From Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong's Dec. 26 opinion in Thomson v. Persistence Technologies BVI PTE Ltd.; Thomson is apparently a "[b]illionaire publishing heiress" and part owner of Thomson Reuters, and the lawsuit claims over $24+M in damages, related to Thomson's investment in the XPRT altcoin:
Thomson alleges, in summary, that Richardson and other Defendants conspired to target Thomson and induce Thomson to invest in a certain cryptocurrency, and made a series of false statements to both Thomson and the public in furtherance of this. Richardson alleges in turn, via her counterclaims, that she and Thomson were friends, that Thomson demanded that Richardson invest in cryptocurrency on Thomson's behalf, that Thomson made rude statements to Richardson and called on Richardson at all hours with requests, and that Thomson eventually made defamatory statements about Richardson….
An order prohibiting a party from harassing another party is appropriate in at least some circumstances. Courts in this district and elsewhere have recognized that it may be permissible and necessary to enjoin a litigant from harassing another party. See, e.g., Beyond Blond Prods., LLC v. Heldman (C.D. Cal. 2022) (issuing an injunction against "threatening or harassing emails" and other conduct); United Artists Corp. v. United Artist Studios LLC (C.D. Cal. 2019) (issuing an injunction against certain conduct that "constitute[s] harassment and would be performed with the intention of intimidation"); see also Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding a portion of the district court's injunction prohibiting Defendant "from threatening or harassing" plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel, or other associated individuals). These courts generally recognize that injunctions against harassing conduct are, to some extent, in tension with the First Amendment's protections on free speech, but nevertheless hold that such injunctions are constitutional in some circumstances, as "courts have rejected arguments that the First Amendment allows a person to make harassing or threatening communications." Beyond Blond; see also United Artists ("even under the First Amendment, courts do have the power to enjoin harassing communication"); Test Masters ("Courts have made a distinction between communication and harassment … The difference is one between free speech and conduct that may be proscribed.").
Although these opinions are not binding, the Court is aware of no precedent pointing the other way on the general question of whether orders of the nature Thomson requested are at times permissible. The Court finds that if Thomson could show sufficient harassment, then it would be appropriate for the Court to grant the Application. But given the Ninth Circuit's guidance cautioning courts regarding injunctions that control litigants' behavior, and given the First Amendment concerns that such injunctions implicate, the Court will not grant such an injunction absent a strong showing.
