Turnout at the 2024 general election was just 60% – one of the lowest in modern history. This is not an isolated phenomenon: there was a decline in turnout for the 2024 local elections, and the byelections held during the 2019-2024 parliament had the lowest recorded average turnout since 1945.
Given the critical role that elections play in democratic societies and how turnout affects the legitimacy of a government, it’s important to understand why citizens choose not to vote. New evidence suggests that these low levels of participation can be explained by the rise of undecided voters. In a system that offers more parties to choose from than ever but is also characterised by voters’ weakened attachment to political parties, the result seems to be people staying home on election day.
Voter indecision has grown in many western democracies over the past 50 years. In the UK, polling data from February and March 2024 showed that roughly 17% of voters were undecided and 45% of those who had decided said they might change their mind before polling day. In a YouGov poll reported as late as two days before the July 4 election, 12% of voters said they had not made up their minds.
This level of uncertainty was not always the case. The British electorate’s voting behaviour used to be far more predictable because of strong partisan attachments. Historically, most voters in Britain identified with either Labour or the Conservative party, and a smaller subset preferred the Liberal Democrats. Deciding who to vote for was relatively straightforward. If turnout dropped it was most likely because people did not feel the election was a particularly important one or because they felt the outcome was certain. It was not driven by voter indecision.
This is no longer the case, partly because there are so many parties to choose from. It was once thought that choice-rich environments increase participation because it’s easier for people to find a party they like when there are more parties on offer. But recent evidence contests this. Theory from the decision-making literature shows that complex choice environments can lead to what’s called choice avoidance – that is, not making a choice at all. When a person does not have a clear singular preference, and therefore likes two or more of the options to a similar degree, they defer their choice until later.
British elections have a deadline of polling day, meaning citizens can’t postpone choosing. And they’re majoritarian, which means only one option can be chosen. Without a singular preference, the decision to vote becomes psychologically burdensome, as these voters must weigh the competing party platforms.
New evidence shows that the British electorate is exhibiting choice avoidance. Undecided voters who like two or more parties to a similar degree are ten percentage points less likely to vote than those who have a clear party preference. This is a substantial difference in participation rates. Somewhere between 28% and 42% of adults in Britain fall into this category – a significant proportion of the electorate.
The new evidence also shows that constituency marginality has no effect on turnout intention. In other words, it is not the closeness of the election that turns people off voting but rather how certain or uncertain they feel about their choice.
Our reduced attachment to parties also plays a role here. Those with a party identity are significantly more likely to vote, even if they are somewhat undecided between parties. Similarly, voters who pay more attention to politics are less likely to experience indecision and are more likely to vote.
There was some evidence that voting indecision decreases with age, and that those living in Scotland were more likely to have a clear preference than those in England. Those with similar preferences for two or more parties are also much more likely to switch the party they vote for between elections.
Volatile voters
In the 1960s, approximately 90% of Britons identified with a party. Now the highest estimate shows only around 45% of the electorate report having a strong party identity. Voter volatility, which is when citizens switch parties between elections, is the highest it has ever been.
And those volatile voters have more options than ever. Britain was, for a very long time, a two-and-a-half party system in which votes were concentrated almost entirely among the Conservatives and Labour, with the Liberal Democrats on the fringes. In 2024, 90% of seats had five mainstream parties on the ballot – the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green and Reform UK, plus the SNP in all of Scotland and Plaid Cymru in all of Wales. On top of that, there were more than 900 independents or other parties fielding candidates.
A non-partisan voter therefore has more parties than ever competing for their vote. It takes more cognitive effort to choose and voters are also absorbing often conflicting, or strikingly similar, arguments from multiple sources. A 2024 voter could have been moved by Lib Dem leader Ed Davey’s personal story, but thought that Reform’s Nigel Farage was a more truthful politician than others, and also wanted some of the Greens’ policies enacted. The same voter might have thought that former prime minister Rishi Sunak was best to handle the economy, but that then opposition leader Keir Starmer would overall make the better prime minister, all at the same time. Who are they supposed to vote for if they’re cross-pressured like that? It’s a difficult choice.
These findings show that citizens find it difficult to settle on a choice in first-past-the-post elections with multiple parties on offer. The electoral system was never meant to accommodate these numerous parties. Some have revisited calls for electoral reform since the 2024 election.
If Britain were to move to a more proportional system, it might alleviate some of the participation problem. Certain voting systems allow voters to express more than one preference, meaning their choice becomes a little easier. That might make people currently staying at home more likely to cast a vote.
Hannah Bunting receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
