The story so far: On May 5, five soldiers were killed and another was injured in a gunfight with militants in the Rajouri-Poonch sector of Jammu division. According to the Army, the gunfight broke out after an explosive device was triggered when a search team established contact with a group of terrorists hiding in a cave in the Kandi forests, killing two soldiers. On April 26, an IED (improvised explosive device) killed 10 security personnel of the District Reserve Guard in Chattisgarh’s Dantewada area. The jawans were out on an anti-Maoist mission when they were ambushed.
Were any tactical mistakes made?
The quintessential dilemma for security forces is that they are dealing with an enemy who is faceless, unidentifiable and hidden among the people. Wedded to upholding the law of the land and protecting its people, security personnel can open fire only in self-defence, not on apprehension. Militants, whether they are the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir or the Maoists in central India, have the ‘first mover advantage’, on triggering a landmine or an IED on a mobile Army vehicle or opening burst fire with an AK- 47 on a static CRPF sentry post.
