From Warren v. DeSantis, decided today by the Florida Supreme Court in an opinion written by Justice Canady (for more on the case, see this post):
On August 4, 2022, Governor Ron DeSantis issued Executive Order 22-176 suspending Petitioner Andrew H. Warren, the elected State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, on the grounds of "neglect of duty" and "incompetence." More than six months later, Petitioner filed a petition in this Court arguing that the Governor lacked authority to issue the Executive Order and requesting the issuance of a writ of quo warranto directed to the Governor and alternatively seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the Governor to reinstate him…. We agree with the Governor that the petition should be denied on the ground of unreasonable delay.
Within two weeks of his suspension, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court seeking, among other things, a writ of quo warranto on the ground that the suspension order was facially insufficient under Florida law. Quite predictably, the federal district court promptly dismissed that state-law claim after concluding that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution barred that claim from being brought in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (1984). Petitioner then waited almost five months before finally petitioning this Court and requesting our "expeditious review" of his state-law claim. Petitioner offers no explanation for the delay. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the time for our review has passed….
Article IV, section 7 of the Florida Constitution grants "the governor" the power to "suspend from office any state officer not subject to impeachment" and enumerates the grounds for suspension, including "neglect of duty" and "incompetence." Art. IV, § 7(a), Fla. Const. A suspension is done "[b]y executive order stating the grounds and filed with the custodian of state records." Article IV, section 7 then grants "[t]he senate" the power to, "in proceedings prescribed by law, remove from office or reinstate the suspended official."
Although the text of article IV, section 7 does not attribute any role to the courts in suspension matters, our precedents recognize a narrow judicial role in reviewing the face of a suspension order to determine if it satisfies the constitutional requirement of " 'stating the grounds' of the officer's suspension." That is a "limited" role that entails no more than "determining whether the executive order, on its face, sets forth allegations of fact relating to one of the constitutionally enumerated grounds of suspension." The allegations need only "bear some reasonable relation to the charge made against the officer." The "some reasonable relation" standard is "a low threshold" to satisfy, and the executive order need only satisfy it "on the whole."
