presents a clear difference to the Georgian parliamentary election results on October 26, which saw an openly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party win an election considered as neither particularly free nor fair, in results that the Georgia’s opposition-aligned president and western pollsters allege have been rigged.
Sandu’s win, by contrast, demonstrates both the appeal of the idea of a European future and the limits of Russian interference. Yet the understandable enthusiasm about the result in Moldova also needs to be tempered by a more careful analysis of some of the deeply entrenched societal cleavages that the elections have all but confirmed and the difficulties that lie ahead.
Deep divisions
Sandu’s win overall looks impressive. But she did not win the vote in Moldova itself, where Stoianoglo beat her by some 30,000 votes. What saved Sandu, like the EU referendum, was the strong support for her among voters in the diaspora, where she captured almost five times as many votes as Stoianoglo.
Just over 270,000 votes (83%) of the votes cast by Moldovans living abroad, predominantly in western Europe and north America, saw her comfortably across the finishing line. There may be good reasons not to distinguish between votes from inside and outside Moldova – but the optics are not good.
Nor can the overall margin of Sandu’s victory gloss over the fact that her supporters inside the country are predominantly concentrated in the capital and the centre of the country. In the capital Chisinau, in the centre of Moldova, Sandu won with 57%, representing almost one-third of her total vote inside the country. In the north and south of the country, Stoianoglo generally took the largest vote share.
In the country’s second-largest city, Balti in the north, he won 70% of the vote, compared to Sandu’s 30%. In the southern autonomous region of Gagauzia, a hotbed of pro-Russian, anti-European activism, Sandu obtained less than 3%. In Transnistria, Sandu came away with just 20% of the vote.
These results are not surprising, given the outcome of the first round of the elections. But they represent fall in support for Sandu compared to in 2020, when she beat the then incumbent, socialist party leader Igor Dodon. Four years ago, Sandu obtained over 250,000 votes more than Dodon, winning almost 58% of the total vote. While she took the overwhelming share of the diaspora vote then as well, she also bested Dodon in most constituencies in the south.
Dodon campaigned for Stoianoglo in this election, but much of the challenger’s support was very probably due to a massive pro-Russian interference campaign that capitalised on many Moldovans’ fears and frustrations. Pro-Moscow messages aimed to capitalise on fears about being dragged into Russia’s war against Ukraine.
But there was also frustration with a government that has made little progress on much needed anti-corruption reforms and presided over a serious cost-of-living crisis in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and made worse by the war on Moldova’s eastern neighbour. Sandu’s party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a commanding majority in the 2021 elections – so failures of the government are seen as failures of Sandu and her agenda.
Challenges ahead
That Sandu won the presidency again, and against these odds, demonstrates her resilience. But it can’t be taken for granted that her party will similarly prevail in parliamentary elections due by the autumn of 2025. She may well be forced into a difficult cohabitation with a potentially socialist-led government next year. In a parliamentary democracy, in which the powers of the government by far exceed those of the president, this could significantly slow down Moldova’s EU accession negotiations.
But there are also some silver linings on the horizon. That Sandu won clearly demonstrates the limits of Russian interference. There is a core part of the Moldovan electorate that cannot be swayed by Russian misinformation or vote buying. This is a basis on which Sandu and PAS can build.
Perhaps more importantly, Sandu and Stoianoglo both sent conciliatory signals on election eve. Stoianoglo emphasised the importance of respecting the outcome of the democratic process and expressed the hope that Moldovans would now move beyond hatred and division. Sandu acknowledged the concerns of those who had not voted for her and promised to serve as the president of all Moldovans and to work for the country’s further development.
If they both stay true to their word, Moldova may finally break with a past of repeated political crises and economic stagnation.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
