Iran’s decision to sell Russia short-range missiles supplementing Moscow’s existing supplies appears, on the surface, to be a political reversal for Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new reformist president.
He was elected on a promise to lift sanctions and develop more balanced relations with the east and west, especially Europe. The bulk of his diplomatic appointments, including the retention of the former foreign minister Javad Zarif as an adviser, underscored that intention, and already a lively debate had started in Tehran about the extent to which Iran and Russia’s interests truly aligned.
Tehran’s Russia sceptics were making some headway pointing to positions taken by Moscow on the future of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict that undermined Iran’s territorial integrity. There was also anger at Russia’s stance over Iran’s claim to three islands in the strait of Hormuz. In the reformist press, it also became commonplace to allege that Russia was trying to put a stone in the road of better Iranian-European communications.
“It is not right to break relations with Russia or create a conflict, but it is necessary to reach a balance as soon as possible,” said Salal Sadatian, a former Iranian chargé d’affaires in the UK in the 80s. “It is the balance that helps us achieve our goals, if we are looking for 8% growth and attracting foreign capital, we must create a balance.”
Yet in the first big strategic decision since Pezeshkian’s election, the Iranian military has, according to the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, provided as many as 200 short-range missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine, a country of great strategic importance to Europe. It is a mysterious way to start a new chapter in relations with the west.
There are many possible explanations. The first is that Iran, as it claims, has not supplied the weapons. Ultimately, the intelligence that the US says it has been sharing with partners in recent days will be tested on the basis of the missiles expected to slam into Ukraine’s energy infrastructure later this winter. Iran also claims it has not supplied Shahed drones to Moscow, but their distinctive debris is littered around the country they invaded in 2022.
The second explanation is that, in return for the missiles, Russia is supplying something that Iran finds irresistible either in the form of nuclear technology or nuclear materials. Blinken spoke in these terms at his joint press conference with the UK foreign secretary, David Lammy, in London. Iran may have calculated Russia will emerge well from the struggle in Ukraine and wanted to be close to the victor. Russia’s former defence minister Sergei Shoigu was in Tehran recently discussing the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership.
The third is that Pezeshkian is a well-intentioned figure distracted by a multitude of domestic crises. The contract to supply these missiles was, according to the US treasury, signed in late 2023 before his election and the death of the previous president, Ebrahim Raisi, in May.
Pezeshkian could have intervened when, in the summer, Russian military personnel were trained on the use of Iran’s Project 360 CRBMs (close-range ballistic missiles) , but he did not do so. He has already made a series of strategic concessions to the conservatives based on the belief that reformers will make no progress if it goes for a showdown with the unelected state. Moreover, big decisions about relations with the west including a revised nuclear agreement await the election of a new US president. Donald Trump this week said he did not think Iran was trying to undermine US democracy and he could come to an agreement with Tehran, part of his pitch to reduce the cost of US foreign policy entanglements.
The fourth explanation, a variation of the third, is that Pezeshkian is, as is commonly alleged, not in charge of Iran’s foreign and defence policy even if this renders him powerless to implement his new economic policy that is so dependent on Iran breaking out of the sanctions cage. The true foreign policy power brokers in Iran are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Either way, less than 42 days after Pezeshkian’s confirmation by parliament, Iran and the west are back on the familiar treadmill of sanctions and counter-sanctions.
