For an academic, there is nothing like a focused, concentrated encounter with the reality of what you are studying. I was recently part of a delegation to Kyiv of military, intelligence and diplomatic experts organised by the thinktank Globsec. One abiding impression remains – the profound determination of Ukrainian people to fight what almost everyone now accepts is going to be a long war.
At no level is there any appetite for settlement or ceasefire. In the words of a very senior intelligence chief: “A ceasefire would bring us a new war, maybe in 2026 or 2027 after the restoration of Russian [military] potential.” By the same token, very few take the view that Ukraine’s spring offensive will be decisive.
Seeing the war as likely to be long and grinding, Ukrainian senior leaders are focusing on two closely connected elements of sustaining their country’s security into the next (long) phase of the war. First is the prospect of eventual Nato membership. Given the nature of undertakings made so far, the question is likely to be not if, but when. Second, and closely connected, is how the Ukrainians are going to sustain their defence – with or without Nato membership – in the medium and long term.
