In brokering a deal to resurrect diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Chinese President Xi Jinping has achieved a diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East. This is new: China usually refrains from playing a mediating role at all, let alone in the Middle East. And on the surface, it’s significant: Beijing and Moscow—as well as critics of the Biden administration in Washington—have characterized the agreement as a setback for U.S. influence and status in the Middle East and around the world.
Dig a little deeper, however, and the sky is not falling for Washington. On the contrary, while the deal may have temporarily damaged some of the United States’ interests in the region, the upside could significantly outweigh the downside, in both the short and the long terms.
On the negative side of the ledger, U.S. interests and values are not served by deeper cooperation between three autocracies—China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia (and a fourth, Russia, fully supportive in the background). Each suppresses human rights and any campaigns for democracy at home and detests the advance of democrats and democratic ideas abroad, including during the Arab Spring more than a decade ago and in Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty today.
In addition, by brokering the agreement, Xi and his diplomats have scored a boost for China’s image as a promoter of peace and stability. At a time when both Xi and U.S. President Joe Biden have framed U.S.-Chinese relations as competitive and confrontational, a win for Beijing in the Middle East is seen by many as a loss for Washington. Beijing’s diplomatic breakthrough appears to confirm Xi’s hypothesis about China as a rising power and the United States as a declining one. Moreover, in securing this deal, China bolstered its role as the leader of global authoritarianism—a signal to the rest of the world that liberal democracy is fading, while illiberal dictatorship appears to be the future.
The accord also threw a lifeline to the flailing dictatorship in Tehran, a desperate regime that is economically beleaguered, politically cornered at home, and isolated internationally. China had initially threatened its long-standing ties to Iran by nurturing closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Beijing’s rapprochement there amplified Saudi and Arab grievances against Iran, which angered and unnerved Tehran’s theocrats. However, Chinese diplomats then cleverly pivoted back to Iran, reassuring Iran’s leadership and making it willing to give concessions to Saudi Arabia’s leaders in Riyadh. For now, Beijing’s diplomatic breakthrough strengthens Iran’s autocrats, which clearly hurts U.S. national interests. By bolstering the regime in Tehran, the accord weakens Iran’s democratic movement and allows a more stable Iran to assist Russia in its war in Ukraine. When autocrats are cooperating, democrats lose out—in Iran, Ukraine, and elsewhere.
Finally, if implemented, the accord might dampen the possibilities of further Arab-Israeli rapprochement.
But when the totality of U.S. interests is measured, the deal also advances several other U.S. security goals in the region. In the long run, it may even hinder Chinese objectives.
First and most importantly, the resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations will help solidify the truce in Yemen, a horrific proxy war in which the two rivals have been involved. This tragic civil war began in 2014, when the Iranian-backed Houthis took over most of Yemen. This triggered Saudi intervention to restore the government, which, in turn, led to a yearslong cycle of escalation. In 2019, Iranian drones attacked Saudi oil company Aramco’s processing facilities; and in 2021, the Houthis used Iranian arms to radically escalate their missile and rocket attacks on Saudi targets, including civilians. The Saudis responded by attacking targets in Yemen, also perpetrating civilian deaths.
The Biden administration, supported by other countries with a commitment to stopping this war, helped negotiate a truce. But Riyadh refused to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran until Iran agreed to stop supporting the Houthis and their attacks on Saudi Arabia. In signing the accord last week, the mullahs in Tehran acquiesced. That’s good for U.S. national interests, good for Yemen, and also good for democrats in Iran who have long criticized their regime’s intervention in Yemen. The United States wants a more stable Middle East, and the new accord—no matter who brokered it—is positive step towards this goal.
Of course, no one should have any illusions that resumption of diplomatic relations will end all conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Kyiv did not stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, for example. The accord is a positive and necessary step, but a small and easily undone one. Still, more and better communication between Iran and Saudi Arabia might avoid greater conflict, and that is also in U.S. national interest.
Second, it remains to be seen whether the deal’s benefits for Iran’s autocrats will translate into long-term gains. Iran and its nuclear weapon aspirations are still rightly viewed as a security threat, and that won’t change with this agreement. The level of distrust between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains high. If the accord breaks down, Iran is more likely to be blamed, perhaps even by China. With the Iranian democratic movement not fading away anytime soon, the hopelessly corrupt Iranian regime will get a likely respite, but not a lifeline, from the deal. The economy is on the verge of collapse; resistance to the regime, especially from courageous women, has subsided but not died away; and the Iranian diaspora has never been as organized and mobilized to help Iran transition to secular democracy. Diplomatic relations with Riyadh will not eliminate any of these major challenges to the Iranian regime.
Third, scoring this agreement as a long-term loss for U.S. diplomacy is premature. The United States need not and should not try to contain Chinese power on every issue everywhere in the world. That was Washington’s mistake vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War, leading to quagmires such as the Vietnam War and support for despotic rebels such as Jonas Savimbi in Angola. What’s more, the United States today no longer has the resources to pursue total global containment. Instead, the United States must selectively contain China. This Chinese-brokered deal is one of those instances when Washington need not expend energy trying to undermine Beijing. Sometimes Chinese diplomacy can be at least partially complementary to U.S. national interests, which is the case in the Saudi-Iranian deal.
How much should we really care about growing cooperation between these three autocracies?
What’s more, China’s attempts to expand its influence invariably invite overreach and backlash that has already weakened China and could very well be the case with this deal in the long run. Xi now shares the burden of keeping the peace in the Middle East. This is not an easy assignment, as the United States has learned bitterly over the decades. The new agreement could easily fail. The joint statement gives no clarification on how the signing parties will respond to violations or other deviating behavior. How will Chinese diplomats respond to a military exchange between Saudi-backed forces and Iranian-backed forces in Yemen? Or a terrorist attack in one of the two countries, with one blaming the other for supporting it? Or new measures by Israel to stop Iran’s nuclear program? When Saudi-Iranian tensions inevitably reemerge, will China be able to enforce its diplomatic breakthrough without getting pulled more deeply into the region’s complex politics? In this risky gambit, a stumble by Beijing will expose its limitations as a superpower.
Fourth, we should not exaggerate the deal’s negative consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations. The Saudis will continue to rely on the United States for security for years, if not decades, to come. Riyadh has purchased U.S. weapons systems for decades. The United States just completed a massive naval exercise in the region, which included both Saudi Arabia and Israel. And the Saudis are deeply intertwined with the U.S. economy. On March 14, Saudi Arabia signed one of the biggest-ever aircraft orders with Boeing, which the White House described as a landmark deal. None of these U.S.-Saudi ties have been affected by the Chinese-brokered deal. The Saudis also need the United States to mend their relationship with Israel.
At the same time, the warming relationship between Saudi Arabia and China is real and only likely to grow, not least because it is easier for dictators to cooperate among each other. Xi will never criticize Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman for the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Riyadh, just like Tehran, will never criticize Beijing for the latter’s horrific repression of Muslims in Xinjiang. The United States is no longer reliant on Saudi Arabia for oil, while the Saudis see new opportunities for economic cooperation with a major oil importer like China. In return for energy, China can provide Saudi Arabia with much-needed technology, especially for domestic surveillance.
But how much should we really care about growing cooperation between these three autocracies? Do close relations with the Saudi monarchy really serve long-term U.S. interests? Does the United States want to be tied down for decades negotiating and maintaining peace deals between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Or might U.S. national security interests and values be better advanced with less engagement in the Middle East—and especially less engagement in trying to keep the peace between two autocracies? In the new era of great power competition, where U.S. leaders must choose their fights with China carefully, maintaining the peace between two Middle Eastern dictatorships should not be a top priority. Washington has more important interests to pursue and defend, especially in Asia.
If Washington is going to continue engagement in the Middle East, it should not be to shore up Tehran’s regional relationships. Instead, it should be to support peaceful democratic change inside Iran, which would be a game changer for U.S. interests and values and the region. Similarly, the United States should also do more to support human rights inside Saudi Arabia. Shuttle diplomacy between two dictatorships that helps preserve their power at home does not serve U.S. long-term interests well. In fact, having less business with both autocracies might allow the United States and other democracies to play a more principled and forceful role in advancing political pluralism and human rights in the region—which in the long run would be a much more sustainable basis for stability in the Middle East than autocratic rule.
