Russia has resumed critical gas supplies to Europe through Germany, reopening the Nord Stream gas pipeline after 10 days, albeit at a lower capacity. But will this be enough to resolve the pressing energy worries of Germany and the wider continent?
How reliant is Germany on Russian gas?
Natural gas makes up about 27% of Germany’s overall energy mix. Before the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, just over half (55%) of gas consumed in Germany was imported from Russia. Since Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February, the German government has scrambled to source gas from elsewhere, for example by buying more natural gas from Norway or the Netherlands, or by expanding its infrastructure for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US and Qatar. As of the end of June, Germany is only reliant on Russian imports for about a quarter of its gas needs.
This last quarter, however, is required in areas where Germany is particularly vulnerable: to heat private homes and to power the industry of the EU’s largest economy. In both of those areas, gas is the single largest source of energy, at about 37% of the overall mix.
Why is German reliance on Russian gas causing so much anguish?
Currently, very little gas is flowing from Russia to Germany through any of the three pipelines that connect the two countries. The Russian state-owned gas giant Gazprom in May ceased deliveries through the Yamal pipeline passing through Belarus and Poland, while the Ukraine-transiting Transgas, an extension of the Soyuz pipeline from Russia, is prioritising deliveries to Slovakia and Austria. Germany’s most important pipeline, Nord Stream 1, used to carry up to 170m cubic metres of gas a day. But in mid-June Gazprom reduced its deliveries to about 40m cubic metres a day, citing the delayed “repair” of a turbine by the German company Siemens.
On 11 July, Nord Stream closed down for 10 days for scheduled maintenance works, but the assumption in Germany was that Putin would use the break as a pretext to stop gas exports altogether, with reference to further pretend technical issues. A government spokesperson said on Wednesday that the turbine under discussion was a replacement part not due to be put to use until September anyway, and thus could not explain the drastic throttling of deliveries.
On Thursday morning, the company behind Nord Stream 1 announced that gas was flowing through its pipeline once more, although the head of Germany’s federal network agency said Gazprom had said gas would resume only at 30% of its original capacity.
Will Germany run out of gas this winter?
If Gazprom resumes gas deliveries at 40% of the capacity before the maintenance break, Germany will narrowly scrape through the winter without shortages, modelling by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy suggests. Since Germany has rushed to fill its gas reserves in the first half of the year – ironically buying more gas from Russia than usual in spite of economic sanctions – it is expected to avoid being forced into rationing. It would, however, enter the winter of 2023-24 in a considerably worse situation than this year. In a worst-case scenario where Germany can’t get more gas and also fails to make savings, the institute predicts damage to the economy of up to €283bn (£241.5bn).
Either way, there will be pressure on Germany to reduce its gas consumption significantly in the coming months. According to calculations by the Brussels-based economic policy thinktank Bruegel, Germany would have to find reductions of almost 30%, or 20% if it manages to complete two floating LNG terminals in the North Sea ports of Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel by the start of next year, as planned.
If there are shortages, how will rationing work?
Under current plans, private households would be protected from gas rationing along with other “protected” customers such as care homes or hospitals. The brunt of reductions would have to be made by German industry, accountable for about a third of the country’s gas use.
Yet in recent weeks voices from the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have argued that rationing their sector could set off domino effects with catastrophic consequences for the entire economy, and the energy minister, Robert Habeck, has said private households would also need to “play their part”.
Monitoring radiator use or rationing the individual gas supply to millions of private homes would be technically impossible, however, and a more likely outcome is that the government would try to force consumers into making savings through higher bills.
How did Germany end up in this dilemma?
Both Olaf Scholz’s government and that of his predecessor Angela Merkel identified natural gas as an essential “bridge technology” on the path to a renewable energy future. The war in Ukraine, however, is threatening to tear down that bridge.
Germany is due to shut down its last three remaining nuclear power plants by the end of the year, a decision announced by Merkel after an earthquake triggered an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011, but one whose groundwork had been laid by the previous Social Democrat-Green coalition government in 2000. To meet carbon-reduction targets it is also planning to exit coal power by 2038 at the latest, and, if possible by 2035. The buildup of renewable energy sources, which accelerated massively at the start of the 2010s, has slowed down in recent years.
With the exit dates set, and Germany having incrementally liberalised its energy market since the late 1990s, the economy grew increasingly reliant on Russian gas, which was not only cheap but also satisfied a political desire in some German political circles for knitting closer diplomatic ties with Moscow.
Couldn’t Germany just reactivate its nuclear power plants?
The three remaining power stations – two in the south and one in the north – make up only 5% of Germany’s electricity mix. The government says expanding their lifespan would offer little reward and come attached with considerable risk. The plants, said Habeck recently, were set up now so their fuel rods would be burnt up by the end of the year. To extend them, they would need to go into a saver mode that would also produce less energy. Extending them for a few years rather than months would require purchasing new fuel rods and safety inspections that are already two years overdue. Not carrying out such inspections, Habeck warned, would turn Germany’s nuclear plants into prime targets for potential cyber-attacks.
Nuclear industry spokespeople, however, say the safety inspections could be carried out without having to wind down the plants in the meantime. Pro-nuclear voices also point out that Germany’s electricity needs will grow over the coming years as the country switches to renewable sources of energy: the thinktank Agora Energiewende expects Germany to double its electricity requirements to 1,000 terawatt hours by 2045.
Habeck, a Green party politician, said he would assess the situation around nuclear energy “without taboos”, but a U-turn on the issue harbours potential for an enormous loss of face for the environmental party, which grew out of the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s.
What about the rest of Europe?
Russia accounted for about two-fifths of the EU’s gas needs before the start of the war in Ukraine.
The EU committed in March to reducing gas imports from Russia by two-thirds within a year, but has failed to establish a consensus on an outright import ban amid fears of economic knock-on effects in several states.
