Labour’s 2024 election win came despite a collapse in support among Muslim voters – a group which traditionally has been highly loyal.
Labour’s share of the Muslim vote fell from 80% in 2019 to just over 60% in 2024. Anger over the party’s position on the conflict in Gaza led many Muslim voters to switch to independent candidates. Of the seven seats that Labour lost, five have Muslim populations of 25% or more.
Labour needs to know whether these defections represent a long-term threat that could cost future elections. That, in turn, requires an understanding of why, for most of the post-war period, the vast majority of ethnic minority voters have supported Labour.
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From June to September 2023, Focaldata surveyed 6,384 white voters and 4,780 ethnic minority voters, including 2,249 of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean and African descent. A colleague and I at UK in a Changing Europe, along with Focaldata, have used this data to analyse the myth and reality of ethnic minority support for Labour.
There has, for a start, long been a belief that the relative deprivation of Britain’s ethnic minorities compared to white voters makes them more leftwing on socioeconomic issues.
There is strong evidence that the most economically deprived minority voters are the most likely to choose Labour. Among voters of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean and African descent who earn less than £25,000, there is 93% likelihood that they will support Labour.
These ethnic minorities are substantially more likely – by 33 percentage points – than low-income white voters to have leftwing economic preferences. The association between socioeconomic status and vote choice among white voters is much weaker. Low income white voters only have a likelihood of 42% of supporting Labour.
As voters from these minority groups become more affluent, they are significantly less likely to vote Labour. Support for Labour remains steady for white voters across income levels.
Another long-held belief has been that ethnic minorities perceive parties on the left as more committed to tackling racial discrimination and are therefore more inclined to vote for them. But those in our 2023 sample who said that they would vote Labour in the next election did not appear to be primarily motivated by concerns about racial discrimination.
Only 7% of them pointed to racism and discrimination as the most important issues when deciding to vote. Their priorities were the NHS, economic growth and poverty and inequality – the same priorities as white Labour voters.
This doesn’t mean ethnic minorities feel racial discrimination isn’t a problem. Two-thirds of survey respondents agreed that their ethnic background had made it difficult to get ahead. However, this did not have a significant effect on their vote choice. Those who strongly agreed on this point were no more likely to vote for Labour than those who strongly disagreed.
Past work also suggests minority groups vote with a “linked fate” in mind. They view their individual interests as inseparable from their community, which drives them to vote cohesively for the same party. A landmark 2013 study found that high levels of Labour partisanship among ethnic minorities were better explained by group norms and sentiments than individual attitudes and policy preferences.
To test whether this holds true more than a decade later, we presented respondents with a list of ways they might describe themselves (British, English, a member of a religious community, a member of an ethnic group, and so on). We asked them to choose the three descriptors they most identified with and to rank them in priority order.
If voters of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean and African descent identified as being a member of an ethnic group or part of a religious community as the first or second most important part of their identity, they were classified as strong ethnic or religious identifiers. Those who did the opposite were were categorised as weak ethnic or religious identifiers.
We only found a meaningful difference in the likelihood of voting for Labour between strong and weak identifiers at the low income category. However, the decline in the probability of voting for Labour when comparing low and high-income voters is much smaller among strong identifiers than among weak identifiers.
This suggests that personal economic interests are a stronger influence for people who are less likely to have a sense of a linked fate with their community. It’s possible that voters who have a strong sense of group attachment are more likely to base their vote choice on which party they believe will pursue policies that are in the interests of others in their group.
In the case of individuals in these ethnic minority groups, almost half of whom are categorised as low income, that would mean voting Labour.
Because it came from summer 2023, the data in this analysis was based on a survey which largely predates anger over Labour’s response on Gaza and the very real impact that had on people’s decisions in 2024. The large-scale defection of Muslim voters in 2024 can be understood as a particular type of “linked fate” which was a response to an exceptional situation.
However, one of the virtues of the timing of our survey was that it has allowed us to assess the structural explanations of voting behaviour of ethnic minorities that characterise electoral competition during “normal times”.
Our analysis has found weak or mixed evidence for two of the main theories – racial discrimination and the linked fate thesis – often used to explain the high levels of support for left-leaning parties among ethnic minorities. Although we found strong support for the relative deprivation thesis, the results from 2024 show that Labour’s stronghold over low-income ethnic minorities can’t be taken for granted.
In a closer election, the support of these voters, particularly in the 40 constituencies where Muslim voters make up a sizeable share of the population, could be crucial.
Given the particularly strong relationship between low income and support for Labour among certain ethnic minority groups, delivering on economic growth and improving public services will have to be part of Labour’s strategy. However, by itself, it is unlikely to enough.
Although our findings suggest linked fate and racial discrimination aren’t generally significant drivers of vote choice, the 2024 election shows that sudden events can substantially heighten the salience of identity and community for some voters. If Labour is to retain the support of these communities, it will need to be more responsive to their concerns over issues such as Gaza and Islamophobia.
Zain Mohyuddin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
