Britain’s refresh of its defence and foreign policy may mark the moment when the UK sobers up about its place in a world that it now describes as “defined by danger, disorder and division”, and increasingly tilting to authoritarianism.
Gone is the optimistic Global Britain bombast of the Boris Johnson era, set out in the original integrated review only two years ago. That version championed the UK as “a beacon of democratic sovereignty” and one of the most influential countries in the world, and hailed its ability to draw on its post-Brexit status to “do things differently, economically and politically”.
By contrast, the reworked review is a vision of a colder, darker and more hostile world where the interests of the west do not necessarily triumph. There is no shortage of patriotism, but warnings and forebodings fill every page:
“What has changed is that our collective security now is intrinsically linked to the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine.”
“The transition into a multipolar, fragmented and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated. We are now in a period of heightened risk and volatility that is likely to last beyond the 2030s.”
“A growing convergence of authoritarian states are challenging the basic conditions for an open, stable and peaceful international order, working together to undermine the international system or remake it in their image.”
But the scale of these intensifying threats has only led to a modest increase in defence spending of £5bn over two years, mainly related to the Aukus nuclear submarine deal. There has been, however, a re-evaluation of the importance of alliances and partnerships to the UK. The emphasis now is less on the benefits of Britain going it alone, and more on the necessity for democracies to “out cooperate” the autocracies. Rishi Sunak’s visit to the US to mark the next stage of Aukus symbolises the importance of alliances.
Yet the passages in the refreshed review on Europe are also striking. Where the Johnson review made some grudging references to future bilateral relations with Germany, France and Italy, Sunak’s version says: “Our ambition is to build even stronger relationships with our European allies and partners based on values, reciprocity and cooperation across our shared interests. This includes the EU, with which we seek to work closely in areas of mutual benefit, as we have done in response to Ukraine.” Indeed the effect of Russia’s invasion has been to make UK ties in Europe stronger than for decades, it says.
The paper promises new forms of cooperation on issues of shared interest. It does not go as far as Labour’s call for a security pact with Europe, but it amounts to a course correction.
The domestic practical proposals, including taking spending on defence to 2.25% of GDP, fill gaps or correct errors. There is an acknowledgment of soft power, for instance giving the BBC World Service £20m to avoid cuts to the BBC Arabic service. On the principle of know your enemy – the philosophy enunciated by Sir Percy Cradock, Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser – more diplomats will be employed that can interpret China.
The importance of sanctions to modern foreign policy is accepted through a sanctions enforcement and evasion body. The conflict, security and stability fund, aimed at fragile states, is buried, replaced by a body with a greater domestic security agenda. An M15 one-stop shop called the National Protective Security Authority will advise businesses of the risks of autocracies entering their supply chain.
Many of these policies look to have the imprimatur of the foreign affairs select committee whose previous chair, Tom Tugendhat, is now security minister.
There is also an implicit, but not explicit, admission that the merger of the international development department and the Foreign Office is a problem with measures including a new governance structure to improve oversight of all aid spending.
However, if the 2023 refreshed review is clear about the threat posed by the autocrats, it is less clear on how to reduce their growing appeal. The 2021 review more than once said Britain would be a force for good in the world by putting human rights at its heart of its appeal.
But the 2023 version says: “Today’s international system cannot simply be reduced to ‘democracy versus autocracy’, or divided into binary, cold war-style blocs.” It explains “an expanding group of ‘middle-ground powers’ are of growing importance to UK interests as well as global affairs more generally, and do not want to be drawn into zero-sum competition any more than the UK does”.
The UK, it concludes, needs to work with these countries to protect a shared interest in an open and stable international order, but accepts that we may not share all of the same values and national interests. This is as much about stability as democracy.
This ambiguity about values is reflected in the UK approach to China. Yes, the review addresses the threat to Taiwan for the first time, but overall it is reluctant to get off the fence. The refresh treats China as a trading partner and potential partner to slow climate change, on the one hand, at the same time warning it is “an epoch-defining challenge to the UK type of international order, both in terms of security and values”.
That will disappoint many MPs. Alicia Kearns, the current chair of the foreign affairs select committee, reflected that frustration, arguing the challenge from China is not just a threat to an economic order but to the whole values system of the west. But with the Ukraine issue and its fallout so urgent, perhaps this is a conclusion the government dare not yet fully embrace.
