An excerpt from the 12K+-word opinion by Judge Gerard McHugh (E.D. Pa.) yesterday in Landau v. Corp. of Haverford College (for more, read the whole opinion, and I've also posted separately about the court's allowing the breach of contract claim to go forward, though only for nominal damages):
As recognized in my first opinion in this action [see here -EV], dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, antisemitism is a serious problem. Where antisemitism results in a deprivation of educational opportunities, federal law provides a remedy. And where the record supports it, some federal courts have permitted parties to proceed with such claims.
Here, without minimizing to any degree the extent to which Jewish students in the tumult of the current global and political climate might feel profound discomfort, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint still struggles to meet the threshold of what is required to state a Title VI claim under federal law. While Plaintiffs paint a picture of a stressful campus climate for Jewish students, many of the incidents pled fall within the protection of the First Amendment.
In other instances where College officials appear vulnerable to criticism, their response to the situation cannot be deemed deliberate indifference…. I will therefore grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Title VI claim ….
[1.] Public, Political Speech is Protected by the First Amendment.
Higher education institutions are prototypical marketplaces of ideas. College campuses have served as historical sites of foment and the breeding grounds for progress. In periods of social unrest, emblematic of the American story, "intellectual advancement has traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as a diversity of views ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because they are popular." Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. (9th Cir. 2010).
A court enforcing a federal statute must do so in a way that comports with the Constitution. Although both important, Title VI and the First Amendment are naturally in tension. "A disparaging comment directed at an individual's sex, race, or some other personal characteristic has the potential to create a 'hostile environment'—and thus comes within the ambit of anti- discrimination laws—precisely because of its sensitive subject matter and because of the odious viewpoint it expresses." Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist. (3d Cir. 2001). But "speech on matters of 'public concern'—expression that 'can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community'—is entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment' and generally 'cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arousing contempt.'" Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y. 2025). However noble the objective of nondiscrimination, institutions cannot be threatened with civil liability for declining to censor First Amendment protected speech.
