In any respectable democratic system, a winning poll candidate who secured an overall majority of electoral support would take office with the earliest effect. Not in Thailand. When Chadchart Sittipunt trounced 29 rivals by gathering 1.38 million or 51% of the votes cast in Bangkok's gubernatorial election on May 22, the capital's electorate had to hold their breath in suspense to see whether and when the Election Commission (EC) would validate his runaway victory.
The EC's assertion of authority after the recent Bangkok vote reflects a broader pattern of politically motivated regulation results in possible favour of one side over the other. Working hand in glove with the Constitutional Court and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the EC has decided electoral outcomes regardless of voters' preferences, having dissolved major political parties and banned representatives. It's worth mentioning that many of them stood on the opposing side of the conservative-military regime over the past 15 years.
The most recent political parties the EC disbanded were the Future Forward Party in February 2020 and Thai Raksa Chart a year earlier. The former came in third with 6.3 million votes in the March 2019 general election, whereas the latter was on course to fare well in the same poll before it was ejected. The seven-member EC, the Constitutional Court and the NACC have formed a tag team to shave numbers at margins after the polls in order to come up with their preferred post-election government. If that was not enough, outright dissolutions of parties were an option with a military takeover as the last resort.
This has happened time and again as seen with the military coup in September 2006, the dissolution of the largest parties in May 2007 and December 2008, another putsch in 2014, more party dismantlement in 2019-2020, and the rewriting of constitutions in 2007 and 2017.
This is how and why Thailand has a rickety and abysmal coalition government under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, the lead coup-maker from eight years ago. It is also how Jarungwit Pumma can transition conveniently from being the EC's secretary-general to a senator within weeks earlier this year, in what looked like a revolving door between these two coup-spawned bodies.
Beyond these three poll-related agencies, the offices of the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, and the Anti-Money Laundering Office -- supervised mostly by appointees from the two coup eras -- complement this conservative-military regulatory framework. Accordingly, elections are like a nomination process whereby voter preferences are taken into account but final arbiters get to decide who takes office. And it works this way.
Typically, all sorts of post-poll complaints are practically encouraged and all are accepted by the EC. These complaints of irregularities then become de facto buttons the EC can press.
Sometimes, the NACC can be the channel for complaints, working in tandem with the Constitutional Court. The burden of proof falls on the accused representatives and parties, with arbitrary powers reserved and exercised by these agencies, which went into overdrive prior to the 2006 and 2014 coups but have stayed rather muted since the takeovers by the military and pro-military parties.
The results have been conspicuous and hard to deny. Parties and elected representatives from the anti-military side have been banned in one way or another, while the pro-military factions have proved immune and able to take office at will. In fact, the EC's assertion of authority along with that of the NACC and the Constitutional Court, has deeper roots dating back to April 2006, when judicial assertiveness -- sometimes called "judicialisation" -- in Thai politics began in earnest. Thailand has been politically rocky and unstable ever since.
In Mr Chadchart's case, the complaints came from Srisuwan Janya, a firebrand activist whose motives are suspect in the eyes of many. He lodged a complaint with the EC claiming that the new Bangkok governor had campaigned using vinyl posters which could be reused, thereby representing a transactional promise to voters and contravening an election law. Another charge from an unclear source suggested that Mr Chadchart insulted bureaucrats by indicating that they needed to shape up.
To his credit, Mr Chadchart played it cool. His answer to the mudslinging, smear campaigns and potential bullying from higher authorities has been to concentrate on working for the good of Bangkokians. His is an uphill task, as Bangkok mirrors broader Thailand in having stagnated and decayed from poor and incompetent governance for nearly two decades. The new governor will also have his work cut out for being so popular with the public.
The final arbiters of Thai elections have taken popularly elected representatives and political parties to task in the recent past. There is no reason why they will not do the same to Mr Chadchart. Their preferred version of Thailand envisions a fractious party system with mediocre governance and an unstable government. It is easier for institutions like the military and the bureaucracy to keep power when alternative sources of popular legitimacy are weakened.
Mr Chadchart can only hope that being in charge of the capital rather than the whole country will minimise the risks he poses to supporters of the conservative-military regime. If Thailand were a ship, these elites seem not to care if it sinks, as long as they can stay on top and go down last. Promoting a forward-moving vessel that can benefit all is detrimental to conservative elite interests because of inherent power shifts and the chances of the strata down below rising up to have their say.
When the time comes, politicised poll-regulating agencies need to be revamped. They were set up with good intentions in the reform-driven 1997 constitution but have been distorted and subverted since. Their appointment processes must be independent and impartial. These election-related agencies should play a role of coordination and facilitation. At most, they can collectively be a referee to ensure fair play, but they should not be the judge that overrides and supersedes the people's electoral choices.
