It is still unclear how many North Korean soldiers will find their way onto the killing fields of eastern Ukraine. What is clear is that the drive to recruit fighting forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is at least in part politically motivated. But is it also a tactical masterstroke that will boost the Russian war machine’s chances of a definitive victory?
The political aspect appears straightforward. The use of foreign forces from an enemy of the United States demonstrates a clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order. It also deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.
But despite boosting troop numbers, there are multiple problems with these would-be mercenaries from the far east joining Putin’s forces on the front line in Europe. North Korea is impoverished and authoritarian. This means its personnel are mostly poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished. Where and how they are deployed will, therefore, likely be critical.
If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches. Most would surely be killed by FPV (first-person view) drones or western tank fire.
Defections could well pose an additional risk. If commanded outside the immediate control of Korean officers in the field, some will doubtless view this as a chance to escape oppression and poverty in their homeland. Desertions en masse to the Ukrainian side might become a possibility. Even more so if identified and directed how to surrender by Ukrainian, or other, special forces on the ground.
Considering these seemingly obvious flaws, it would be easy to assume the deliberate showcasing of training camps in eastern Russia for North Korean soldiers is little more than a political gimmick. One that is designed to strike fear into an already struggling Ukrainian army and poke its western backers in the eye. At the same time, there may be cause to think there is more to this move than pure politics.
Rules of engagement
The difference between supplying artillery shells for Russian guns and putting bodies on the line is stark.
But this fundamental difference does not necessarily mean that there is no tactical value to the deployment of Korean forces on the battlefield. The key likely lies in where and how they are deployed.
There is the immediate question of international law. Or, perhaps more importantly, how Nato countries might respond to further breaches of the established rules of engagement by Russian directed foreign forces. For sure, use of Korean mercenaries to fight in the Donbas region, which is recognised by western allies as Ukrainian territory, would constitute a gross violation.
The response from Nato could be rapid and definitive, as it would effectively justify proportionate use of force, including foreign personnel, to counter any subsequent Russian advances. This would likely result in an own goal for Putin. Any initial advantage gained would quickly be lost as friends of Ukraine justifiably enter the fray to push back an illegal Moscow-Pyongyang alliance of aggression. Escalation thereafter would also be a serious and grave concern.
Conversely, if deployed in a combination of technical and logistical roles, or primarily to defend Russian territory, the utility of additional manpower becomes more credible. Not least, it would seem legitimate from an international legal perspective for Russia to seek assistance from alliance partners in repelling Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region of southwestern Russia.
This could deal a double blow to Kyiv. On the one hand it would likely supply sufficient personnel to rapidly finish off the already threadbare Ukrainian forces holding on to captured sovereign Russian territory. At the same time, Moscow’s own military machine would be able to focus its entire attention on the already growing advances being made along the Donbas front.
Distraction from the end game
North Korea’s influence on the international stage has grown since the start of the war in Ukraine as its massive stockpiles of ammunition proved significant in Russia’s attritional tactics. In that respect, the addition of foreign fighters may add a further factor in Moscow’s favour if skilfully deployed and directed.
Ultimately, however, the limited dispatch of inexperienced Korean troops to a war zone in which they have no legal or moral basis to be sent is unlikely to prove decisive. As it stands, with or without the help of forces supplied by North Korea’s despotic leader, Kim Jong-Un, Russia’s brutal military advance looks set to grind on.
In these regards, the arrival of North Koreans to Europe’s worst war for a generation is probably little more than another bizarre episode in this cruel conflict. The real concern is how authoritarian states such as Russia and North Korea can be transformed into something resembling civilised societies that might pursue more positive foreign policy pathways.
Ra Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
