It has been clear for some time that the United States should do less in the Middle East, despite the attendant risks and costs—a case that we made in these pages last year (“America’s Middle East Purgatory,” January/February 2019). At the time, some welcomed this argument; others balked at it. Yet the dramatic developments of recent months have underscored the need for the United States to focus less on the region, highlighting both the opportunity costs of remaining entangled and the unique dangers of President Donald Trump’s approach.
Even before the twin crises of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent collapse in oil prices brought a wave of political and economic instability to the Middle East, a new American approach was long overdue. In a region where the United States has long reigned as hegemon, the reality of diminished interests and the resulting diminished influence is painful for many U.S. policymakers and analysts to accept. But as the tide of the pandemic recedes, the region will look rather different—and in this changed landscape, there will be opportunities for the United States as well as dangers.
The challenge for the United States is to protect its remaining and still important interests in an era of austerity and competition, without simply doubling down on the failed approaches of the past. The United States still enjoys opportunities for progress toward a more stable region that do not require expensive or long-term commitments. A focus on constraining geopolitical competition within the region, confronting Iranian behavior more effectively, and resolving proxy conflicts where possible should enable Washington to maintain preponderant influence, doing less in the Middle East without giving up on it altogether.
