Russian President Vladimir Putin, largely confined to the Kremlin due to western restrictions, on December 6 dramatically set out on whirlwind tours to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in one day. The next day, he received Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow. And on December 8, Mr. Putin announced that he would be standing for elections in 2024, affirming that he would be leading Russia at least up to 2030 and possibly beyond.
Talks in the Gulf
Mr. Putin’s visit to the Gulf was marked by considerable pomp on the part of the hosts and affirmations of mutual goodwill and camaraderie. The UAE ruler, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, spoke of the “importance of strengthening dialogue and cooperation”, while Mr. Putin told his Saudi host that “nothing can prevent the development of our friendly relations”.
A Russian spokesman described the talks in the Gulf capitals as “a concentrated shot”. The agenda was self-evident: continued cooperation among “OPEC +” members on oil policy; exchange of views on the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts; increasing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians trapped in Gaza; and enhancing bilateral-political-economic ties. Cooperation among “OPEC +” countries led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, for instance, has ensured that the agreed production cuts are adhered to and oil prices, much to the U.S.’s chagrin, remain at levels that serve the producers’ interests.
Despite their long-standing alliance with the U.S., both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have in recent years been asserting “strategic autonomy” and have prioritised expanding ties with China and Russia. The UAE is now Russia’s most important trade partner in the Gulf. Neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia have supported the U.S.-sponsored sanctions on Russia or criticised the latter for the Ukraine war.
In fact, thousands of Russians have set up alternative homes, businesses, and investments in the UAE. Cooperation is thriving between the two countries in the technology sector. As a result, the West has placed the UAE under scrutiny to ensure that restrictions on export of hi-tech products to Russia are complied with. Russia has also conveyed it is standing by to support Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme at the opportune moment.
Iran and Russia, as targets of increasingly onerous western sanctions, challenge the West’s global strategic leadership and seek the realisation of a multipolar world order. Flowing from this, they have built substantial bilateral relations in the energy and military areas: in March this year, the Russian, Chinese and Iranian navies carried out joint exercises in the Gulf of Oman. In November, it was reported that Iran would get Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft from Russia, as also training aircraft and attack helicopters. Iran has boosted Russia’s military prowess in Ukraine with supplies of drones, ammunition and body armour.
During Mr. Raisi’s visit to Moscow, the two sides had “extremely intensive discussions” covering the Gaza war, Ukraine, and oil prices. Mr. Putin and Mr. Raisi called for an immediate end to Israel’s “genocide and crimes against humanity” which, they said, was backed by the U.S. and western powers.
Putin’s agenda
Was there something more to Mr. Putin’s recent engagements with the major Gulf states? The Reuters correspondents in Moscow have noted that “mystery still surrounds the Kremlin chief’s hastily arranged trip” to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, and wondered “what issue was so important for Putin to make a rare overseas trip”. The most obvious response is that the trip itself was a message – Mr. Putin was signalling that Russia was not isolated and that it had some close friends, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, that, till recently, had been the U.S.’s closest allies in the region.
But beyond this, Mr. Putin would have had a more ambitious agenda. First, on the basis of Russia’s close ties with Iran, he would have told the UAE and the Kingdom that the Gaza war will not spread across the region, conveying the assurance that Iran will restrain the Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen in the interests of regional stability.
Second, Mr. Putin would have sought a deeper strategic and political alignment between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran, presenting Russia and China as guarantors of regional peace. In this context, Mr. Putin would have recognised China as the lynchpin in regional politics and, given Russia and China’s close alignment on global security issues, projected Russia as complementing China’s diplomatic role in the region.
Third, Mr. Putin would have sought the support of his Gulf interlocutors to the consolidation of this regional alignment so that, in the post-Gaza war scenario, they would act unitedly with Russia and China in managing regional political and diplomatic challenges, while excluding the U.S. from this arrangement. This should resonate well with most regional states as, with its unconditional support for Israel, the U.S. has excluded itself as a credible player in West Asia.
Above all, Mr. Putin would have assured his Gulf interlocutors that there would be continuity in Russia’s regional approach, by giving them advance notice that he will be seeking re-election in March 2024 and lead Russia at least till the end of this decade.
Mr. Putin’s recent interactions with Gulf leaders have brought Russia into the mainstream of West Asian affairs and affirmed that the Sino-Russian alliance will challenge U.S. hegemony and seek to redefine the regional political order.
