As you read this, the young men and women of Ukraine’s newly trained and equipped brigades are preparing for their spring – more likely summer offensive operations. Despite huge pressure from their allies to demonstrate that the equipment and ammunition that have been committed can be converted into serious territorial gains, Ukrainian officials are at pains to assert that this coming campaign is unlikely to be decisive. Instead, gains are more likely to be slow and incremental than sweeping and extensive.
Over the past year Ukraine has been forced to fight a war of attrition at truly punishing cost. Wars of attrition such as this are never quick, and it is naive to believe that it will be over soon. There is no room for the idea that “it will all be over by Christmas”; it won’t. And probably not the Christmas afterwards either. Sustaining this effort into the medium- (one to three years) and long-term ( two to 10 years) will require a prodigious industrial effort, and a step-change in the supply of military equipment, far greater than what we have already seen. Whatever the situation is at the end of this summer’s series of operations, Russia is not going away. The threat from the east will persist.
Speaking to a military and diplomatic delegation I attended in Kyiv earlier this month, one senior Ukrainian military official was asked what his message in a single term would be; he replied: “Sustainability.” They are thinking about how to keep their political and military situation stable on a much longer timescale. At the political level, Ukraine is pinning its hopes on a plan for eventual Nato membership. Nato nations will deal with how (or if) this is done at the forthcoming Vilnius summit in July.
On the military front, the nature and scale of western assistance is completely insufficient to sustain Ukrainian efforts to retake their land. The reality is that the astonishing successes of Ukraine’s defence forces have been based on a largely ex-Soviet inventory. Nato equipment has augmented, but not displaced, this equipment. As the inexorable power of attrition takes effect on their existing kit, the requirement for new and better armaments in large quantities will increase.
Let’s take tanks as an indicator as to how far short the west is falling. So far, the US and allied countries have pledged about 140 reasonably modern western-made vehicles. Germany says it has delivered 18 Leopard 2s (rumours in Kyiv indicate that about half of them are not ready for combat). Earlier this week, more (albeit older – Leopard 1) models were promised as part of an increased German commitment. The UK has donated 10% of its tank force in the form of 14 Challenger 2 tanks. So far, so good. The US has promised 31 Abrams tanks; Denmark and the Netherlands have jointly pledged 14; and various other countries (Spain, Poland, Canada, Norway) are promising a few dozen more, some of which have been delivered. However, the 31 US Abrams are not due until the autumn and the Dutch and Danish models will arrive in early 2024.
To put this into context, last September the commander of the Ukrainian forces, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, asked for at least 300 new western tanks for the forthcoming campaign alone. Zaluzhnyi has received fewer than 100 relatively modern tanks and a slightly larger number of armoured fighting vehicles.
Nato countries are suffering from stresses on their supplies of equipment and ammunition – particularly artillery shells – in the short term. Yet the US alone has more than 2,000 M1A2 Abrams tanks in storage, with thousands more artillery systems and armoured fighting vehicles. There are no military reasons for this equipment not to be released to Ukraine. Not a single one of these platforms would be of any use in a conflict with China, the current and likely future preoccupation of the US defence establishment. If they don’t go to Ukraine, they will never be used.
As matters stand, the supply of weapons and ammunition is carried out in a rather ad – hoc fashion through a process known as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. This amounts to a monthly meeting at Ramstein air base in Germany where Ukraine’s needs are matched with the declared resources of the 54-nation group. At the last meeting, there was discussion (for 90 minutes) on developing a more sustainable and long-term approach. There was even mention of a coherent development of an industrial strategy, which both world wars demonstrated was essential to victory.
If we are genuinely interested in helping Ukraine to succeed in its basic objectives – which sometimes may seem in doubt – we need to get serious about replacing the current piecemeal system of drip-feed donations with a large-scale systematic resupply and re-equipment. And the planning needs to begin now. The aim must be to help Ukraine create armed forces able to integrate properly with its western allies and defend itself beyond the “spring offensive”. The reward for success will be a new, invigorated and dynamic component of our polity.
• Frank Ledwidge is a barrister and former military officer who has served in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan
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