The July 7 meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meet in Bali, served as a reminder of the curious state of affairs in India’s relations with China. That the two Ministers had their second meeting in four months — Mr. Wang was in New Delhi in March — indicates both sides see value in continued engagement and remain dissatisfied with the current low level of relations. The problem, however, is that the commonalities appear to end there. Mr. Jaishankar reiterated India’s stand, conveyed to China on numerous occasions since the start of the LAC tensions in 2020, that normalcy would not be possible without a resolution of the boundary crisis and full disengagement from all friction areas. The MEA said the External Affairs Minister called for an early resolution of all outstanding issues, and reiterated the need to sustain the momentum to complete disengagement from all the remaining areas.
It is, however, clear that Beijing does not appear to share that view. On the contrary, recent actions suggest Beijing has no desire to resolve the row immediately, which India reasonably sees as a prerequisite for restoring normalcy in relations. Indeed, the official Chinese readout of the Bali talks failed to make a single mention of the LAC crisis, suggesting it is not a priority for Beijing. Instead, it emphasised Beijing’s current interest in engaging with India on multilateral groupings such as BRICS and the SCO, which China and Russia see as valuable platforms to counter the West, and to promote, as Mr. Wang put it, “a fairer international order”. The Chinese military, meanwhile, has dragged its feet in responding with dates for the 16th round of military talks, marking the longest pause since the talks began. At the last round, that was held as long as four months ago on March 11, both sides failed to achieve a breakthrough to disengage at Patrolling Point 15 in Hot Springs. Depsang and Demchok also remain unresolved. There is little expectation in New Delhi for an imminent breakthrough, particularly with domestic politics in China on edge before the Party Congress this fall when Xi Jinping will begin a third term and the military leadership will also see sweeping changes. The Chinese Foreign Minister, in Bali, said both countries “should push for the early return of bilateral relations to the right track”. That aspiration, however, contrasts sharply with Beijing’s continued unwillingness to restore the status quo of April 2020. The apparent goal appears to be aimed at testing India’s resolve to sustain its forward deployments and to force New Delhi to accept a new normal at the LAC. Until that changes, the stalemate along the borders, and in the relationship, is likely to endure.
