The killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the veteran leader of Hezbollah, on Friday marks a turning point in the conflict in the Middle East. Both Nasrallah and the organisation he led were hardened by successive decades of conflict within Lebanon, against Israel and, latterly, in Syria. Both were powerful political and social forces with very significant regional and local influence.
Through more than three decades in charge of Hezbollah, Nasrallah built up a fervent personal following, steering the Shia Muslim movement through a number of transitions, balancing the demands of its military role with those of its expansive social welfare systems, building a political wing and negotiating the various crises that broke across the region. He earned adulation from supporters and bitter personal enmity from foes.
Nasrallah was born in about 1960, the son of a Shia vegetable seller in a poor, mixed neighbourhood of Beirut. Despite their growing numbers, Lebanon’s Shia people had long been marginalised politically and economically. Nasrallah was inspired by the new Islamist ideologies spreading across the Middle East and by a moderate Iranian-born cleric, Musa al-Sadr, who sought to mobilise Lebanon’s Shia to win greater representation and more resources. He joined Amal, a Shia militia formed shortly before the brutal civil war that broke out in Lebanon in 1975.
Four years later, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seized power following the Iranian revolution. This seismic event sent a wave of energy coursing through Shia communities everywhere in the Middle East. Nasrallah had became close to Khomeini when studying in a seminary in Najaf, the Iraqi holy city, where the radical cleric had been exiled. In about 1981, like many other young recruits, Nasrallah left Amal to seek more radical alternatives.
When Israel sent an army into Lebanon in 1982 in response to cross-border attacks by Palestinian militants, a coalition of Islamist groups was formed with Iranian sponsorship and direction. Nasrallah was an enthusiastic early recruit. Under the name “Islamic Jihad”, this coalition went on to launch massive suicide bombings against the invaders and then against US and French peacekeepers, killing hundreds. Three years later, the coalition had been melded by Iran into an organisation called Hezbollah, the party of God. In 1985, Hezbollah published its main manifesto, lambasting the US, the USSR and calling for the destruction of Israel.
A qualified Islamic scholar, effective public speaker and competent organiser, Nasrallah gained leadership experience during the long battle against Israeli troops and their local auxiliaries in the south of Lebanon. In 1992, he was chosen as the movement’s new secretary-general after Israel assassinated his predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi. Months later, Iran used Hezbollah networks and operatives to execute a massive bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina, killing 29.
In 2000, Israel’s humiliating and chaotic withdrawal from Lebanon’s south brought Hezbollah and Nasrallah acclaim in the Middle East and broader Islamic world, despite historic sectarian animosity between majority Sunnis Muslims and the minority Shia. The victory came at personal cost to Nasrallah: a son was killed in a clash with Israeli troops.
Six years later, Nasrallah led Hezbollah into a new confrontation with Israel, when he ordered an attack across the contested border that killed eight Israeli soldiers and captured two. This war was less conclusive, and Nasrallah turned his attention to a more political strategy, emphasising his movement’s Lebanese nationalist credentials and building a portfolio of businesses, many illicit. Any residual project of creating a Khomeini-style Islamic regime had long been shelved. Imposition of conservative codes in the swaths of Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah was, on the whole, lax.
Reconciling this new role with the demands of Iran, Hezbollah’s principal sponsor, was a complex task and Nasrallah only reluctantly agreed in 2013 to send thousands of his fighters into Syria at Tehran’s behest to bolster the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This helped tip the balance in the brutal civil war in the neighbouring country, but hurt Hezbollah at home. So too did Nasrallah’s fierce resistance to political reform in Lebanon.
There is no evidence that Nasrallah knew what Hamas had planned for 7 October, but he reacted to the bloody raids on Israel with what must have seemed fine judgment. Hezbollah did not launch a major offensive but began firing some of its vast stocks of rockets and missiles into Israel in a bid to maintain its “resistance” credentials. Nasrallah probably believed the conflict would be short and he could avoid further escalation. On both counts, he was fatally wrong.
The consequences of the killing of Nasrallah are hard to gauge. Pessimists will predict massive escalation, as Iran seeks to reassert its power and avenge the death of a leader who was one of its most important overseas assets. Optimists may argue that it has effectively removed a key player from the conflict, deterring Tehran and opening a way to some kind of diminution of, if not an end to, hostilities.
Finding any replacement will be very difficult for Hezbollah and Iran. Even without the elimination of key lieutenants by Israel over recent months, there is no one in the movement who has anywhere near Nasrallah’s regional stature, experience or influence. It is now clear that Israel is capable of gathering critical, timely intelligence from the very heart of Hezbollah, and of acting on it effectively. The life expectancy of any new secretary-general is likely to be extremely short.
